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2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. Decline or Disaggregation of the Nation State, Dichotomy of Public and Private and Constitution and Constitutionalization

Author : Gerd Droesse

Published in: Membership in International Organizations

Publisher: T.M.C. Asser Press

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the decline, or, as Slaughter has shown, the disaggregation of the nation state. It highlights that it is possible, as a matter of principle, that forms of cooperation between regulatory agencies or other sub-state actors may also qualify for recognition as international organization based on progressive institutionalization. It is proposed that international organizations should transform themselves into fora and platforms that involve a great variety of stakeholders, including, inter alia, sub-state actors. The public-private distinction, “which stands out as one of the grand dichotomies of Western thought”, also increasingly became blurred, as the borderline between public and private international law is moving. Also, the way between international and non-governmental organizations has become a two-way road, and whether an entity should be classified as public or private, often is a policy decision and has nothing to do with the process of its creation or the representation arrangements in its governing bodies. Public authority may also be exercised by private-sector entities. The chapter also discusses the concept of constitution, the transformational potential of constituent agreements, and constitutionalization in relation to the membership structures and legal and policy frameworks of international organizations. While the constituent agreement establishing an international organization is frequently seen as a hybrid of treaty and constitution, an international organization does not need to be established by a treaty, nor does its constitution need to be adopted as a treaty. This is shown with several examples and it is substantiated that the constitution adopted by a plenary body of an international organization may have similar functions as a constitution adopted by a treaty; it may also be the basis for the external action of the organization. In addition, the chapter reviews the various implications of the discussion on constitutionalization and discusses the connotations of the “fragmentation, pluralization, verticalization (and privatization) of international law”, the role of the private sector, and implications of governance structures for the legitimacy of international organizations.

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Ku 2014, p. 38.

Clapham 2012.

Ibid., 2.

Claude 1971, p. 6.

Guzman 2013, p. 1002.

Pauwelyn et al. 2014, p. 733; see Pauwelyn et al. 2012.

Pauwelyn et al. 2014, p. 743.

Schachter 1997, pp. 7–23.

Slaughter 2004, p. 31.

Oeter 2009, p. 14.

Ibid., p. 18.

Klabbers 2011, p. 11.

Ibid., 12.

Ibid., 14.

Crawford 2013, para. 246.

A similar approach is also adopted by Charnovitz who also proposes to treat the IPU “as an NGO”. Charnovitz 1997, p. 187.

Milliken and Krause 2002, p. 757.

See Slaughter 2004, pp. 12–15.

Ibid., 13.

Abeyratne 2009, p. 542.

“For example, in many member States, aviation has numerous players in different areas such as customs and immigration, medical and quarantine, tourism, police, airports, and air navigation service providers. In most instances, these players do not act in accord, thus resulting in disharmony in the ultimate delivery of an efficient air transport product. ICAO’s Mission and Vision Statement exhorts ICAO to do just what is needed—to act as the global forum in the key areas of concern to international civil aviation through cooperation between its member States.” Abeyratne 2009, pp. 542–543.

Kotzur 2012, p. 590.

Weintraub 1997, p. 1.

Horwitz 1981‐1982, p. 1423.

Ibid., 1423–1424.

Ibid., 1427.

Jönsson 2013, p. 1.

Mills 2011, p. 477.

Ibid., 502.

Hansen 2010, pp. 1–129.

Jönsson 2013, p. 4.

The International Meteorological Organization, the predecessor of the WMO, was established in 1873 as the outcome of the Vienna Congress. It was conceived as a “governmental organization from which meteorologists in universities and private institutions were excluded”, but after the First Conference of Directors of Meteorological Services held in Munich in 1891, “it became a non-governmental body in which all meteorologists could be involved, whether in government service or not. And in this body, all meteorologists were welcome to work as technical experts.” See Sarukhanian and Walker.

The predecessor of the World Tourism Organization, the International Union for Official Tourism Organizations (IUOTO), was an association established under Swiss private law. See Vrancken 2006.

The Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC) was set up by the Federal Office of External Economic Affairs (OFAEE) of the Swiss Federal Administration, when within the framework of the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva, the Swiss government decided to finance a programme to strengthen the capacity of less-advantaged country missions in Geneva and neighboring capitals to lead a more effective trade diplomacy. See http://www.aitic.org.

Sagar 1999, pp. 127–147. On the privatization of Intelsat, see Katkin 2005, pp. 1–66.

As indicated by UNDP, “First, the private sector, the main driver of economic growth, represents the main source of employment creation in most countries and invests human capital and workforce development. Furthermore, it creates and delivers goods and services that can benefit society at all levels, develops and deploys new technologies and innovations, and has the capacity to levy scalable solutions through market-based approaches. It also represents the primary source of tax and other public revenues and directs social investment and philanthropic resources toward development. The private sector also has the ability to apply norms and standards in its operations that have impact on important UN areas such as labor rights, environment, human rights and corruption. At the same time, the private sector sometimes also contributes to a negative impact on development, including on the environment, social conditions, labor rights, corruption and conflict to name a few. UNDP should work with and influence private actors to improve their performance and reverse such negative impact.” UNDP (2012) Strategy for Working with the Private Sector, Section 2.4. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Partnerships/Private%20Sector/UNDP-Private-Sector-Strategy-final-draft-2012.pdf.

Statutes of the World Road Association, Article I.1, Oct. 2015. https://www.piarc.org/ressources/documents/Statutes-World-Road-Association/23758,Statutes-World-Road-Association-November-2015.pdf.

See Statutes of the World Road Association, Article IV. http://www.piarc.org/ressources/documents/Statutes-World-Road-Association/23758,Statutes-World-Road-Association-November-2015.pdf.

KAICIID. Who we are. About us. https://www.kaiciid.org/who-we-are.

KAICIID. Who we are. Governance. https://www.kaiciid.org/governance.

https://www.icann.org/en.

Hartwig 2010, p. 576.

Antonova, p. 3.

Weintraub 1997, p. 8.

Weintraub 1997, p. 2.

Noortmann 2011, p. xxxviii.

Charnovitz 2006, p. 351, citing J. J. Lador-Lederer.

Martha 2010, p. 143

Resolution 288 (X), Review of Consultative Arrangements with Non-Governmental Organizations. 27 Feb. 1950, para 8. Economic and Social Council Official Records. Tenth Session. 7 Feb. to 6 March 1950, 24–33, 25. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/753/48/IMG/NR075348.pdf?OpenElement.

Martha 2010, p. 140.

Ibid., 140.

Ibid., 150.

Ibid., 153.

Citing Martha 2010, p. 153.

Schermers and Blokker 2011, §35.

Statutes of the Inter-Parliamentarian Union (Adopted in 1976 and extensively revised in Oct. 1983, April 2003, and Oct. 2013). http://www.ipu.org/strct-e/statutes-new.htm.

IPU Statutes. http://www.ipu.org/strct-e/statutes-new.htm#1.

See Kissling 2011. Footnote 50 with further references.

I Brownlie and GS Goodwin-Gill, Statement 1, para 1.

Ibid., para 11.

Slaughter 2004, p. 18.

Ibid., 13.

See Majid 1996, p. 125.

Ibid.

Scott et al. 2011, p. 1.

Jönsson 2013, pp. 12–13.

Scott et al. 2011, p. 3.

Ibid.

Wirth 2009, p. 81.

Bartley 2011, p. 518. http://www7.tau.ac.il/ojs/index.php/til/article/view/784/742.

Strauss 2013, p. 502, ss. http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1681&context=wmborj.

Bellis 2010, p. 4.

Uruguay Round Agreement. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm.

The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm.

“Pascal Lamy cites ‘vital relationship’ between WTO and ISO”. ISO. 21 Sept. 2011. https://www.iso.org/news/2011/09/Ref1463.html.

ISO 2010, p. 3.

See the International Finance Corporation website. http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/home.

Governing Instrument of the Green Climate Fund, para 16.

Governing Instrument of the Green Climate Fund, para 41.

“What We Do: Private Sector Facility”. Green Climate Fund. http://www.greenclimate.fund/what-we-do/private-sector-facility.

“Sector Members, Associates and Academia”. ITU. http://www.itu.int//en/membership/Pages/sector-members.aspx.

See Peters 2013, pp. 1–57, with further references.

“Die Besonderheit der Gründungsdokumente ist dass sie einen neuen politischen Akteur und in der Regel ein neues Völkerrechtssubjekt (also als Zurechnungsobjekt völkerrechtlicher Rechte und Pflichten) konstituieren. Gleichzeitig wird damit eine eigene und möglicherweise eigenständige Rechtsordnung erzeugt. Diese Wirkungen werden als institutionelle und konstitutionelle bezeichnet.” Ibid., 6.

“Die Staaten warden mit dem Vertragsabschluss, der gleichzeitig eine Gründungsakt ist, von blossen Vertragsparteien zu Mitgliedern.” Ibid., 54.

G Gaja (2003). “First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations”, (Doc. A/CN.4/532, 26 March), para 19. http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_532.pdf.

Peters 2012, p. 204.

Klabbers 2011, pp. 11–19.

Tietje 1999, p. 27.

Ibid., 27.

Ibid., 31.

Ibid., 32.

Rosenne 1989, p. 181.

“Hierbei ist die Vertragsfacette eine Chiffre für eine horizontales Rechtsinstrument mit strikter Inter-partes Wirkung, in Abhängigkeit vom Willen der Erzeuger, die sich hiermit lediglich (temporär begrenzt) selbst binden. Demgegenüber ist‚ Verfassung’ eine Chiffre für einen vertikalen Rechtsakt mit Erga-omnes Wirkung, der sich zu einem gewissen Grad autonom von den Erzeugern entwickeln kann.” Peters 2013, p. 10.

Ibid., 13, s.s.

“Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict”, Advisory Opinion, ICJ. Reports 1996, 66, para 19. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/93/093-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.

Brölmann 1999, p. 85.

Rosenne 1989, p. 214.

Rosenne 1989, pp. 214–215.

Brölmann 2007.

Arato 2013, p. 304.

Ibid., 305.

Ibid., 304–305.

Ibid., 291.

Regarding mission creep, see, inter alia, Hockett 2002, p. 178.

106

Arato 2013, pp. 291–292.

107

See Droesse 2011, pp. 139–140, with further references (hereinafter: “Organizational Structures”).

108

Vidigal 2013, p. 1030, with further detailed references.

109

Brunnée 2005, p. 102.

Ibid., 103.

Ibid., 103.

Jacur 2013, p. 24.

Brunnée 2002, p. 4.

Wiersema 2009, p. 74.

115

Ibid., 75.

116

For example, UNFCCC, Article 7, para 2, provides: “The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention….”

117

Brunnée 2002, p. 5.

118

Ibid., 6.

119

Boisson de Chazournes 2005, p. 463.

Ibid., 463.

Ibid., 464.

Ibid., 464.

Ibid., 465.

Ibid., 466.

Pauwelyn et al. 2014, p. 734.

126

“For each decade since the 1950s, the number of new multilateral treaties deposited with the UN Secretary General was around 35. In the 10 years between 2000 and 2010, this number dropped quite dramatically to 20. In the preceding five decades it had never been below 34. Between 2005 and 2010, only nine new multilateral treaties were deposited; in 2011, 2012, and 2013 not a single one. The broader UN Treaty Series database confirms this downward trend as of the 2000s, both for bilateral treaties (12,566 concluded in the 1990s; only 9484 concluded in the 2000s) and multilateral treaties (406 entries in the 1990s; down to 262 in the 2000). Pauwelyn et al. 2014, pp. 734–735.

127

Neuhold 2005, p. 40.

128

Ibid., 40–47.

129

Droesse 2011, p. 16, citing N. Blokker “Proliferation of International Organizations and Exploratory Introduction”.

130

Pauwelyn et al. 2014, p. 762.

131

Ibid., 750–751.

132

See in detail, Martha 2015, pp. 22–50.

133

“Fundamental legal issues raised by the draft of an Asian Clearing Union Agreement to be concluded between the “central banks and monetary authorities” of various countries—Question of the law governing such an agreement—Question whether the Clearing Union thus established would be endowed with legal personality and could claim privileges and immunities—Determination of the entities eligible to become parties to the Agreement.” United Nations Juridical Yearbook. 1971, 215–218, 215. http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../unjuridicalyearbook/pdfs/english/by_volume/1971/chpVI.pdf&lang=EF.

134

Ibid., 218.

135

Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL. http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution.

136

Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill, para 11.

137

See Ragazzi 2011, pp. 486–488.

138

Ibid., 486.

139

Ibid., 486–487.

140

Freestone 2007, p. 1081.

141

See, with further references, Wölker 2007, pp. 32–56.

142

Gold recalls that in his proposal for a Clearing Union, Keynes expressed similar concerns. Gold 1980.

143

See Gold 1980, pp. 7–11.

144

Ibid., 11–26.

145

GCF (2012) Additional Rules of Procedure of the Board (GCF/B.02–12/02, 8 Oct.), para 1. http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24928/GCF_B.02-12_02_-_Additional_Rules_of_Procedure_of_the_Board.pdf/f4243d8e-6e23-4500-95a4-a1f71e605dea. See also the discussion in para 7 of that Board paper.

146

General Regulations of the ICPO-INTERPOL. Article 1. http://www.interpol.int/Media/Files/Legal-material/Reference-Documents/General-Regulations.

147

Article 1 of the General Regulations of the International Criminal Police Organization-Interpol state: “These General Regulations and Appendices have been adopted in accordance with Article 44 of the Constitution of the Organization. Should there be any differences between the two, the Constitution shall prevail.”

148

Article 66 of the Rules of Procedure of the INTERPOL General Assembly provides: “The present Rules of Procedure are adopted under the authority of, and are subject to, the Constitution and the General Regulations. In the event of a conflict between a provision of the present Rules of Procedure and a provision of the Constitution or of the General Regulations, the Constitution and General Regulations shall prevail.” Similarly, Article 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Executive Committee provides: “The present Rules of Procedure, adopted in application of Article 8(d) of the Organization’s Constitution, constitute an appendix to the Organization’s General Regulations. (2) Should any provision of the present Rules of Procedure diverge from a provision of the Organization’s Constitution or General Regulations, the latter shall prevail.” The fundamental texts of INTERPOL, including the INTERPOL Constitution, General Regulations and Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly and the Executive Committee may be accessed through INTERPOL. Fundamental Texts. https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Fundamental-texts.

149

Paragraph 50 of the Rules of Procedure of the GCF Board provides: “In the event of any conflict between any provision of these rules and any provisions of the Governing Instrument, the provisions of the Governing Instrument shall prevail.” See GCF. Rules of Procedure of the Board. https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/56440/Rules_of_Procedure.pdf/9d55fae7-f4df-45fe-a3f3-754bc0d98e67. It is further indicated in para 2 of the said document:

There are a range of matters that are not expressly covered by the Governing Instrument, such as the role and functions of the two Co-Chairs, the role of the alternate member after a Board member is elected Co-Chair, actions to be taken if a vacancy occurs prior to the end of the statutory term of a Board member, membership in Board committees and a range of other procedural matters. The Governing Instrument also called on the Board in para 14 to “develop procedures for adopting decisions in the event that all efforts at reaching consensus have been exhausted” and in para 16 to “make arrangements, including developing and operating accreditation processes, to allow for effective participation by accredited observers in its meetings.”

150

There is a hierarchy between the bylaws of the Global Fund and certain core policies such as the Board and Committee Operating Procedures (which expressly refer to the bylaws), and between the core governance and institutional documents of the Global Fund and other policies. The governance and institutional documents of the Global Fund can be found under https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/governance-policies/.

151

Cogan 2009, p. 219.

152

Ibid., 219.

153

Barton 1983‐1984, p. 1530.

154

See Kleinlein 2012, 2, ss.

155

Cass 2005, p. 29.

156

As indicated by Kleinlein: “Für Vertreter der Konstitutionalisierungsthese ist im Völkerrecht ein die Staateninteressen transzendierendes Gemeinschaftsinteresse der Menschheit anerkannt, setzen hirarchisch übergeordnete‚ Verfassungsprinzipien dem bisher bindungslos gebliebenen Willen der Staaten Grenzen, verselbständigen sich internationale Organisationen gegenüber ihren Mitgliedstaaten und verbleibt den Mitgliedstaaten nicht länger ein genuiner domaine réserve.” Kleinlein 2012, p. 2.

157

Oeter, S. states: “Man kann zur gegenwärtigen Debatte um eine Verfassungsgebung für die Europäische Union, im Sinne der Setzung einer formellen Verfassungsurkunde, stehen wie man will – daß die europäische Integration Züge einer ‚Verfassungswerdung‘ angenommen hat, im Sinne einer allmählichen institutionellen Verdichtung, hin zu verfassungsartigen Strukturen, ist kaum zu bestreiten, ja trägt Züge eines Gemeinplatzes.” Oeter 1999, p. 901.

Tuori 2015, pp. 6–7.

Ibid., 9.

Ibid., 12–13.

Lenaerts 2014, pp. 707–715. http://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=smulr. See also, with a critical note of the decisions, Anthony 2009, pp. 293–298 and Kämmerer 2008, pp. 65–87.

162

Peters 2012, p. 205.

163

Ibid., 155.

164

Klabbers 2001, pp. 403–421.

165

Klabbers 2011, pp. 18–19.

166

Cass 2005, p. 4.

167

Kleinlein 2011, p. 41.

168

Ibid., 48.

169

Ibid., 45.

170

See the definition in the International Organizations Immunities Act, 9 Dec. 1945. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/288.

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Title: Decline or Disaggregation of the Nation State, Dichotomy of Public and Private and Constitution and Constitutionalization
Author: Gerd Droesse
Publisher: T.M.C. Asser Press
Book: Membership in International Organizations
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-326-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-94-6265-327-6

Copyright Year: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-327-6_4

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