Cyborgs and the Interactive Self: An Abstract

In what ways do individuals exercise their morphological freedom to become cyborgs? Does becoming more machine-like enrich or diminish their identities as humans? In pursuing answers to these research questions, I relied on an existential-phenomenological framework (Sartre 1976) and a three-year qualitative study of near-field communication (NFC) microchip consumers that resulted in a new conceptualization: The Interactive Self. Differently from the extended self (Belk 1988) that is composed of everything humans can call theirs (James 1890), the interactive self is nurtured by cyborgs’ experiential and embodied sense of ownership and a sense of agency for their actions (Gallagher 2013).

Drawing on Transhumanism (Sorgner 2020), cyborg anthropology (Hables-Gray et al. 2020), and theories of the self (Gallagher 2013), the concept has three conceptual dimensions: Firstly, the Identity-Enabler Object is an object (e.g., an NFC microchip) that has the power to change the human ontological status to that of fledgling cyborgs. Secondly, the iMine Boundarylessness comprises the physical, symbolic, and digital boundaries that are crossed or blurred, allowing for the simultaneous process of extension & incorporation into the self. Finally, the third conceptual dimension is the Data Meshwork, which is a bundle of data that flows through the cyborgs’ internal (e.g., an NFC microchip) and external digital organs (e.g., a smartphone).

This study contributes, firstly, to the understanding of work on identity projects in the transhumanist era. Since Belk’s (1988) seminal contribution, consumer researchers directly or indirectly draw on the notion that “knowingly or unknowingly, intentionally or unintentionally, we regard our possessions as parts of ourselves” (Belk 1988, 139). However, from the Interactive Self perspective, this premise does not fully encompass the cyborg ontology since there is no point in having an implanted microchip and not doing anything with it (i.e., interacting to exchange data). Still further, from the identity project perspective, I also introduce the simultaneous processes of extension & incorporation into the self, as recently suggested (e.g., Connell and Schau 2013). The third theoretical implication of this research relates to technology consumption studies, which thus far are essentially about what consumers can or cannot do with technology. However, when technology changes our ontological framing of ourselves as human beings, we must change our view of technology as well (Belk 2020; Schmitt 2020). Cyborgs do not use technology; they are technology. In this sense, my findings challenge prior consumer and marketing theories and research in which technology is portrayed as a purely instrumental means to an end.