2005 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Cryptanalysis of PASS II and MiniPass
Authors : Bok-Min Goi, Jintai Ding, M. U. Siddiqi
Published in: Information and Communications Security
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.
Select sections of text to find matching patents with Artificial Intelligence. powered by
Select sections of text to find additional relevant content using AI-assisted search. powered by
In ACISP ’00, Wu
et al.
proposed attacks to break the Polynomial Authentication and Signature Scheme (PASS), in particular, they are able to generate valid authentication transcripts and digital signatures without knowing the private key and any previous transcripts/ signatures. They showed that PASS can be broken with around 2
38.3
trials. In this paper, we analyze the security of the improved versions of PASS; viz. PASS II and MiniPASS, and extend the Wu
et al.
’s attacks to PASS II and MiniPASS to break them. Furthermore, we discuss why and how these schemes are broken from the view point of the structure of cryptosystems and point out the fundamental weakness behind.