3. Defining Agricultural SCEs with Several Steps

See Hiez (2017), p. 9 et seq.; Schulze (2004), p. 10 et seq.

See Molk (2014), p. 910; Hansmann (1999), p. 388; Lehmann (2014), p. 36 et seq.; Fici (2017), p. 20 et seq. For details, see Sect. 3.2. For general observations, see Engelhardt (1977).

In contrast, many large-scale enterprises are owned by outside investors. See Molk (2014), p. 901. In this context also consider World Co-operative Monitor 2018.

See Barton (1989), p. 1 et seq. Also consider Ortmann and King (2007), p. 42.

See Barton in Cobia 1 et seq. Also consider Nilsson (2001), p. 341; Ortmann and King (2007), p. 42. Generally, Nilsson (1999).

See Fici (2013a), p. 40 et seq.; Henrÿ (2012), p. 78.

See Birchall (2011).

On this issue, see, among others, Holzer (2018), p. 153 et seq.; Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 127 et seq.; Martinez (2016d), p. 770 et seq.; Vecchione (2009c), p. 353 et seq.; Iannarelli (2001), p. 35 et seq.; Norer (2005), pp. 469 et seq. and 485 et seq.; Götz (2012), p. 11 et seq., Alessi (2006), p. 1255 et seq.

Section 3.2.

Section 3.3.

Section 3.4.

Section 3.5.

Section 3.6.

See Hiez (2017), p. 13. Also consider Beuthien (2007), p. 5; Galle (2006), p. 255; Fici (2010), p. 3 et seq.; Eichwald and Lutz (2011), pp. 41 et seq. and 51. Generally, Ringle (2007), p. 15 et seq.; van Diepenbeek (2007), pp. 13 et seq. and 28 et seq.

This is further complicated by the lack of interest in cooperative law within the international academic community. In fact, cooperative law is primarily discussed among cooperators or cooperative institutions. Nevertheless, there were and are different initiatives that stipulate a legal framework to help provide coherent legislation. These initiatives vary in scope and legal value, and include the SCE-R. See Hiez (2017), p. 14 et seq. Also consider Lehmann (2014), p. 32 et seq.; Krimphove (2010), p. 893; Henrÿ (2012), p. 45 et seq.

See Fici (2017), p. 20 et seq.

See Fici (2017), p. 21.

See Henrÿ (2012), p. 45 et seq. Also consider Fici (2013a), p. 16 et seq.; Fici (2012); Hiez (2017), p. 14. Also consider Bonfante (2006), p. 4 et seq. For instance, German law considers the mandatory elements of cooperatives to be: (a) the promotion of members’ needs, (b) the secondary status of non-member transactions, (c) statutory freedom, (d) allocation of surplus or profits for transactions conducted between members and the cooperative, (e) the potential for unlimited member liability, and (f) indivisibility of the reserves. See Beuthien (2007), pp. 6 and 16.

For a concise analysis, see Henrÿ, where he discusses cooperatives and the features which distinguish them from social economic enterprises and stock companies. See Henrÿ (2012), p. 30 et seq. Also consider Münkner (2006), p. 12.

On this issue, see Pedri (2017). See also Fici (2014), p. 156 et seq.

See Recital 7 SCE-R.

See Recital 8 SCE-R.

On this issue, see also Pönkä (2018), p. 54 et seq.

See Recital 10 bullet 2 SCE-R.

See Fici (2014), p. 150 et seq.; Schaschko (2010), p. 89 et seq.; Fici (2013a), p. 26; Pönkä (2018), p. 43; Münkner (2015), p. 31 et seq.; Kramer (2006). See also Birchall (2011), p. 205 et seq.

See Recital 7 SCE-R.

Differing from all the other types of business organisations.

In principle, the legal framework determining the functioning of cooperatives can be divided into a group of general provisions and a group of special provisions. General rules are mainly contained in the civil code and have to be applied to all types of cooperatives. However, this basic source of law does not delineate a clear framework. It contains rules specifically adopted for cooperatives (Art. 2511 CC—Art. 2545 octiesdecies CC.), but also refers to provisions to be applied residually, and which have been designed with (capitalistic) companies in mind. In fact, Art. 2519 para. 1 CC declares that, for matters not regulated by the provisions contained in title VI book no 5 of the Italian Civil Code, one has to consider—insofar as these provisions are compatible with cooperatives—the provisions regarding the spa. Alternatively, the provisions adopted for the srl can be applied, depending on the size of the cooperative and contingent on an express choice being formulated in the cooperative’s statutes (see Art. 2519 para. 2 CC). The Italian legislator only adapted the existing provisions for the spa, without developing specific provisions for cooperatives. This is true for both the commercial code, enacted in 1882, and the civil code, enacted in 1942, although here fewer references have been provided for. This legislative choice is based on the notion that cooperatives also depend on the rules that govern the markets. It has been criticised that this leads to the imposition of organisation models which primarily pursue a speculative goal at the expense of organisational models which pursue self-organisation. See Bonfante (2014), p. 299 et seq. For details Tatarano (2011), p. 3 et seq. Also consider Zamagni, Per una teoria economico-civile dell'impresa cooperativa, in Mazzoli/Zamagni (Ed), Verso una nuova teoria economica della cooperazione (2005). See also Fauceglia (2019).

This definition contains a particular feature to help distinguish a cooperative from other legal forms and describes the aim assigned to the cooperative by law. Indeed, the wording “with mutual purpose” is a distinctive and traditional formula of Italian law, referring to the mandate which the SCE regulation or other national laws assign to cooperatives. See Fici (2013b), p. 484. For details Tatarano (2011), p. 82 et seq. See also Piras (2017), p. 110 et seq.; Paolucci (2019a), p. 29 et seq.

Amending statutes requires calling an extraordinary general meeting.

For details, see Sect. 2.​1. See also Pönkä (2018), p. 46 et seq.

In other words, an Italian cooperative has to either employ its members (worker cooperatives) or pursue exchanges with its members (consumer cooperatives and production cooperatives). For specific information regarding mandate, membership and similar aspects, see Sect. 3.4.

The law does not specifically limit a cooperative’s economic activities, although there are specific rules relating to the nature of business it may conduct. However, these rules apply equally to all legal entities. See Fici and Strano (2010), p. 683; Bonfante (2014), p. 178 et seq.; Paolucci (2019c), p. 64 et seq.

For further information, see Sect. 3.4.1.

See Paolucci (2019l), p. 45 et seq.; Paolucci (2019a), p. 33 et seq.; Paolucci (2012b), p. 9 et seq. Also consider Tatarano (2011), p. 62 et seq.; Bonfante (2014), p. 149 et seq. In general, Genco (2014); Ragazzini (1992); Fici (2015), p. 80 et seq. Also consider Sects. 5.​3 and 5.​5. Similarly, Art. 2545 undecies CC states that if a cooperative is transformed into a company, its assets (at their effective value) must be allocated to mutual funds, after deducting (re-evaluated) subscribed capital and undistributed dividends. As an exception, the law allows increasing non-devolved assets up to the minimum capital necessary to constitute the new company. Also consider Sect. 5.​5.

See Paolucci (2012b), p. 9 et seq.; Paolucci (2019a), p. 33 et seq., Law no. 381/1991 addresses social cooperatives, stating that such cooperatives do not pursue a mutual aim but rather promote the general interest of the community. According to Art. 1 para. 1 of this law, “social cooperatives aim to pursue the general interest of the community for the human promotion and social integration of citizens through: (a) the management of social health and education services, (b) the performance of agricultural, industrial, commercial, service or other activities for the working integration of disadvantaged persons.” For details consider for example Codini (2007) and Cotronei (2009). In the agricultural sector, for example, this interest includes initiatives that fall within the concept of social farming.

For details see Paolucci (2019k), p. 17 et seq. Also consider Miribung (2014), p. 779 et seq. In line with Art. 45 Cost, Italian cooperatives are subject to public control. Legislative decree no 220/2002 determines the various aspects of this cooperative vigilance. Different forms of control are possible. The ordinary form of control (cooperative revision) basically considers the cooperative’s mutual nature, focusing on the effectiveness of membership, the members’ contribution to the cooperative’s existence (especially by means of transacting with the cooperative), the absence of for-profit aims, eligibility for tax breaks and other benefits and solidity of assets. If irregularities are found via audit, the cooperative must resolve the situation if possible. Otherwise, the supervisory authority can apply different sanctions, including substituting new managers and dissolving the cooperative. The audits are conducted by organisations recognised by the cooperative movement or by the Ministry of Economic Development for Cooperatives. Recognised organisations control all of their associated cooperatives, while the Ministry controls all other cooperatives. Cooperatives are audited every 2 years (ordinary inspections) with the exception of social cooperatives, which are audited every year. Extraordinary inspections are also possible. See Fici and Strano (2010), p. 692 et seq. For details Cusa (2014a). See also Paolucci (2019i).

The Austrian cooperative act was adopted in 1873. See Genossenschaftsgesetz, Austrian Imperial Law Gazette (Reichsgesetzblatt) 1873. It is composed of five main parts with a total of 95 sections. It has been amended several times, most recently in 2006 with a change to cooperative law (Genossenschaftsrechtsänderungsgesetz 2006, [GenRÄG 2006]), in 2008 with a change to company law (Unternehmensrechtsänderungsgesetz 2008 [URÄG 2008]) and finally in 2014 (See Rechnungslegungs-Änderungsgesetz.), 2015 (See Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz.) and 2016 (See Abschlussprüfungsrechts-Änderungsgesetz.).

Open Door Principle. See Sect. 2.​1.

For further details, see Sect. 5.​2.

It is not a appropriate to define it as a statutory promotional mandate, as the law only requires the mandate—the content is defined by statutes later. For example, the aim of a credit cooperative provides for certain promotion measures, which will definitely not be the same in a production or consumer cooperative, for example. As a result, the promotion mandate as contained in Sec. 1 GenG cannot be considered a valuable substitute for a mandate clearly defined via statutes.

See Dellinger (2014), p. 23.

It states: “An SCE shall have as its principal object the satisfaction of its members’ needs and/or the development of their economic and social activities, in particular through the conclusion of agreements with them to supply goods or services or to execute work of the kind that the SCE carries out or commissions. An SCE may also have as its object the satisfaction of its members’ needs by promoting, in the manner set forth above, their participation in economic activities, in one or more SCEs and/or national cooperatives. An SCE may conduct its activities through a subsidiary.”

Until 2008, social activities were admissible as a secondary mandate. See Dellinger (2014), p. 32. It has been correctly observed that the SCE-R allows a principal object (Art. 1 para. 3 SCE-R), which initially went beyond the promotion mandate Austrian cooperatives were allowed to pursue. However, the promotion of social or idealistic aims beyond the economic promotion mandate was allowed only by means of so-called additional transactions. However, in 2008 the GenG was amended to allow social activities as the principal mandate. See Greda (2014), p. 835. For the application of consumer protection law to cooperatives, see Dellinger (2014), p. 31.

As shown below. See Sect. 3.4.

That is, the development of law strongly depends on existing law and rules, verdicts and procedures in a given setting. This makes change difficult, as the existing body of rules is already linked to previous problems which had to be solved. Today, there is a great variety of such paths, because in addition to national law, supranational, international and regional rules have to be observed when developing new laws. See Baer (2011), p. 186 et seq. Also consider Lombardo and Pasotti (2004), p. 193; Leyens (2003), p. 64 et seq.; Roe (2004). Critical, Beyer (2005), p. 5.

The PECOL define a cooperative in Chap. 1, Sec. 1 para. 1.

The business is managed by the people who use its services.

A producer cooperative comprises producers as members who manage the business. Agricultural marketing cooperatives carry out several related activities concerning the planning of production, cultivation and harvesting, sorting, packaging, transport, storage, food processing, distribution and sales.

The business is managed by the people who work there.

On this issue, see Fici (2017), p. 72 et seq.

See Fici (2017), p. 27. This general definition also applies to secondary or higher degree cooperatives. Fici (2017), p. 22 et seq.

For details, see Fici (2017), p. 32 et seq.

Similar to the SCE-R.

The reference to private law highlights the private nature of cooperatives. See Fici (2017), p. 21.

See Fici (2017), p. 22. The non-profit mandate is given in some national cooperative laws and serves to clearly distinguish between cooperatives and companies. See Fici (2017), p. 22.

Normally by means of patronage refunds. See Sect. 5.​3.

These subtypes cover all the different types of cooperative which exist in different sectors of the economy (e.g., agriculture or banking). See Fici (2017), p. 24.

See Fici (2017), p. 25.

It has also been observed that a mutual cooperative may consider ICA principle no 7 (concern for the community) as an additional objective, whereas it is the primary objective for a general interest cooperative. See Fici (2017), p. 31.

See Sects. 5.​2 and 5.​3.

See Fici (2017), p. 25 et seq. Also consider Sect. 5.​5.

The idea behind general interest cooperatives is to use them in the health sector, to provide social services and to offer working integration for disadvantaged people. In addition, they could also provide public services to the community, for instance in the renewable energy field. See Fici (2017), p. 31.

For other examples, see Fici (2017), p. 28 et seq.

For example, German law only knows cooperatives that serve the social and/or cultural interests of their members. There is debate over whether this might ultimately open the door to general interest cooperatives. This type of cooperative might contradict the very essence of a cooperative as it is understood by German scholars. See Fici (2017), p. 30. Also consider Schöpflin (2018a), p. 1241 et seq.; Beuthien (2007), p. 7. Austrian doctrine seems to diverge from German principles. In fact, Sec. 1 para. 3 GenG refers explicitly to Art. 1 para. 3 SCE-R (which implies the object of a cooperative may also be the satisfaction of its members’ social activities rather than their (personal) needs), with the result that the GenG acknowledges general interest cooperatives. Interestingly, it has been observed that Sec. 1 para. 3 GenG runs contrary to the description of a cooperative as self-help organisation. See Dellinger (2014), p. 32. These types of cooperatives are already extant in the Italian agricultural sector because of the adoption of specific laws and, thus, play an important role in agricultural activity. However, this study does not focus on these types of cooperatives; therefore, the issues arising in this regard will not be analysed here.

I.e., by maximising returns on shares.

See Sect. 2.​4.

As mentioned in the introductory part of this study, these analyses do not consider tax law.

See Norer (2017b), p. 638 et seq.; Martinez (2016c), pp. 761 et seq. and 765. See also Vecchione (2009c), p. 353 et seq.; Costato (2004); Adornato (2007).

See Germanò (2016), p. 10 et seq. See also Albisinni (2011a); Costato (2004), p. 121 et seq. Generally, the question concerning the notion of agricultural law was and is not easy to answer. What is agricultural law? It is, so to speak, the cardinal question in the history of scientific research of the special legal relationships attributable to agriculture and forestry in the broadest sense. Repeated attempts to answer these questions are manifold in their approaches and results, and are partly also subject to time-related developments. Compared with other legal disciplines that are well-established in jurisprudence, it is obviously difficult to provide a generally satisfactory definition of agricultural law that claims to be generally valid.

See Martinez (2016c), p. 765.

For details, see Sect. 3.3.4.

E.g., the renting of buildings for residential use provided that revenues are marginal. See Art. 36 para. 8 legislative decree no. 179/2012.

See, among others, Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 757 et seq.; Vecchione (2009a, b); Costato and Russo (2015), p. 324 et seq. In addition to the notion of agricultural entrepreneur, the Italian legal order also contains a definition of small farmer. Art. 2083 ZGB regulates the small entrepreneur, and as part of this definition, the small farmer (coltivatore diretto). Under this term, the legislature subsumes ‘self-builders of real estate, craftsmen, small merchants and those who pursue a professional activity primarily based on their own work and the work of their family members’. With regard to the self-construction of real estate, this means that a farmer must carry out at least one-third of the agricultural activity himself or herself (in accordance with Art. 2135 ZGB). Family members also can meet this quantitative requirement. If the farmer has employees, the requirement, according to Art. 2083 ZGB, must be distinguished from managerial activity, which this does not cover. On this issue, see, among others, Germanò (2011), p. 801 et seq.

Economic activity is an organised activity. Organisation of the entrepreneur’s labour and capital is sufficient, but it is necessary to have a minimum of ‘external organisation’ (e.g., the use of external labour or capital). Professional means habitual and continuous, not occasional. As a rule, a single business transaction is insufficient unless it involves a large number of individual operations. Someone who only produces for his or her own needs is not deemed an entrepreneur (requirement of market orientation). See, among others, Cetra (2019); Rondinone (2017), p. 5 et seq. See also Rook Basile (1995), p. 87 et seq.; Galloni (1999), p. 15 et seq.; Lamanna Di Salvo (2003), p. 103 et seq.

Therefore, this does not apply to freelancers or pure use of assets.

Regarding the concept of land management, here are a few examples of the activities that may be mentioned: soil preparation; the use of technical aids/machinery; plant pruning; and the purchase of seeds or horticultural crops. Cultivation of the soil also includes rearing in greenhouses. Technical aids/machines are permitted if required by soil management (stretta relazione—The law refers here to a close relationship). It requires labour input that covers the entire growth cycle; therefore, mere harvesting of the fruit does not constitute cultivation of the soil. In civil law, garden centres also are regarded as agricultural holdings, whereas in tax law, differentiation must be made in this respect. The general criteria to be observed in plant breeding are the same as for mushroom growing. In principle, the term soil could lead one to think exclusively of fields, which would exclude greenhouses. However, this is not the case because soil management means that fruit/plants should be grown from the soil and that natural resources should be used. In other words, soil management means plant cultivation. Furthermore, dog breeding and/or a dog school is not sufficient, as this is not necessarily carried out on ground and soil, in the forest or near bodies of water. For details, see Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 762 et seq.; Sciaudone (2005), p. 42; Petrelli (2007), p. 228; Vecchione (2009a), p. 238.

This notion not only refers to logging, but also must take into account reforestation to meet the biological cycle’s demands. Therefore, it is a matter of care, reproduction/development and conservation of the stock. This also includes the beating of timber. Thus, it is an economic activity to produce wood in accordance with the given reproductive cycles and through regular logging of wood plants. Additional activities are the care of trees and their renewal. The activity is subject to prior approval. It is also possible to speak of the care/processing of the forest soil. The forest not only produces wood, but also represents the environment and serves to protect the environment. It significantly affects the surrounding landscape, people, soil, water and air, as well as flora and fauna. These functions are so closely interconnected that their relationships were not understood until the twentieth century. The reasons for this increased awareness and the urge to understand include, among other things, decreasing land reserves, increased demand for clean drinking water, increased environmental pollution, an increasing need for recreation and the steady market demand for wood. Therefore, the forest has a utility function, protective function, recreational function and other special functions such as landscape conservation or nature conservation. Accordingly, Legislative Decree 227/2001 refers to these functions. It also contains a sustainability concept that regulates logging. Art. 2 Ld 227 distinguishes forestry from tree culture (arboricultura). This refers to tree cultivation that does not take place in forests (terreni non boscati), with the exclusive aim of producing wood and biomass. In this case, the forest is not managed. Forestry-related activities include debarking, logging and storage. For details, see Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 767 et seq.; Petrelli (2007), p. 236; Vecchione (2009a), p. 251. See also Abrami (2005) and Bolognini (2011a).

The term livestock has been replaced by the broader term animals, which overcomes restrictive judicial interpretations. Before this, livestock only included cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and horses (because the rearing of these animals traditionally is connected to the soil, in contrast to (small) farm animals such as poultry, bees, etc). The purpose of animal breeding must be to raise animals until they are fully developed, regardless of the fact that the animal’s entire biological cycle does not take place on a single farm. For example, the concept refers to the following animals: rabbits; hares; pigeons; partridges; pheasants; frogs to be eaten; fish farming; shellfish farming; oyster farming; and the rearing of frogs, mollusks; crustaceans; and aquacultures (regardless of whether they live in fresh, salt or brackish water. Regarding fish farming, it should be noted that Italy never had classified hunting and fishing as an agricultural activity, as the rearing criterion was not met, whereas at the EU level, a different approach was adopted. In fact, in the Treaty of Rome (now Article 38 TFEU), the notion of agriculture was extended to fishing. As a result, Art. 2 LD 22672001 equates fishing with agricultural activity and requires appropriate authorisation. Finally, according to Law n 313/2004, beekeeping is an agricultural activity. See Petrelli (2007), p. 239; Vecchione (2009a), p. 256; Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 768 et seq.

Also see Casadei (2009), p. 328 et seq.; Costato (2006), p. 93 et seq.; Vecchione (2009d), p. 223 et seq.

See also Salaris (2002), p. 54 et seq.; Costato (2001), p. 142 et seq.; Vecchione (2004), p. 67 et seq; Goldoni (2019), p. 380 et seq.; Iannarelli (2019), p. 218 et seq. Accordingly, such activities also can be carried out in seawater. For further information about the notion of agrarietà, see Sect. 1.​2.​2.

See also Casadei (2009), p. 328 et seq.; Galloni (1999), p. 11 et seq.; Vecchione (2004), p. 28 et seq.; Magno (2006), p. 89.

It not only includes classical types of land cultivation, such as pasturing, but also flower growing, mushroom growing, tree nurseries and seed breeding. The same applies to plant products used to produce biogas or other energy.

See Art. 2135 para. 2. CC.

See also Albisinni (2011b), p. 286 et seq.; Albisinni (2014b), p. 6 et seq.; Casadei (2009), p. 334 et seq.; Albisinni (2003), p. 333 et seq. See also Vecchione (2004), pp. 44 et seq. and 54 et seq.

For details, see Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 775; Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 775 et seq.; Sciaudone (2005), p. 56; Petrelli (2007), p. 248; Vecchione (2009b), p. 275; Vecchione (2004), p. 75 et seq. See also Goldoni (2019), p. 379 et seq.

The list in paragraph 3 contains examples and also permits atypical activities. However, the application in this respect should be limited, as the rule is already very broad (examples could include preparatory work, such as levelling or ditch excavation). According to the cassation, the associated activity also may be carried out by a cooperative or a consortium.

See Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 776; Vecchione (2004), p. 86 et seq.

See Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 776 et seq. See also Casadei (2009), p. 345 et seq.

Predominantly does not mean exclusively.

It is emphasised that the activities concerned must relate primarily to the products and services of the holding concerned. As a result, the processing of agricultural products cannot take on industrial dimensions. Processing means that a new item is created, e.g., wine from grapes.

On this issue, see, for example, Costato and Russo (2015), p. 348. See also Casadei (2009), p. 351 et seq.; Vecchione (2004), p. 88 et seq.

In this regard, see Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 780 et seq.

One can see that the lines are blurring between industrial and service sectors.

Another example would be an agricultural entrepreneur who helps farmers with agricultural activity (such as ploughing or harvesting) by providing machinery.

See Cavanna (2014), p. 641 et seq.; Bonfante (1999), p. 213. In general, see Giuffrida (1981), Rossi (1979), Rook Basile (1981) and Carmignani (1999, 2011).

See Cavanna (2014), p. 642 et seq.; Giuffrida (1981), p. 210.

See Cavanna (2014), p. 644 et seq.; Scordino (1970), p. 204 et seq.

See Cavanna (2014), p. 647 et seq. Opposed to this approach, the cooperatives register only distinguishes between agricultural-worker cooperatives and cooperatives that manage the supply of agricultural products and conduct livestock farming, thereby excluding cooperatives that actually do not conduct agricultural activities, but merely deliver services to members who are agricultural entrepreneurs. See Cavanna (2014), p. 642.

See Sects. 1.​3.​3 and 2.​1.

See Cavanna (2014), p. 645 et seq.; Carmignani (2013), p. 858; Carmignani (2011), p. 259. See also Casadei (2009), p. 347; Carmignani (2011), p. 860; Rook Basile (1981); Giuffrida (1981); Alessi (2006), p. 1248 et seq.

See Carmignani (2013), p. 858 et seq. See also Costato and Russo (2015), p. 383 et seq.; Galloni (1999), p. 465. See also Vecchione (2009c), p. 367 et seq.

Carmignani (2013), p. 863.

See Sect. 3.4.1.

See Carmignani (2013), p. 861 et seq.; Carmignani (2011), p. 259 et seq.

These types of cooperatives must operate predominantly with members. For details, see Sect. 3.4.1.

On this issue, in general, Germanò (2016), p. 4 et seq.; Costato and Russo (2015), p. 3 et seq. See also Sciaudone (2016). See also Zecchin (2017).

On this issue, see, among others, Germanò (2011), p. 798 et seq. See also Carmignani (2013), p. 864; Sciaudone (2019); Rauseo (2018); Ferrara (2013); Vecchione (2009c), p. 359 et seq.

In accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 of the Council of 17 May 1999.

As referred to in Article 2135 of the Civil Code.

See Bolognini (2011b), p. 336 et seq. See also For the entrepreneur operating in the disadvantaged areas provided for by Art. 17 of EU Regulation no. 1257/1999, the requirements listed are reduced by 25%.

The Italian Legislation has introduced the figure of the ‘professional agricultural entrepreneur’ (PAE), who has replaced the former figure of ‘main agricultural entrepreneur’ for applying the legislation to the agricultural sector. For details, Costato and Russo (n 8), p. 375 et seq., Germanò (n 8), p. 118 et seq.

They are eligible for further subsidies and tax relief.

See Bolognini (2011b), p. 346. See also Rook Basile (1995), p. 77 et seq. and, in general, Lamanna Di Salvo (2003), p. 103 et seq.

See Holzer (2018), p. 38; Holzer (2017a), p. 22 et seq. It applies to all commercially exercised activities that are not prohibited by law if carried out independently, regularly and with the intention of realising a profit or other economic advantage.

In addition to the notion of agricultural activities, the Austrian legal order also contains a definition of farmer, which can be found in the various Grundverkehrsgesetze (GVG) of the Länder, which comprises the various laws on the acquisition and sale of land (real estate law). It is important to stress that these laws regulate, generally speaking, the acquisition of land, as well as the acquisition of rights to agricultural or forestry land. Thus, the definitions contained therein must be read in conjunction with these laws’ scope. Moreover, these laws do not define what agricultural activities are, but contain a definition of agricultural or forestry land, agricultural or forestry holding and farmer. This approach, which is not a specific definition of agricultural activities, is in line with the general approach followed by the Austrian legislature, which uses a negative differentiation criterion instead of providing a specific definition.

A legal definition of the term farmer can be found in the Grundverkehrsgesetze of Carinthia (§ 10 para. 4), Lower Austria (§ 10 para. 4), Salzburg (§ 4 para. 4), Styria (§ 8a para. 5), Tyrol (§ 2 para. 5) and Vorarlberg (§ 2 para. 3). Accordingly, a farmer is defined as a person who, alone or together with family members or his own agricultural workers, wishes to farm/cultivate an agricultural or forestry holding as an independent economic unit or to farm/cultivate land after it has been acquired, and who possesses the necessary skills to do so. The concerned laws of Carinthia, Lower Austria and Salzburg link the status of farmer to the additional criterion that the person concerned must at least, to a considerable extent, earn his living and that of his family from farming or wish to do so after land acquisition. Therefore, the decisive factor is the share of family income derived from the operation of agriculture and forestry according to the actual circumstances. However, the share of the concrete lifestyle’s costs is irrelevant. In addition, legal persons are regarded as farmers on the condition that they are economically dominant in the society and are willing and able to manage the property themselves. As already explained, not only are those already engaged in farming deemed farmers, but also those who, after a planned land acquisition, seriously intend to produce agriculture oriented toward sustainable yields. They also must be able to substantiate this on the basis of certain circumstances (e.g., technical training, previous practical activity, business concept). GVG’s openness to ‘newcomers’ is the necessary consequence of the fundamental prohibition on the creation of a privileged class of farmers already practising this profession.

This has been a reality since the 1850s. See Holzer (2012a), p. 761. See also Norer (2005), p. 9.

See Holzer (2012a), p. 760; Holzer (2018), p. 39.

It is stressed that this is linked to a partially outdated historical demarcation between agriculture and forestry and the commercial sector. It has been argued that this does not do justice to the current economic and socio-political significance of multifunctional agriculture and forestry. Therefore, repeated recent calls have been made for an explicit constitutional anchoring of a contemporary concept of ‘agriculture and forestry’ or ‘agricultural and forestry area’.

Already, the Kundmachungspaket of 20 December 1859 stipulated that the Gewerbeordnung was not to apply to agricultural and forestry production and its ancillary trades, in so far as these mainly concerned the processing of the company’s own products.

See also Holzer (2012a), p. 760 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 386.

See decisions of the Administrative Court no. Ro 2014/05/0040 (27.04.2016) or no. 2013/05/0210 (05.03.2014). Consider also tax and social law: on these issues, Holzer (2018), p. 50 et seq.

See Sect. 3.3.1.

See Holzer (2018), p. 386. By 1859, it had been clarified that GewO was not to apply to ‘agricultural production and its ancillary trades, in so far as they mainly involve the processing of their own products’. Also excluded from the GewO was the serving of one’s own (agricultural) product. In the explanatory note it was explained that agriculture is not a trade in terms of language usage. This concerns both the extraction of a natural product and its processing, provided that the latter activity is so intimately connected with land cultivation that without it, the natural product cannot be brought into commerce at all, and provided that the persons involved belong to the actual agricultural population (e.g., dairy farmers, cheese makers, winemakers). See Holzer (2012a), p. 763.

See Holzer (2012a), p. 760 et seq.; see also the statement in the explanatory note to the government bill of the GewO 1973, p. 111.

See Holzer (2012a), p. 761.

See Sec. 2 para. 1 GewO.

Processing in the Buschenschank is also specifically excluded.

See Holzer (2012a), p. 764; Holzer (2018), p. 39; Holzer (2017b), p. 22 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 387 et seq.

See Holzer (2018), p. 386; see also the statement in the explanatory note to the government bill of the GewO 1973, p. 111. In the context of primary crop production, also the additional purchase of products is possible. Here the legislator determined rather strict quantitative criteria (see for example Sec. 2 para. 3 subpara. 1 GewO). See Holzer (2012a), p. 764; Holzer (2018), p. 388. It is clear that the Italian legal system—at least if one considers private law—will not deal with such issues, as it does not focus on product categories. However, Art. 2135 para. 3 CC shows that in this regard, the Italian legislature has adopted—under private law—a rather vague concept. An adequate answer regarding issues like this can be found in tax law.

See Holzer (2017b), p. 28; Holzer (2018), p. 387 fn 1492.

Thus, edible mushrooms, reeds and resins are considered to be vegetable primary products. Furthermore, it is not necessary for the farmer to bring in the harvest himself. For example, selling wood on the stick, selling a standing crop in the field or a buyer picking strawberries remain the seller’s products (and the buyer does not become a farmer or forester).

In this regard, see Lamanna Di Salvo (2003), p. 33 et seq.

Here, too, no connection to soil and land is necessary, e.g., cattle fattening on a third-party feed basis is not a commercial operation under commercial law (in contrast to the tax field). See Holzer (2017b), p. 30; Holzer (2018), p. 388 et seq.

See Holzer (2012a), p. 765 et seq.

See Holzer (2012a), p. 765.

See Holzer (2012a), p. 765 et seq.

On the contrary, and similar to Italian law, keeping animals for other purposes, e.g., housing cats or dogs in a kind of ‘animal shelter’ during holidays for pet owners is a business practice. On this issue, see Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 772; Costato and Russo (2015), p. 337 et seq.

See Holzer (2018), p. 388; Holzer (2017b), p. 30.

See Art. 2135 para. 1 CC. Also see Sect. 3.3.1.

by Regulation and in agreement with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management, the Federal Ministry of Social Security and the Federal Ministry of Finance.

It came into force on 1.1.2009. See https://​www.​ris.​bka.​gv.​at/​GeltendeFassung.​wxe?​Abfrage=​Bundesnormen&​Gesetzesnummer=​20006095. Accessed 26 November 2019.

The listing of products in primary product regulations that are considered to be primary products is also relevant for Social Security and tax assessment, although tax authorities do not recognise the products ‘milled round wood, as well as raw boards and beams’ as primary products. Italian tax law provides for a similar list-based system. See Art. 32 Testo Unico Imposte sui Redditi (TUIR, Italian Tax Law).

For a precise interpretation of individual products, it is possible to use the definitions contained in other laws (e.g., the Wine Act) or in the Austrian Food Code (Codex Alimentarius Austriacus).

See Holzer (2017b), p. 31 et seq. The production of these primary products must be carried out by farmers, but it is irrelevant where this happens and whether the farmer produces it himself or has it produced by another farmer as part of an ancillary service activity. Exceptions are made for pressing edible oil and processing wine into sparkling wine, which an authorised trader must carry out. See Holzer (2012a), p. 768.

See decision of the Administrative Court no. 2005/08/0140 (26.04.2006); see also Holzer (2018), p. 387.

See also Holzer (2012a), p. 767; Holzer (2018), p. 389; Holzer (2017b), p. 31 et seq.

It seems that the legislature preferred to use certain categories of activities and products instead of developing an abstract and generally applicable definition of agricultural activities.

Which uses such an approach only under taw law. See Sect. 3.3.1.

See Sect. 3.3.3.

For example, Sec. 2 para. 5 Tiroler Grundverkehrsgesetz. Interestingly, the various notions of farmer contained therein refer to an agricultural activity conducted primarily by the farmer (or members of the farmer’s family). Therefore, the concept appears to be similar to the concept of direct farmer, as determined by Art. 2083 CC. See fn 71 and 112. See also Sec. 10 para. 4 Kärtner Grundverkehrsgesetz. See also Holzer (2012b), p. 688 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 409 et seq.

The Italian legal system offers a similar solution.

See Holzer (2017b), p. 36 et seq.; Gfrerer (2007), p. 199 et seq.; Holzer (2010), p. 171 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 390.

For details, see, among others, Holzer (2018), p. 394 et seq.; Holzer (2010).

The level of capital employed for investments in ancillary trades is not relevant. In addition, the 1997 amendment made it possible for an authorised trader (e.g., butcher, miller, baker) to carry out processing in the respective branch of industry on a contract basis. This is mandatory even when processing wine into sparkling wine.

See Holzer (2018), p. 394 et seq.; see also Holzer (2017b), p. 43.

With the abolition of the standard linkage, the production of biogas as an ancillary trade also was permitted.

See Holzer (2017b), p. 43; Holzer (2018), p. 394.

See Sect. 3.3.1.

See decision of the Administrative Court no. 2007/07/0117 (25.09.2008).

See also Holzer (2010), p. 171 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 40; Holzer (2017b), p. 28 et seq.

See Sect. 3.3.1.

See decision of the Administrative Court no. Ro 2014/04/0051 (14.10.2015).

See also Holzer (2018), p. 393; Holzer (2010), p. 187 et seq.; Holzer (2012a), p. 768 et seq. In 2008, the Administrative Court, with reference to older findings, has argued that the economic subordination of an auxiliary agricultural activity to primary agricultural and forestry production is only given if it is slight (in terms of volume and economic significance). See decision of the Administrative Court no. 2008/07/0117 (25.09.2008).

Therefore, it seems advisable to refer to tax law to determine the relation between main and related activities or primary and ancillary production, as this is basically also valid for the Italian context.

As well as the clarification concerning the admissibility of a limited non-member business. See Holzer (2012a), p. 782; Massauer (1978), p. 82 et seq.

For details, see Massauer (1978), p. 82 et seq.

Also excluded are cooperatives whose activities include the operation of banking businesses (credit cooperatives such as Raiffeisenkassen, land credit and land acquisition cooperatives, and agricultural construction and machinery credit cooperatives). Purchasing cooperatives and sales cooperatives (‘warehouse cooperatives’) are not exempt from the GewO’s application scope, as they completely converged toward commercial operations in terms of appearance and operating form. See also Holzer (2012a), p. 782 et seq.

lex specialis in respect of the general exemption provisions referred to in Sec. 2 para. 1 Nr. 1 in conjunction with Sec. 2 para. 3 of the GewO.

As determined by Sec. 2 para. 1 in conjunction with Sec. 2 para. 3 GewO.

The following activities mentioned in § 2 para. 3 are not covered by § 2 para. 1 no. 4: (a) the purchase of plant products, (b) hunting and fishing; and (c) the hiring of mounts (to be understood as primary production since the amendment of 2017).

E.g. use of cooling systems for the members’ own needs.

See Sect. 3.4.1.

See Dellinger (2014), p. 32.

See Sect. 3.3.3.

Typical farm activities.

On these issues see, among many, Norer (2005), p. 485; Holzer (2018), p. 139 et seq.; Germanò (2016), p. 295; Costato and Russo (2015), p. 340 et seq. In general, Balestrino (1994), Abler (2004), Vatn (2002), Beintema et al. (2009) or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001), Potter (2015) and Manservisi (2014). See also Rook Basile (1995), p. 77 et seq.; Galloni (1999), p. 29 et seq.; Vecchione (2004), p. 134 et seq.; Vecchione (2009b), p. 327 et seq.; Alessi (2006), p. 1253 et seq.; Iannarelli (2007), p. 480; Magno (2006), p. 103 et seq.; Adornato (2004), p. 6; Costato (2008), p. 458 et seq.

At the end of this sub-chapter.

Here one can refer to the question of whether fishing is an agricultural activity or not. On this issue, see, among others, Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 115 et seq.; Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 773 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 53.

See Bieber (2016), p. 543 et seq.; McMahon (2007), p. 37 et seq.; Norer (2017b), pp. 636 et seq., 643 et seq.; Martinez (2016c), p. 757 et seq.; Iannarelli (2009); Costato (2009); Germanò (2015).

EU agricultural law is rightly regarded as probably the most complex structure of the Community legal order, whose positive knowledge (by those subject to it and by the authorities) is made considerably difficult by its casuistry, technical nature and short-lived nature. Because of the Union’s broad competence in agriculture (including fisheries) and the economic policies adopted on a large scale, the bulk of all Union legislation adopted still concerns agricultural policy. However, many provisions are merely periodic reassessments of levies or subsidies, purchase and selling prices, levies, refunds, etc. whose scope is limited in time and substance and whose structure and content are largely standardised. Whereas in the past almost half of the EU’s legislative acts concerned agriculture, the share of agricultural legislation has been declining steadily for a number of years. In September 2009, about 17% of the legal catalogue in the Directory of the applicable Union law was still attributable to the agricultural sector. In terms of case law, the agricultural sector constitutes about 18% of all previous judgements of the European courts. See Norer (2017b), pp. 636 et seq., and 643 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 153 et seq.; Martinez (2016c), p. 757 et seq.

See Bieber (2016), p. 543 et seq.

See also Norer (2017b), p. 638; Martinez (2016c), p. 762 et seq.

See Bieber (2016), p. 544 et seq.; McMahon (2007), p. 4 et seq.; Norer (2017b), p. 638 et seq.; Martinez (2016c), p. 764 et seq.; Germanò (2016), p. 24.

See Holzer (2018), p. 164; Martinez (2016c), p. 766.

See Bieber (2016), p. 544; Germanò (2016), p. 23. In this regard, see also Costato (2011).

See Art. 42 TFEU. See also, among others, Martinez (2016b).

These legal but also the economic peculiarities of agriculture and the agricultural market make it clear that this is an independent legal system. See Germanò (2016), p. 24. See also Norer (2017b), p. 641 et seq.; Martinez (2016c), p. 760 et seq.

Conversely, it is also true that the determination of such a topic must always be seen in connection with a specific legal discipline that requires a separate analysis. It follows from this difference that the special European legal standards dealing with agriculture do not only indicate that a separate consideration may be opportune, but rather that such a separate consideration may quasi be required.

This approach is highlighted by the two judgments:. See Case T-61/89 (Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening v Commission of the European Communities), Judgment of 2 July 1992 and Case C-164/97 (European Parliament v. Council of the European Union), judgment of 25 February 1999.

See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 111 et seq.

Accordingly, ‘agricultural activity’ means the production, rearing or growing of agricultural products including harvesting, milking, breeding animals and keeping animals for farming purposes, or maintaining the land in good agricultural and environmental condition as established in Article 6 (of Reg. 73/2009). See Art. 2 letter c Reg. 73/2009 (OJ L 30/06). See also McMahon (2007), p. 2 et seq.

See also Norer (2017b), p. 639 et seq.; Martinez (2016c), p. 765; Martinez (2016d), p. 772 et seq.; Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 112 et seq.; Albisinni (2014a), p. 973 et seq.

See Norer (2017b), p. 643 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 1553 et seq.; Norer (2017c), p. 656 et seq.

With regard to the content of the agricultural policy itself, Articles 40 to 42 TFEU provide only indications as to which measures are intended to achieve these objectives. The central instrument is the common organisation of agricultural markets (Art. 4 para. 1 letter c TFEU), but also agricultural structural policy, various measures such as vocational training or sales promotion (Art. 41 TFEU) and the consideration of agriculture in the competitive sector (Art. 42 TFEU). Today, three pillars of the CAP have emerged: the Common Market Organisation, rural development and legal harmonisation. The fundamental principles of the CAP are market unity, Union preference (priority for production in the internal market) and financial solidarity (Union financing). Their validity as political guidelines is undisputed, but their importance and scope as legal principles—possibly directly applicable—appear doubtful. See Holzer (2018), p. 185 et seq.; Bieber (2016), pp. 545 et seq. and 547 et seq.; Norer (2017b), p. 647 et seq.

In addition to the integration of agriculture into the internal market, Article 38 para. 4 of the TFEU lays down the CAP’s application scope. The purpose of designing a CAP is to develop an internal market for agricultural products and make it work. Both must ‘go hand in hand’. Art. 39 TFEU lists the CAP’s objectives, taking into account the particular characteristics of agriculture and its close links with member states’ economies in their entirety. This list of objectives includes increasing productivity, ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural population, stabilising markets, securing supplies and supplying consumers at reasonable prices. A powerful trend in the CAP and common agricultural law can be seen under the keywords of coherence and integration in a networked, integrated view and in consideration of all affected policy areas. This applies particularly to the integration of environmental policy. See Bieber (2016), p. 545 et seq.; Norer (2017c), p. 652 et seq.; Holzer (2018), pp. 171 et seq. and 176 et seq.

See Norer (2017b), p. 636 et seq.; Bieber (2016), p. 545; Epiney (2016), p. 623 et seq.

See Bieber (2016), p. 544 et seq.

See Martinez (2016d), p. 772 et seq., Legal acts based on legal sources other than those in Articles 38 to 44 TFEU are constantly gaining in importance for agriculture: provisions of environmental protection law and nature conservation, structural and regional policy, state aid law, veterinary and public health law, as well as international agreements, legal acts and the setting of standards to implement the internal market, can have wide-ranging effects.

See Art. 4 para. 1 letter e Reg. 1307/2013 (OJ L 347/608).

See Germanò (2016), p. 25; Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 114 et seq. See also Albisinni (2014a), pp. 976 et seq. and 984; Costato (2011), p. 123 et seq. Nevertheless, the list of agricultural products in Annex 1 is still essentially important, as it allows for specifying exemptions from competition law.

Neither in terms of commercial activity, nor in terms of agricultural activity. See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 140.

Judgment of the ECJ of 23 April 1991 (Höfner and Elser v. Macrotron GmbH). See European Court reports 1991, Page I-01979.

See Judgment of the ECJ of 16 June 1987, Commission v. Italy (C-118/85), Judgement of the ECJ of 18 June 1998, Commission v. Italy (C-35/96), Judgment of the ECJ of 12 September 2000, Pavlov and Others, Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98.

See also Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 140 et seq.; Alessi (2006), p. 1237 et seq.

However, here, too, there is no definition. See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 141 fn 29. See also McMahon (2007), p. 2 et seq.

See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 142.

See first part of this chapter.

See also McMahon (2007), p. 3 et seq.

See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 142.

This reorientation moved away from the general objective of maximising production toward economic management, in line with the necessities for being competitive in the market. Furthermore, the aim or basic idea is to keep the rural population on the spot––and to give them a future in agricultural activities. See Holzer (2018), p. 172 et seq.; Norer (2017c), p. 652 et seq. See also Vecchione (2009c), p. 353 et seq. and in general Iannarelli (2007).

See Vecchione (2009c), p. 353 et seq.; Alessi (2006), p. 1258 et seq.; Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 143 et seq.

See Martinez (2016a), p. 793 et seq.; Norer (2017a), p. 670 et seq.; Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), pp. 208 et seq. and 256 et seq.

See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 146 et seq. See also Casadei (2009), p. 336 et seq.; Vecchione (2009c), p. 353 et seq.

See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 142 et seq.

This is also due to the fact that these are categories of terms that require clear definitions so that they can be interpreted.

See Art. 50 Reg. 1307/2013. For details, see, among others, Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 218 fn 33; Holzer (2018), p. 55.

See title V Reg. 1307/2013. For details, see, among others, Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 149; Holzer (2018), p. 55 et seq.

See Art. 9 Reg. 1307/2013. For details, see, among others, Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 149 et seq.; Albisinni (2014a), p. 979 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 54 et seq.

See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the Common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, COM(2018) 392 final (01.06.2018). Art. 4 para. 1 letter d states: ‘genuine farmers shall be defined in a way to ensure that no support is granted to those whose agricultural activity forms only an insignificant part of their overall economic activities or whose principal business activity is not agricultural, while not precluding from support pluri-active farmers. The definition shall allow to determine which farmers are not considered genuine farmers, based on conditions such as income tests, labour inputs on the farm, company object and/or inclusion in registers.’

Here, the production of public goods (i.e., biodiversity, water regulation, land-scape, erosion control, resilience to floods and climate change mitigation)—where there are currently no markets—is essential. See also Casadei (2009), p. 339 et seq. In general, Iannarelli (2007). See also Magno (2006), p. 89 and, on these issues, Albisinni (2014a).

For details, see Holzer (2018), p. 433 et seq.; Holzer (2018), p. 41 et seq.

For details, see Germanò and Rook Basile (2011), p. 775 et seq. See also Casadei (2009), p. 336 et seq.; Sgarbanti (2009).

This issue is also regulated by the relevant Italian collective agreement, which governs employment relationships between enterprises engaged in agricultural activities, as well as related activities—including enterprises engaged in the creation, development and maintenance of public and private green areas—and the agricultural workers employed by them.

On this issue, see, among others, Canfora (2008). See also Costantino (2013), Albisinni (2013, 2014b), Sepe (2013) and Iannarelli (2008b, 2011).

A producer organisation (PO) is a strategic tool developed by the European Commission, and this is fully in line with the broader objective of reforming the Common Agricultural Policy (introduced by Art. 11 of Reg. (EC) No. 2200/96 and confirmed by Reg. (EC) No. 1234/2007 and Reg. 1308/2013 (OJ L 347/671). See also Iannarelli (2008a).

Studies have revealed that POs are mostly organised by means of cooperatives. See Van der Sangen (2012), p. 101. Also consider Ecorys and Wageningen Economic Research (2018), pp. 15 and 27. According to the specific Italian legal framework, these entities can be organised as a joint-stock company, agricultural cooperative and its consortia and/or consortium societies. See Art. 3 para. 1 legislative decree no. 102/2005.

See Art. 152 para. 1 letter b Reg. 1308/2013. In the PO, the decision of ‘what, how and how much to produce’ results from the sum of multiple free individual decisions, which are not shattered into disjointed entrepreneurial behaviours but contained in a collective will capable of orienting those behaviours.

See Art. 152 para. 1 Reg. 1308/2013. See also Holzer (2018), p. 192; Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 154 et seq.; Germanò (2016), p. 132; Costantino (2013), p. 1449; Alessi (2006), p. 1271 et seq.; Norer (2017a), p. 667 et seq.

See Art. 32 Reg. 1308/2013. Concerning the economic functioning of POs, see Ecorys and Wageningen Economic Research (2018), p. 9 et seq.; Amat et al. (2019), p. 145 et seq.; Ajates Gonzalez (2018), p. 22 et seq. See also Alessi (2006), p. 1271 et seq.

The objectives are: (1) ensuring that production is planned and adjusted to demand, particularly in terms of quality and quantity; (2) concentration of supply and the placing on the market of the products produced by its members, including through direct marketing; (3) optimising production costs and returns on investments in response to environmental and animal welfare standards, and stabilising producer prices; (4) carrying out research and developing initiatives on sustainable production methods, innovative practices, economic competitiveness and market developments; (5) promoting, and providing technical assistance for, the use of environmentally sound cultivation practices and production techniques, and sound animal welfare practices and techniques; (6) promoting, and providing technical assistance for, the use of production standards, improving product quality and developing products with a protected designation of origin, with a protected geographical indication or covered by a national quality label; (7) the management of by-products and of waste in particular to protect the quality of water, soil and landscape and preserving or encouraging biodiversity; (8) contributing to a sustainable use of natural resources and to climate change mitigation; (9) developing initiatives in the area of promotion and marketing; (10) managing of the mutual funds referred to in operational programmes in the fruit and vegetables sector referred to in Article 31(2) of this Regulation and under Article 36 of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, (11) providing the necessary technical assistance for the use of the futures markets and of insurance schemes. See Art. 152 para. 1 letter c Reg. 1308/2013.

See Art. 32 Reg. 1308/2013.

Art. 33 para. 1 subpara. 2 Reg. 1308/2013. In addition, specific support may be granted for the establishment of a PO under the rural development programme of a Member State.

See Art. 154 para. 1 letter b and c Reg. 1308/2013. POs may also ask the member states to lay down binding rules for the supply of certain products (cheese and ham) bearing a protected designation of origin or a protected geographical indication. See Art. 150 and Art. 172 Reg. 1308/2013.

See Art. 154 para. 1 letter b Reg. 1308/2013. Moreover, according to Art. 154 para. 1 letter c the PO must provide sufficient evidence that it can carry out its activities properly, both over time and in terms of effectiveness, provision of human capital, material and technical support to its members, and as appropriate concentration of supply. See also Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 157; Holzer (2018), p. 192. See also Amat et al. (2019).

In general, the EU encourages farmers to set up POs.

See Art. 159 Reg. 1308/2013. The importance of this collaboration vehicle is also demonstrated by the fact that recognised POs’ rules also may be extended to non-members. See Art. 164 Reg. 1308/2013.

See Holzer (2018), p. 192, Here the specific link between agricultural activities and the mechanisms of the free market is evident.

See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 158; Germanò (2016), p. 132; Costato and Russo (2015), p. 162. In general, Costantino (2013).

See Arts. 168 et seq. Reg. 1308/2013.

See Arts. 169 et seq. Reg. 1308/2013.

See Costato and Russo (2015), p. 162 et seq.

These similarities also are shown by acknowledging that POs can be the first step to a formation of a cooperative, and cooperatives may comprise several POs recognised for different agricultural sectors. The introduction of POs has been endorsed by the European Union as part of its policy to ensure that farmers remain competitive and have the bargaining power to do so. See Van der Sangen (2012), p. 18 et seq.; Ecorys and Wageningen Economic Research (2018), p. 105 et seq. As already mentioned, bargaining power is also created by agricultural cooperatives and is one of their factors for success. See Sect. 1.​3.​3.

See Art. 153 para. 2 letter c Reg. 1308/2013. The fact that different implementation models exist in this respect is illustrated in a 2012 study. See Van der Sangen (2012), p. 18 et seq.

See also Ajates Gonzalez (2018), p. 23 et seq.

See Arts. 152, 222, 209 and 149 Reg. 1308/2013. Yet, POs must offer the possibility of integrating members’ activities in other ways, with the aim of producing efficiency gains that, in turn, should compensate for the possible negative effects of joint selling. See van Herck (2014), p. 14. On this issue, see also Albisinni (2013), p. 12.

See Art. 154 para. 1 Reg. 1308/2013; in particular Art. 154 para. 1 letter a in conjunction with Art. 152 para. 1 letter c Reg. 1308/2013. On this issue, see also Ecorys and Wageningen Economic Research (2018), p. 9 et seq.

Which are primarily anchored in private law.

See Commission delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/232 of 15 December 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to certain aspects of producer cooperation (OJ L 44/1).

And this will probably become even clearer if one considers that modern agri-food production is a not insignificant driver of anthropogenic climate change and that the European legislature can take this circumstance into account, among other things, through the instrument of cross-compliance.

This chapter analyses the position of members within an SCE. It does not analyse specific rights and obligations, except where necessary to understand the issues. This focus is saved for the chapters on the general meeting and financing issues.

Art. 1 para. 3 SCE-R states: “An SCE shall have as its principal object the satisfaction of its members’ needs and/or the development of their economic and social activities, in particular through the conclusion of agreements with them to supply goods or services or to execute work of the kind that the SCE carries out or commissions. An SCE may also have as its object the satisfaction of its members’ needs by promoting, in the manner set forth above, their participation in economic activities, in one or more SCEs and/or national cooperatives. An SCE may conduct its activities through a subsidiary.” For general information, see Sect. 3.2. On this issue, see also Pönkä (2018).

Like public limited-liability companies.

See Lehner (2007), p. 148; Lehner (2009), p. 99 et seq. Also consider Schöpflin (2018a), p. 1241 et seq.; Bianca and Zanardo (2016), p. 204 et seq.; Racugno (2006), pp. 317; Chirico and Troianiello (2007), p. 43; Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 80. See also Pönkä (2018), p. 43 et seq.

They do not have to refer to the members’ needs, but may be described as secondary goals. See Schöpflin (2018a), p. 1241 et seq.

Thus, ideal aims can be promoted. It is important to stress that an SCE may not focus solely on remuneration of the capital subscribed by its members via conducting business with third parties. See Schöpflin (2018a), p. 1241 et seq. Also consider Lutter et al. (2012), p. 1586; Albamonte (2008), p. 298 et seq.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 80.

See Recital 10 bullet 1 SCE-R.

See Recital 10 bullet 2 SCE-R. Also consider Albamonte (2008), p. 304.

This does not imply that ultimately a single user member wants his needs to be satisfied. See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270 et seq. As a result of admission to an SCE, and in accordance with the principle of double quality, customers become members. Their position when transacting with a cooperative is changed from a mere voluntary relation to something more, even though the specifics of this involvement under Recital 10 are vague. See Münkner (2014), p. 52. Also consider Fici (2012), p. 9; Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 80. Generally, Birchall (2011), p. 3 et seq. In general, the obligation to participate is based on agreeing to the statutes. See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 80.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 80.

See Schöpflin (2018a), p. 1241 et seq.

In this sense, Art. 14 para. 1 subpara. 3 SCE-R states that members who are legal bodies shall be deemed users members by virtue of the fact that they represent their own members, provided the members are themselves users. These members have to be natural persons. In other words, this provision is not applicable if the members are legal persons. Thus members of the legal persons need not necessarily be members of the SCE. In fact, the provisions states “are users”, and subpara. 3 should make membership superfluous. See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270 et seq.

See Recitals 9 and 10 bullet 2 SCE-R.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 82. Generally, Schöpflin (2018a), p. 1242 et seq; Schöpflin (2018c), p. 1250 et seq.

Between the SCE and its members. See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 80.

See Sect. 2.​1.

See Sect. 3.2.

The basic rule in this context is contained in Sec. 1 GenG, referring to the promotion purpose of a cooperative, which must be specified by the statutes.

See Art. 2516 CC. Also consider Hirte (2007), p. 2216.

Other questions regarding specific rights and duties will be dealt with in the chapters on financing. See Sect. 5.​3.

See Laurinkari (1990), p. 403. Also consider Chirico and Troianiello (2007), p. 43.

It states: “An SCE may not extend the benefits of its activities to non-members or allow them to participate in its business, except where its statutes provide otherwise.”

The relevant feature here is that the customer is not obliged to subscribe capital. The same is true for cooperatives which offer their services to disabled people (e.g., cooperative sociali in Italy or société coopérative d'intérét collectif in France). See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 81. Also consider Schöpflin (2018a), p. 1241 et seq. In general, Laurinkari (1990).

See Greda (2014), p. 835 et seq. Also consider Chirico and Troianiello (2007), p. 43. Critical, Beuthien (2007), p. 7.

See Art. 14 para. 1 subpara. 2 SCE-R.

For details see Sects. 3.5.2 and 5.​6.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 81.

And vice versa. See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270 et seq.

The SCE-R refers to both members, and third parties in the context of investors. In fact, Art. 64 para. 1 sent. 1 SCE-R allows the formulation of a statutory provision, according to which an SCE may issue “securities other than shares, or debentures the holders of which are to have no voting rights.” They may be subscribed by both members and non-members, although they do not confer member status. See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 81 et seq.; Albamonte (2008), p. 309; Bianca and Zanardo (2016), p. 206.

See Greda (2014), p. 834.

See Iengo (2006), p. 9 et seq.

See Paolucci (2012a), p. 99 et seq.; Paolucci (2019a), p. 29 et seq.; Tatarano (2011), p. 69; Paolucci (2012b), p. 4 fn 7. Also consider de Giorgi and Vaciago (2011), p. 192 et seq.

Due to Art. 8 para. 1 letter c SCE-R.

I.e., when the agricultural SCE transacts with its members.

See Giorgi (2018a), p. 3207 et seq.; Cuomo (2014), p. 109 et seq. Generally, Cuomo (2013). Also see Paolucci (2019b), p. 51 et seq.; Santagata (2017), p. 811.

See Art. 2527 CC. Also consider Paolucci (2019b), p. 51 et seq.; Tonelli (2003), p. 49 et seq.; Giorgi (2018a), p. 3207 et seq. Also Cuomo (2014), p. 100; Santagata (2017), p. 811.

A right to obtain services could jeopardise the economic success or even survival of the cooperative. The same is true for patronage refunds, where members also do not have rights. See Paolucci (2019b), pp. 51 et seq. and 54; Giorgi (2018a), p. 3207 et seq. Also consider Cuomo (2014), pp. 100 et seq., 114, 121; Santagata (2017), p. 809 et seq.

See Paolucci (2019b), p. 52. Also consider Art. 2521 para. 2 CC.

See Giorgi (2018a), p. 3207 et seq.; Schirò (2008a), p. 43; Santagata (2017), p. 811.

See Art. 2521 para. 2 CC.

The 2003 company law reform introduced a distinction between mainly mutual cooperatives and other cooperatives. For general observations consider Paolucci (2019l), p. 52 et seq.; Bonfante (2014), p. 132 et seq.; Marano (2014), p. 72 et seq.; Marasà (2004), p. 50 et seq.; Bassi and Passalacqua (2014), p. 13 et seq. Also consider Marasà (2013), p. 847. See also Paolucci (2019a), p. 29 et seq.; Santagata (2017), p. 813 et seq.

See Art. 2512 CC. According to Art. 2513 CC, the status of this condition must be reported in the balance sheet.

See Arts. 2513 and Art. 2514 CC. For details, see Sects. 5.​3 and 5.​4.

See Art. 2513 para. 3 CC.

See Rocchi (2007), p. 45 et seq., Similar, Marano (2014), p. 75 et seq.; Carmignani (2011), p. 259 et seq. Partially different, Di Ronza (2010), p. 34.

See Rocchi (2007), p. 45 et seq. Similar, Marano (2014), p. 75 et. seq. This provision must be viewed as an exception to the former three, which delineate the general framework on how to calculate mutuality, whereas here, the legislature has determined ad hoc criteria for a specific type of agricultural cooperative.

See Art. 2514 para. 1 CC. See Sects. 5.​3, 5.​5 and 5.​6.

See Sects. 5.​3, 5.​4 and 5.​5.

See Ingrosso (2013), Sect. 3.

Art. 2520 para. 2 CC refers to special laws for cooperatives, stating that special laws can allow founding cooperatives that aim to promote the needs of special categories of persons, even though they are not members. In this context, law no. 381/1991, which governs social cooperatives, is important. It is important to stress that the Italian legislator primarily fostered what Italian cooperative theory defines as “internal mutuality”, whereby cooperatives must favour the promotion of their members’ needs. See Bonfante (2014), p. 149. See also Santagata (2017), p. 813 et seq. For the differentiation between internal, external and systemic mutuality, see Sect. 3.2, Sects. 5.​3 and 5.​5 fn 306. Regarding the agricultural sector, here one can refer to social farming. As mentioned, this study does not further deal with this specific issue.

Art. 1 para. 4 SCE-R.

See Ministry for economic development (2006), Art. 1; Fici and Strano (2010), p. 674. Also see Sect. 2.​5.

By applying the clauses contained in Art. 2514 CC. See Ministry for economic development (2006), Art. 1; Chirico and Troianiello (2007), p. 35.

See Bonfante (2014), p. 186 et seq. Also consider Tatarano (2011), p. 86; Galgano (1993), p. 38 et seq.; Marasà (1992), p. 369. In general, Ragazzini (1992).

See Rocchi (2006), p. 97 et seq.; Mazzoli and Rocchi (1996), p. 117 et seq.

See Bonfante (2014), p. 186 et seq.

See Bonfante (2014), p. 291 et seq.

Or non-members, as Art. 2526 CC applies regardless of whether a person is a member or not.

The only real limit defined for financial instruments is contained in para. 2 of Art. 2526 CC, according to which the privileges of allocation of profits or reimbursement of capital, do not include the indivisible reserves determined by Art. 2545 ter CC. Consider in this context, Sect. 5.​5.

The specific characteristics of financial instruments issued by a cooperative, will depend on the statutes. Hence, a cooperative may issue a variety of financial instruments such as equity financial instruments (admitting investor members), bonds or hybrids (participative bonds). See Lamandini (2007), p. 214 et seq.; Cusa (2006), p. 25 et seq.; Rescigno (2007), p. 932.

See Lolli (2012), p. 151; Paolucci (2019f), p. 85 et seq. The law gives a wide range of freedom to draft the statutes in this context. Accordingly, statutes may define the financial and administrative rights of the holder of financial instruments. See Lamandini (2007), p. 214.

E.g., voting rights. Non-user members are ultimately an optional minority group with regards to user members. They are considered instrumental in relation to traditional user members. See Bonfante (2014), p. 186 et seq. Also consider Marasà (2012), p. 202.

See Art. 1 para. 4 SCE-R.

See Art. 39 para. 3 SCE-R, Art. 59 para. 3 SCE-R or Art. 61 para. 3 subpara. 2 SCE-R. Also consider Lutter et al. (2012), p. 1601 et seq.; Münkner (2006), p. 22.

As seen, this can also be achieved through subscription of shares in legal entities, although only in a subordinated manner.

The basic rule in this context is contained in Sec. 1 GenG, referring to the promotion purpose of a cooperative, which must be specified by the statutes.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014a), p. 180; also consider Zahn (1963), p. 37; Holthaus and Lehnhoff (2016), p. 223 et seq.

See Kastner et al. (1990), p. 17 et seq.; Keinert (1988), p. 111; OGH 07.04.1987, 5 Ob 29/86 SZ60/62.

For instance, consider the discussion on investor members. See Astl and Steinböck (2014a), p. 180 et seq.; Keinert (1988), p. 150.

In this context one may refer to it as relative equal treatment. See Astl and Steinböck (2014a), p. 181; Keinert (1988), p. 111. In addition, absolute equal treatment exists for certain matters. Consider, e.g., the right of resignation. See Astl and Steinböck (2014a), p. 181. If the equal treatment is not absolute, unjustified discrimination is permitted provided the affected person consents. See Astl and Steinböck (2014a), p. 181.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014a), p. 181 et seq.; OGH 07.04.1987, 5 Ob 29/86 SZ60/62.

The cooperative (SCE) must also observe those fiduciary duties whose best manifestation is the principle of equal treatment. See Astl and Steinböck (2014a), p. 184; Holthaus and Lehnhoff (2016), p. 236.

See Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2013 ).

Genossenschaftsvertrag.

The so-called “principle of identity”.

See Dellinger (2014), p. 23; Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2013), nt15–nt 18, findok.bmf.gv.at/findok?execution=e1s1 (13.02.2017).

Also consider Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2013), nt 15- nt 18 and Schöpflin (2018a), p. 1241 et seq.

Counter transactions are those necessary to conduct primary main transactions. For example, in a credit cooperative whose aim is to offer loans to its members a typical counter transaction would be the deposit business. Another example would be a consumer cooperative which purchases its goods from a producer. Dellinger (2014), p. 23 et seq.; also consider Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2013), nt 16.

Auxiliary transactions are necessary to transact both the primary and counter transactions, e.g., hiring employees or renting a shop. See Dellinger (2014), p. 24; also consider Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2013), nt 17.

Sideline transactions are all other types of transactions, e.g., those conducted to achieve social or idealistic goals but which are not covered by the promotion purpose of the cooperative. In this context, one can refer to privilege of sideline aims (Nebenzweckprivileg). See Dellinger (2014), p. 24; also consider Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2013), nt 18.

See Dellinger (2014), p. 23.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014e), p. 160.

See Dellinger (2014), p. 23; Nowotny (2008), nt 5/13; Frotz (1977), p. 59.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014e), p. 160; also consider Pramer and Pfaffenzeller (1976), p. 6; Kastner (1986), p. 137. If non-member business is conducted without a specific statutory provision, the transaction is still effective, but the management organ could be liable for any damage sustained. See Astl and Steinböck (2014e), p. 160. Also consider Sec. 23 GenG.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014e), p. 160.

See Dellinger (2014), p. 33. There are no limits on transactions conducted to fulfil the purpose of the cooperative, including counter transactions and auxiliary transactions. See Astl and Steinböck (2014e), p. 160; also consider Keinert (1988), p. 88 et seq.; Pramer and Pfaffenzeller (1976), p. 6 et seq.

See Dellinger (2014), p. 33.

Also Nowotny (2008), nt 5/9; Dellinger (2014), p. 28. A further distinguishing feature of the Zweckgeschäfte results from how benefits are distributed among members. Unlike companies, which distribute their benefits after the fact in the form of dividends, cooperatives distribute their benefits directly by conducting business with their members. As a result, the conditions of the purpose transactions must be calculated based on the benefit to the members, not the cooperative. Thus, the promotion purpose aims to ensure that members who conclude transactions with the cooperative gain an economic advantage. See Dellinger (2014), p. 24.

See Greda (2014), p. 835 et seq.

Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2013).

Sec. 3 SCEG.

See Greda (2014), p. 835.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014e), p. 162.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014e), p. 162.

See Kober (2008), p. 47 et seq.

This only requires national law to permit the admission of non-user members without making further national rules applicable. In addition, other articles of the SCE-R dealing with the admission of members in general are applicable to non-user members. See Art. 4 para. 7 sent. 1 SCE-R, Art. 14 SCE-R para. 1 subpara. 4 or para. 2 SCE-R.

Art. 14 para. 1 subpara. 2 sent. 2 SCE-R.

Art. 59 para. 3 SCE-R, which defers almost everything about voting rights granted to non-user members to national law.

Art. 61 para. 3 SCE-R.

Art. 39 para. 3 SCE-R.

Promotion purpose and internal mutual purpose.

Especially since the enactment of the URÄG 2008. See Sect. 3.2.

The mutual purpose does not substantially differ from the purpose which the SCE-R assigns to an SCE according to Art. 1 para. 3 SCE-R. See Fici and Strano (2010), p. 682.

Art. 5 para. 4 SCE-R.

In this context, Recital 10 points out that the members should naturally be involved in the activities of the SCE, for instance as customers, employees or suppliers. In addition, the opening clause of Art. 1 para. 4 SCE-R states that third parties who are not members of the SCE, may not take advantage of its activities unless the statutes provide otherwise.

These prevent unequal treatment, unless based on objective reasons. Thus, ultimately differentiations can be made.

Sec. 1.4 para. 2 PECOL.

See Fici (2017), p. 41.

See Iengo (2006), p. 9 et seq.

Doctrine and the law have developed the category of Zweckgeschäft. Members must be promoted via these types of transaction. Other categories of transaction have also been developed by doctrine, including counter transactions, supporting transactions and sideline transaction. These are not bound to membership and, thus, can be conducted with anybody. Counter transactions and supporting transactions are conducted to fulfil the purpose of the cooperative. Hence they can be conducted without limits.

This does not require to set a ratio between member business and non-member business, as long as the non-member business is in the minority.

To enjoy tax benefits and thus become a mainly mutual cooperative, cooperatives must opt in via statutory provision, as determined by Art. 2514 CC.

Crucially, the SCE-R does not contain any information on the relation between members and non-members. Thus it seems to propose a rather flexible approach, which would allow the adoption of either model outlined in the Italian legal system. Yet, the SCE-R does not require the criterion of essentiality, meaning it differs from the model of an Austrian cooperative.

See Sec. 1.4 para. 1 PECOL.

The PECOL use the term “cooperative transactions”, and similar concepts are applied under Italian law. In fact this relates to mutual relationships. Similarly, German and Austrian scholars use the term Zweckgeschäfte (purpose transactions) for the typical transactions with members. See Fici (2017), p. 41.

Section 1.5 of PECOL deals with transactions with non-members. It acknowledges that activities with non-members are necessary, but requires them to be limited (but not prohibited), at least for mutual cooperatives (General interest cooperatives may conduct business with third parties without restrictions.). It is stressed that this is necessary to preserve the distinct identity of mutual cooperatives. Clearly, non-member business in mutual cooperatives may be prohibited via statute. See Sec. 1.5 para. 2 PECOL, Fici (2017), p. 43 et seq. Interestingly, the approach contained in Art. 1 para. 4 SCE-R works the other way around, as the basic rule is that non-member business is not allowed unless the statutes provide otherwise. Thus, it can be argued that the general model of the PECOL is based on the assumption that non-member business in mutual cooperatives is the norm, rather than the exception. As mentioned above, a further difference is that the SCE-R does not try to regulate the relationship between members and non-members, either in terms of numbers or quality. This is linked to the fact that Art. 1 para. 4 SCE-R does not differentiate between satisfying members needs and developing social activities. This latter refers to social cooperatives which provide services in the general interest instead of focusing primarily on its members’ needs.

See Sec. 1.4 para. 3 PECOL. Then Sec. 1.5 para. 3 PECOL explicitly specifies that non-members may be allowed to become members. It also requires the revenue from non-member cooperative transactions to be allocated to indivisible reserves (Sec 1.5 para. 5 PECOL). These last two provisions are to prevent the abuse of the cooperative legal form. See Fici (2017), p. 43 et seq. As will be seen (Sect. 5.​3), the Italian legal system requires indivisible reserves on a mandatory basis, whereas the Austrian legal system simply allows indivisible reserves as a faculty.

Here the PECOL (Sec. 1.3 para. 3 PECOL) specifically stress that these members shall support the cooperative via their contributions. E.g., voluntary work or capital. See Fici (2017), p. 39.

See Fici (2017), p. 43 et seq. In addition, Sec. 1.3 para. 5 PECOL requires specific statutory provisions to admit non-user members.

See Bonfante (2014), p. 199.

See Sect. 2.​1.

These provisions are contained in Chap. 1, which outlines general provisions. See also Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 77.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 78; Bianca and Zanardo (2016), p. 208. According to Art. 5 para. 4 SCE-R, the statutes must include not only “the conditions and procedures for the admission, expulsion and resignation of members,” but also “the rights and obligations of members, and the different categories of members, if any, and the rights and obligations of members in each category.” In this context, see Art. 14 para. 1 subpara. 4 SCE-R, Art. 14 para. 2 SCE, Art. 4 para. 1 subpara. 2 SCE-R or Art. 1 para. 4 SCE-R.

Art. 2 para. 1 bullets 1–3 state:

An SCE may be formed as follows:

— by five or more natural persons resident in at least two member states,

— by five or more natural persons and companies and firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48 of the Treaty and other legal bodies governed by public or private law, formed under the law of a Member State, resident in, or governed by the law of, at least two different member states,

— by companies and firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48 of the Treaty and other legal bodies governed by public or private law formed under the law of a Member State which are governed by the law of at least two different member states.

Art. 2 para. 1 bullets 2 and 3 SCE-R. If provided for by national law, a local authority can also become a member of an SCE. As a result, an SCE can also try to satisfy public needs. See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 78; Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq.

Former Art. 48 para. 2 ECT. See Art. 2 para. 1 bullets 2 and 3 SCE-R.

See Art. 54 para. 2 TFEU.

This is based on the right of establishment, as contained in Art. 49 para. 2 TFEU. This right of establishment is interpreted broadly. See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 78.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 78. Also consider Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq; Iengo (2006); Chirico and Troianiello (2007), p. 68. Generally, Lutter et al. (2012), p. 64 et seq.

Even though Art. 14 para. 1 subpara. 4 SCE-R only refers to natural persons and legal bodies, it has been correctly observed that it would not make sense to allow such associations of persons to form a new SCE, only to deny them membership at a later stage. See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270. The same is true for companies prior to registration, and therefore also cooperatives prior to registration. See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270 et seq.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 78 et seq.; Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq.

If an SCE’s membership is exclusively made up of cooperatives, it is called a “secondary” or “second-degree” cooperative. See Recital 9. Also consider Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 78 et seq.; Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq.

See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270 et seq.; Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 78 et seq.

See Recital 9, which states: “Cooperatives have a share capital and their members may be either individuals or enterprises. These members may consist wholly or partly of customers, employees or suppliers. Where a cooperative is constituted of members who are themselves cooperative enterprises, it is known as a ‘secondary’ or ‘second-degree’ cooperative. In some circumstances cooperatives may also have among their members a specified proportion of investor members who do not use their services, or of third parties who benefit by their activities or carry out work on their behalf.”

While these issues can be considered settled due to the 2003 company law reform, it was previously ignored. This might be linked to the economy, which at that time was not well developed. A different situation applied during the Fascist period. At that time, cooperatives were increasingly seen as an instrument for achieving political goals. As a result, representatives of the state were admitted as members to act as a guardian for the Fascist regime and provide financial resources. As a result, the old version of Art. 2532 para. 3 CC expressly allowed legal persons to be members of a cooperative. More precisely, statutory provisions could grant up to five voting rights to legal persons depending on their quota and the number of members. Nowadays, a similar provision can be found in Art. 2538 para. 3 CC. See Bonfante (2014), p. 206 et seq. Also consider Racugno (2014), p. 196 et seq.; Paolucci (2019e), p. 81 et seq.

It has been discussed whether companies might also be admitted. During the period immediately following the Second World War, it was argued that companies could not be members of cooperatives because the promotion purpose at the heart of the cooperative system cannot be reconciled with the goals of a capitalistic society. Especially public limited-liability companies. However, during the early 1960s the discussion changed.

Para. 3 determines that the statutes may assign any member that is a legal entity up to five votes, either in relation to the capital held or the number of its members. It does not explicitly address the question of who may become a member.

Which hence do not have the status of a legal person. See Bonfante (2014), p. 208; Racugno (2014), p. 198. Also consider Marasà (1992), p. 368.

But not regarding the somewhat cumbersome formula.

In this case scholars refer to “indirect” mutuality (mutualità mediata). See Bonfante (2014), p. 151.

Art. 2527 para. 1 CC states that membership requirements must be determined via statutes and must agree with the object of the cooperative (its mutualistic aim) and its economic activity. It is also required that they be defined according to non-discriminatory criteria.

Special legislation often allows membership of legal entities based on instrumental grounds. See Bonfante (2014), p. 208; also consider Chieffi (2007), p. 230; Paolucci (2019g), p. 88 et seq.

The legislative framework has also been changed to allow freelancers to form a cooperative. See law no 266/1997 and law no 183/2011 and decree no 1/2012). See Bonfante (2014), p. 210.

See Bonfante (2014), p. 209; there is also nothing restricting this option to small- or medium-sized enterprises. See Bonfante (2014), p. 210; Marasà (1984), p. 309; Oppo (1992), p. 404. The law on social cooperatives allows membership to be granted to public or private entities who are interested in developing the activity of the social cooperative, along with voluntary or disadvantaged workers. See Art. 11 law No 381/1991.

Consider, for instance, the specific provisions regarding social cooperatives.

Art. 15 para. 1 bullet 2 SCE-R.

Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, private limited-liability company.

Aktiengesellschaft, public limited-liability company.

Offene Gesellschaft, general partnership.

Kommanditgesellschaft, limited partnership.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 128; also consider Kastner (1986), p. 130; Keinert (1988), p. 269.

See Art. 8 para. 2 SCE-R. Also consider Schröder (2010), p. 186 et seq. Other areas not covered by the SCE-R must be determined according to international private law. Schöpflin (2018d), p. 1262 et seq. The legal form of cooperatives is generally not available to freelancers, as employment law restricts which legal forms of incorporation they can choose. Consider, for instance, the Austrian professional law for lawyers Sec. 1a Rechtsanwaltsordnung. See Miribung and Reiner (2013), p. 236.

Art. 5 para. 4 bullet 5 SCE-R determines that statutes shall include the conditions for admission of members.

See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270 et seq.; Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 79; Albamonte (2008), p. 308.

See Rocchi (2006), p. 111. Also consider Bianca and Zanardo (2016), p. 205.

Art. 14 para. 2 SCE-R states:

“Unless the statutes provide otherwise, membership of an SCE may be acquired by natural persons or legal bodies. The statutes may make admission subject to other conditions, in particular: (a) subscription of a minimum amount of capital, (b) conditions related to the objects of the SCE.” For the minimum number and value of shares, see Sect. 5.​2.

Art. 4 para. 7 SCE-R refers to a minimum number of shares which must be subscribed to qualify as a member, while Art. 14 para. 2 SCE-R refers to the subscription of a minimum amount of capital or contribution in kind, greater than the threshold determined by the former norm. See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 79.

Art. 14 para. 2 bullet 2 SCE-R refers to the possibility and readiness for promotion. This can be based on a special company goal, a specific number of employees, social needs or services for or within the SCE. See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1269 et seq. Also consider Lutter et al. (2012), p. 1602.

As long as the applicable national law provides for such a possibility. See Art. 14 para. 1 subpara. 2 SCE-R.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 78 et seq.; Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1269 et seq.; Lehner (2007), p. 150.

Of course, the relevant statutory provisions may be altered by applying the normal amendment procedure. See Lehner (2007), p. 150. Also consider Art. 61 para. 4 SCE-R.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 79.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 79 et seq.; Schöpflin (2018c), p. 1250 et seq.

If a SCE is formed through a merger between two (or more) existing cooperatives through converting a cooperative formed under the law of a particular member state, the members of the founding cooperatives become members of the SCE ipso iure. See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 79 et seq.

Art. 2527 para. 1 CC is fundamentally important for developing the concept of a cooperative’s mutual purpose. It is described as a tool for putting the promotion purpose into practice. It considerably simplified the former legal discipline. See Bonfante (2014), p. 202 et seq.; Capo (2014a), p. 227 et seq.; Bonfante (2004a), p. 2494. See also Paolucci (2019g), p. 88 et seq. Depending on the object of the cooperative, the requirements for admission must consider the specific requirements contained in special laws. Consider, for instance, social cooperatives or cooperative banks. The specific provisions concerning cooperative banks determine that members must reside (or have a registered office or operate continuously) in the territory where the bank operates (see Art. 34 para. 2 legislative decree 385/1993).

The more open formulation of Art. 14 para. 2 SCE-R prevails. See Art. 14 para. 2 SCE-R prevails due to Art. 8 para. 1 letter b SCE-R. A specific aim of Art. 2527 CC—in combination with Art. 2528 CC—is to make the open door principle more concrete and applicable. See Paolucci (2019g), p. 88 et seq.; Paolucci (2019h), p. 90 et seq.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 128; Keinert (1988), p. 267; Kastner (1986), p. 139; Zahn (1963), p. 24.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 129; also consider Kastner (1986), p. 139; Keinert (1988), p. 269.

Dealing with the minimum number of shares.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 129.

See Sec. 15 and Sec. 24 GenG.

See Sect. 4.​2.​1.​3.

In principle, membership is acquired via a stipulation of contract or by transfer or purchase of shares. See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1269 et seq. Also consider Alfandari and Piot (2004), pp. 79, 83; Korte (2012), p. 335. The prerequisite of entry to the contract is not explicitly laid down in the SCE-R, but it can be derived from the fact that membership (according to Art. 4 para. 7 SCE-R) is accompanied by the subscription of capital. See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 79.

According to Art. 5 para. 4 bullet 5 SCE-R, the statutes of an SCE must include the conditions and procedures for admitting new members.

Specifically, the regulation refers to the subscription of a minimum amount of capital and to conditions related to the object of the SCE. In contrast, the minimum number of shares which must be subscribed for in order to qualify for membership, must be determined by the body stipulating the statutes (Art. 4 para. 7 SCE-R).

See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270 et seq. Also consider Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 83.

Via statutes or the general meeting. See Art. 14 para. 1 subpara. 2 SCE-R.

This must be at the first general meeting held following the application for membership.

See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270 et seq. Different opinion Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 83. Critical, Bonfante (2006), p. 9.

See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 83; Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270.

See Rocchi (2006), p. 111.

This index must contain the address of every member and the number and class of shares they hold. It requires that members shall be registered in a specific alphabetical index.

See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 13271; Lutter et al. (2012), p. 1604.

See Art. 2527 para. 1 CC. For applicants to be admitted as members, they should generally be able to carry out activity with the cooperative (user members). In other words, a person cannot be admitted as a member without the requisite qualities for conducting said activity. The law does not determine what these might be, but requires them to be set via the statutes, taking into account the mutual purpose and economic activity of the cooperative. See Art. 2521 para. 1 no 6 CC and Art. 2527 para. 1 CC. See Capo (2014a), p. 229 et seq.; Schirò (2008b), p. 95 et seq., Santagata (2017), p. 811. See also Paolucci (2019d), p. 68; Paolucci (2019g), p. 88 et seq.

The law on social cooperatives allows admitting public or private entities who are interested in developing the activity of the social cooperatives, as well as voluntary and disadvantaged workers. See Arts 2 and l1 l no 381/91.

The specific provisions regarding cooperative banks state that members must reside (or have a registered office or operate continuously) in the territory where the bank operates (see Art. 34 para. 2 legislative decree 385/1993, TUB).

See Recital 10 bullet 4 SCE-R.

See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1270. As mentioned above, the law allows the admittance of non-user members.

See Art. 2528 paras 1, 3 and para. 4 CC. This approach means the open-door principle is not fully implemented by Italian law, as it does not recognise a right to admission. However, to a certain extent the law protects the interests of candidates wishing to become members. See Capo (2014b), p. 237 et seq.; Mazzoni (2007), p. 770; Bonfante (2004b), p. 2501. Also consider Chirico and Troianiello (2007), p. 39; Paolucci (2019h), p. 90 et seq.

The principle of self-regulation is limited by these safeguards with regards refusal, the right to appeal, the requirement to communicate within 60 days and the need to illustrate the reason for the decision on the balance sheet. See Paolucci (2012a), p. 107; Paolucci (2019g), p. 88 et seq.; Schirò (2008b), p. 102.

Details of the admissions procedure can be determined via statute. See Art. 14 para. 2 SCE-R.

The principle determined by Recital 10 bullet 6 SCE-R, which prohibits artificial restrictions on membership, also refers to the admissions procedure.

Due to Art. 2527 para. 1 CC.

See Cass Civ sez I 26.05.2006 no 12627 (07.02.2017, iusexplorer.it); Tatarano (2011), p. 303; Grosso (2011), p. 2149. Different opinion Bassi and Passalacqua (2014), p. 296. See also Paolucci (2019h), p. 91.

Neither with the written minutes of the decision by the deciding organ, nor with the subscription or the deposit of one part of the quota or share. The admissions procedure has always started with a contractual proposal (a formal application for membership filed by a person) and continued with the acceptance or non-acceptance of the application. See Bonfante (2014), p. 221 fn 221, Bassi and Schlesinger (1988), p. 296. Also consider Sect. 4.​4.​3.

One scholar refers to this as a contract with an open structure, characterised by the possibility of new admissions. See Tatarano (2011), p. 302.

See Paolucci (2012a), p. 108. For details Cusa (2014b), p. 616 et seq.; Paolucci (2019j).

Due to Art. 8 para. 2 SCE-R, which provides accordingly.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014e), pp. 128, 130; Kastner (1986), p. 139.

The same is true for implied actions like paying a deposit. This does not imply that this intention has to be described as such, nor is it required that the declaration must be a specific request for admission. However, a written declaration which unequivocally describes the signatory’s intention to become a member of the cooperative is required. See Astl and Steinböck (2014c), p. 113. Also consider OGH 20.01.1954, 2 Ob 568/53 HS 2274/42 and Keinert (1988), p. 271.

Schöpflin emphasises that the acquisition of membership could also be conducted via the conclusion of a formless contract. See Schöpflin (2018e), p. 1269.

Similar to the declaration required by Sec. 3 para. 2 GenG. See Lehner (2007), p. 151 et seq.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 130; also consider Keinert (1988), p. 277; Kastner (1986), p. 139; Kastner et al. (1990), p. 459.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 130; also consider OGH 23.02.2005, 9 Ob 77/04w; Keinert (1988), p. 275. The statutes can also provide for a condition according to which the member can only exercise his rights if specific conditions are fulfilled. However, it is not possible to limit the length of membership. See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 130 et seq.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014b), p. 187. Austrian law does not contain any obligation to admit new members. The statutes frequently determine certain individual requirements new members have to fulfil (e.g., a particular profession or residence in a certain area). However, even if these requirements are met, the authorising organ does not have to accept their application (unless the statutes provide otherwise). These observations are also valid for an Austrian SCE. Under the Austrian legal system, it is not necessary to provide grounds for refusing membership. In practice, however, the statutes often provide otherwise. See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 131; Dellinger (2014), p. 21 et seq.; Keinert (1988), p. 278; Keinert (1988), p. 81; Kastner (1986), p. 139.

Joining an auditing federation is different. Consider Sec. 19 para. 2 no 2 GenRevG, which defines an entitlement for acceptance. See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 131; Keinert (1988), p. 81.

E.g., to the general meeting. See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 131; Keinert (1988), p. 277.

Art. 1 para. 2 subpara. 2 SCE-R.

For instance to supply a good to another member state. See Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq; Ebers (2004), p. 46.

For details, see Van der Sangen (2012), p. 114.

Governed by public or private law.

According to Art. 15 para. 1 bullet 3 SCE-R.

See Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq. Also consider Chirico and Troianiello (2007), p. 64; Münkner (2006), p. 18.

Art. 73 para. 1 SCE-R.

Art. 2 para. 1 SCE-R specifies that an SCE may be formed by at least five natural persons who are resident in at least two member states. A similar rule applies to legal persons or companies and firms within the meaning of Art. 54 para. 2 TFEU and formed under the law of a member state. In this case, the members have to be “resident in, or governed by the law of at least two different member states.” See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 79. Also consider Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq; Ebers (2004), p. 46.

See Bonfante (2014), p. 188.

This limit refers to user rather than non-user members. See Bonfante (2014), p. 188; Cusa (2006), p. 51 et seq.

In addition, if an Italian cooperative adopts the provisions for an srl instead of those for an spa, the minimum is three members (Art. 2522 para. 2 CC). Special laws may determine other limits for particular types of cooperatives Art. 2522 para. 4 CC. Examples include credit cooperatives, which must have at least 200 members or cooperatives consortiums, which must have at least three members.

If the cooperative adopts the framework for an spa and membership falls below the minimum of nine members, the cooperative can still amend its statutes and adopt the provisions determined for an srl. See Bonfante (2014), p. 189.

Minimum number of members, when the SCE is formed. See Art. 73 SCE-R.

Due to Art. 8 para. l letter c SCE-R.

See Art. 72 SCE-R.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014c), p. 109; also consider Kastner (1986), p. 136; Nowotny (2008), nt 5/39; Keinert (1988), pp. 41 et seq. and 96 et seq.

The criterion of an “indeterminate number of members” is provided by Sec. 1 GenG.

See Dellinger (2014), p. 21; Kastner (1986), p. 122; Keinert (1988), p. 80. Different opinion Pramer and Pfaffenzeller (1976), p. 5. Sec. 6 para. 1 WGG sets a minimum of 60 members for building associations organised as cooperatives.

Unlike Art. 2 para. 1 SCE-R, the PECOL do not differentiate between natural persons and legal or other persons.

See Fici (2017), p. 39.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014c), p. 109; Dellinger (2001), p. 29.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014c), p. 109.

Consider Art. 72 SCE-R.

See Sec. 1.3 PECOL only refers to natural or legal persons here. See also Fici (2017), p. 38 et seq.

However, freelancers are handled differently, with the Austrian legal system being more restrictive here.

E.g., Art. 2527 para. 3 CC.

See Fici (2017), p. 40.

See Art. 2516 CC.

Sec. 2.2 para. 3 PECOL. See also Snaith (2017), p. 49.

See Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 128; also consider Kastner (1986), p. 122 et seq.

Art. 2 para. 1 SCE-R specifies that an SCE may be formed by at least five natural persons who are resident in at least two member states. A similar rule applies to legal persons or companies and firms within the meaning of Art. 54 para. 2 TFEU and formed under the law of a member state. In this case, the members have to be “resident in, or governed by the law of at least two different member states.” See Alfandari and Piot (2004), p. 79. Also consider Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq; Ebers (2004), p. 46.

According to new institutional economics.

See Sect. 1.​3.​3.

See Molk (2014), p. 910 et seq.; Royer (1992), p. 82 et seq.; Lehmann (2014), p. 42; Zoppini (2004), p. 442; Preite (1988), p. 274. Also consider Sykuta and Cook (2001), p. 1276; Szabó (2007). Generally, Ortmann and King (2007), p. 49 et seq.; Eschenburg (1988).

See Fici (2013a), p. 40 et seq.; Henrÿ (2012), p. 78.

See Williamson (1998), p. 75 et seq.

See Lehmann (2014), p. 39; Søgaard (1994), p. 71; Kräkel (2012), p. 350. Also consider Bonus (1986), p. 311 et seq.; Szabó (2004); Ménard (2007).

See Lehmann (2014), p. 39.

In this context, Lehman explains: They can serve as an instrument of vertical integration. In the winemaking example, all economic functions, from the production of grapes to their processing, can be integrated into one unit. Thus, the problems related to asset-specific investments and the risk of exploitation by the contractual counterparty can be resolved. Note that competition among the producers of wine will be diminished through the cooperative. But that is not unwelcome. One of the important lessons learned from the application of NIE is precisely that the elimination of competition may, under certain circumstances, lead to increased efficiency. The need for vertical integration is a powerful explanation for the existence of cooperatives. On the other hand, it is not the only reason for which cooperatives exist. There are many other purposes that can be pursued. For instance, the cooperative form might be used to create a countervailing power against a dominant market actor, such as farmers facing a monopoly from a big retail company, for instance. In this case, a horizontal integration between the actors of the supply side takes place. The cooperative also allows for the horizontal integration of the demand side, as the Scandinavian consumer co-operatives illustrate. In addition, cooperatives may be used to administer common goods, like creating sanctioned fishing grounds to prevent excessive fishing.” See Lehmann (2014), p. 42.

See Lehmann (2014), p. 42; Molk (2014), p. 912. Also consider Kyriakopoulos (2000), p. 28 et seq.; Szabó (2007), p. 9. Generally Birchall (2011), p. 31 et seq.; Hoyt (2004), p. 268 et seq.; Ortmann and King (2007), p. 42 et seq.

Suppliers, workers, customers.

See Molk (2014), pp. 912, 922 et seq. Also consider Szabó (2007), p. 9; Royer (1999), p. 53 et seq.; Egerstrom (2004), p. 80 et seq.; Hansmann (1996), p. 122 et seq.; Adams (1991), p. 22. Also consider Milgrom and Roberts (1992), p. 562 et seq. Generally Birchall (2011), p. 31 et seq. For a specific example, see Hernandez-Espallardo et al. (2013), p. 239.

Positive externalities arise due to decisions (made by an individual or a firm) where the decision maker does not receive the full benefit of his decision. Instead, some benefit goes to external actors who do not provide adequate compensation. “External” implies that the effects of the decision are not sufficiently compensated by the market. See Kräkel (2012), p. 46. Also consider Mattei (1987), p. 9 et seq.; Adams (1991), p. 56 et seq.; Bortoleto and Rogerio de Moura Costa (2012).

See Molk (2014), pp. 912 et seq. and 922; Hansmann (1996), p. 69 et seq. In general Pérotin (2013); Denozza (2002), p. 28 et seq.

See Sect. 1.​3.​2.

The opposite can also be argued, albeit in an abstract fashion. In fact, Hansmann conceptualises a public limited-liability company as a special type of cooperative, the capital cooperative. See Hansmann (1996), p. 13 et seq. Also consider Armour et al. (2009b), p. 15; Hansmann (2011, 2014); Ortmann and King (2007), p. 54 et seq.

This concept of ownership differs from that normally used by law. See Sect. 1.​3.​2.

See Sect. 1.​3.​2.

See Schäfer and Ott (2012), p. 701 et seq.; Armour et al. (2009b), p. 14 et seq. Also consider Ribstein and Kobayashi (1999), p. 81 et seq.; Fama and Jensen (1983).

See Easterbrook and Fischel (1998), p. 35 et seq.; Armour et al. (2009b), p. 15; Hansmann (1996), p. 53 et seq.; Holmstrom (1999), p. 407 et seq.

For details, see Sect. 3.5.2.

See Armour et al. (2009b), p. 11 et seq.; Easterbrook and Fischel (1998), p. 41 et seq.; Bolten et al. (2007), p. 846. Also consider Schäfer and Ott (2012), p. 699 et seq. Corporations whose shares are freely tradeable are therefore also treated as open or public corporations rather than closed or private corporations, where the transferability of shares is restricted. See Armour et al. (2009b), p. 12.

See Armour et al. (2009b), p. 12; Kershaw (2012), p. 18 et seq. For further details, see Sect. 5.​6. Limited liability shields the owners (i.e., the shareholders) and their assets from the corporation’s creditors. As a result, the creditworthiness of the corporation does not depend on the creditworthiness of its shareholders. If this were not the case, it would be very difficult to determine the value of shares for potential purchases. See Armour et al. (2009b), p. 12.

See Sect. 1.​3.​2.

In an SCE there must be at least two members, or five if the SCE is made up exclusively of natural persons.

See Zoppini (2004), p. 442 et seq. Also consider Preite (1988), p. 274; Hansmann (1996), p. 13 et seq. It has been criticised that cooperatives disincentivise production as they maximise the median rather than total earnings of each member. See Zoppini (2004), p. 445. For general information Kräkel (2012), p. 350 et seq.

Art. 66 SCE-R uses the term “dividends”.

See Hansmann (1999), p. 398; Kyriakopoulos (2000), p. 30; Torgerson et al. (1998); Lehmann (2014), p. 39 et seq.; Henrÿ (2012), p. 37 et seq.

See Hansmann (1999), p. 398. Also consider Kräkel (2012), p. 353 et seq.; Alho (2015), p. 5.

See Delbono (1994); Wall et al. (2010), p. 199. See also Hansmann (1996), p. 122 et seq.

See Hansmann (1996), pp. 123 et seq. and 141 et seq.; Molk (2014), p. 913 et seq. Also consider Youde and Helmberger (1966), p. 33. Kislev/Peterson, Economies of Scale in Agriculture: A Reexamination of the Evidence, in Antle/Sumner (Ed), Papers in honor of D. Gale Johnson (1996) 156, 156 et seq.; Schroeder (1992); Hetherington (1991), p. 129; Kräkel (2012), p. 350 et seq.; Nilsson (1999), p. 460; Valentinov (2005), p. 141 et seq. Generally, Birchall (2011), p. 155 et seq.

The same is less true if one considers cooperative banks, for example, who act on a market which is more open and competitive, allowing many more alternatives to purchase banking products, in comparison to agricultural cooperatives, which are often necessary to protect and safeguard its members’ businesses. See Hansmann (1996), p. 246 et seq. Also consider Birchall (2011), p. 147 et seq.

See Hansmann (1996), p. 134 et seq. Other opinion Iliopoulos (2015), p. 11.

See Molk (2014), p. 915 et seq.; Hansmann (1996), p. 133 et seq. Also consider Aviram and Tor (2004), p. 264 et seq. In general, Szabó (2004); Hanisch (2006), p. 301 et seq.; Gios and Santuari (2002).

See Sect. 1.​3.​2.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 334; Vitaliano (1983), p. 1079; Nilsson (1999), p. 458; Furubotn and Pejovich (1972), pp. 1141 et seq. and 1154; Fama and Jensen (1983), p. 302 et seq. Also consider Sect. 1.​3.​2.

“They simply own the monetary value of shares in the co-operative society, which are generally redeemable at par value.” See Nilsson (2001), p. 334. Also consider Nilsson (1999), p. 455.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 336. See also Royer (1999), p. 56, Ortmann and King (2007), p. 57; Gentzoglanis (2007), p. 158. Also consider Henrÿ (2012), p. 35 et seq.; Fajardo (2012), p. 5; Costi (2001), p. 129 et seq.

In this context, cooperatives have been described as “ownerless capital”. See Nilsson (2001), p. 342. Also consider Costi (2001), p. 128 et seq.; Consiglio nazionale del notariato (2006), p. 4.

This will be discussed in detail in Sects. 3.5.2 and 4.​4.​6.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 336; Royer (1999), p. 53 et seq. Also consider Tortia et al. (2013), p. 30; Egerstrom (2004), p. 73 et seq.

The first three concern disincentives to contribute risk capital. They may come up due to vaguely defined property rights. See Iliopoulos (2015), p. 7. Also consider Cook (1995) and Cook and Iliopoulos (2000).

The last two regard costs of monitoring management and costs of collective decision-making. See Iliopoulos (2015), p. 7. Also consider Hansmann (1996), p. 35 et seq.; Iliopoulos and Hendrikse (2009).

See Nilsson (2001), p. 337; Royer (1999), p. 56; Tortia et al. (2013), p. 30. Also consider Schäfer and Ott (2012), p. 700.

See Royer (1999), p. 56.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 337; Royer (1999), p. 56; Vitaliano (1983), p. 1078 et seq.; Chukwu (1990), p. 153 et seq.; Cook and Iliopoulos (2000), p. 336; Nilsson (1999), p. 460 et seq.; Iliopoulos (2015), p. 7. Also consider Ostrom (2007), p. 1 et seq. and in particular 182 et seq.; Hardin (1968), p. 1244 et seq.; Williamson (1973), p. 321 et seq.

See Sects. 5.​3 and 5.​5.

The horizon problem arises in particular when a member’s residual claim to the net income generated by an asset is shorter than the period during which that asset can be used. This is due to restrictions on the transferability of residual claimant rights and a lack of liquidity, as there is no secondary market for the transfer of such rights.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 338; Jensen and Meckling (1979), p. 484; Vitaliano (1983), p. 1082; Royer (1999), p. 55; Tortia et al. (2013), p. 31; Cook and Iliopoulos (2000), p. 336. Also consider Furubotn and Pejovich (1970). Critically, Olesen (2007) and Fahlbeck (2007).

See Nilsson (2001), p. 338 et seq.; Iliopoulos and Cook (2013), p. 4; Minguez-Vera et al. (2010), p. 914; Cook (1995), p. 1157; Royer (1999), p. 55; Vitaliano (1983), p. 1082.

See Ortmann and King (2007), p. 58.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 338 et seq.; Kräkel (2012), p. 356.

This is an expression of distorted market signals. See Nilsson (2001), p. 339.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 339; Cook (1995), p. 1157; Royer (1999), p. 55. Also consider Iliopoulos and Cook (1999), p. 80; Boettcher (1980), p. 89 et seq.; Alchian and Demsetz (1972), p. 789 et seq. Also consider Sect. 4.​4.​6.

See Hansmann (1996), p. 134 et seq.; see also Iliopoulos (2014), p. 165; Iannarelli (2008a), p. 367 et seq.

Consider costs of collective decision-making, Sect. 1.​3.​3. “Several crucial decisions entail the distribution of wealth among member-patrons and thus may provoke and influence attempts by members. The allocation of overhead costs, the assessment of members’ product quality and the geographical location of a new investment” are some examples. See Iliopoulos (2015).

See Nilsson (2001), p. 340; Royer (1999), p. 56; in general Cook (1995), p. 1153. Also consider Iliopoulos and Hendrikse (2009); Bolten et al. (2007), p. 845; Egerstrom (2004), p. 76.

See in particular, Sects. 4.​4.​6 and 5.​6.

See Hansmann (1988), p. 278. Also consider Kräkel (2012), p. 356; Milgrom and Roberts (1992), p. 563; Holmstrom (1999), p. 407; Svendsen (2007), p. 116. Generally, Santoro (2014), p. 18 et seq. Rebelo and Caldas analyse the efficiency of Portuguese Agricultural Cooperatives. See Rebelo and Caldas (2015).

See Nilsson (2001), p. 344; Nilsson et al. (2012), p. 196. For a specific example, see Arcas-Lario et al. (2014).

See Iliopoulos (2014); Iliopoulos and Valentinov (2018), p. 7; Cook and Iliopoulos (2016), p. 22. On these issues, see also Blome-Drees et al. (1998), p. 213 et seq.; Seuster (1990), p. 581 et seq.

See Iliopoulos and Valentinov (2018), p. 8. See also Cook and Iliopoulos (2016); Hansmann (1996), p. 136 et seq.

Bullet 6: “there should be no artificial restrictions on membership.”

See Giorgi (2018b), p. 3220 et seq.; Astl and Steinböck (2014d), p. 128. Also consider Santoro (2014); Conte and Vannini (2008), p. 149 et seq.

As will be seen in Sect. 5.​6, a New Generation Cooperative (NGC) cannot adopt the legal form of an SCE. An NGC is an agricultural cooperative model developed in the USA to make cooperatives more efficient. See Cook and Iliopoulos (2000); Nilsson (1999), p. 457. Chaddad and Cook identify different cooperative models in order to define and assign ownership rights to cooperative stakeholders. See Cook and Chaddad (2004). Also consider Chaddad and Cook (2004). However, one must accept the criteria developed to determine a European Cooperative Identity to provide, on the meta-level, the required choice between different standard legal entities (see Sect. 1.​3.​1). It has been correctly observed that “if open membership involved a societal or legal norm to accept any applicant, the principle could easily interfere with the economic need of the cooperative.” See Van der Sangen (2012), p. 23.

See Fleischer (2014), p. 53; Fleischer (2000), p. 4 et seq. Also consider Easterbrook and Fischel (1998), p. 90 et seq. There are different theoretical approaches here. One describes loyalty as an element inherent to every association, functioning as a corollary to a relationship based on trust between the various partners. See Hueck (1947), p. 12 et seq. Others conceptualise these duties as a necessary counterpart to the decision-making power which majority shareholders hold. See Zöllner (1963), p. 342 et seq.

See Sect. 1.​3.​2.

See Fleischer (2000), p. 4 et seq.; Moll (2001–2002), p. 754; Fleischer (2014), p. 55. Also consider Furubotn and Richter (2000), p. 179; Easterbrook and Fischel (1998), p. 91 et seq.; Cooter and Freedman (1991), p. 1051; MacNeil (1974), p. 753.

From an economic perspective, there are different opinions for how to protect reasonable shareholder expectations. On the one hand, it is argued that courts should only enforce those contractual agreements which have been specifically agreed upon, otherwise shareholders will not be motivated to formalise a balance between minority protection and flexibility. See Easterbrook and Fischel (1998), p. 27; O’Kelley (1992), p. 247. On the other hand, it is argued that the court should also include informal agreements, previous contractual practice and the expectations of minority shareholders, where reasonable. It is argued that this will lead to increased investment by minorities. See Johnston (1992), p. 333 et seq.; Eisenberg (1989), p. 1465 et seq.

It is stressed that shareholders rarely include contractual provisions referring to potential future events when the statutes are written. Indeed, such provisions may often be counter-productive and erode mutual trust between the parties. Next, informal agreements among members hold members to their own contractual expectations. If the statutes contain a reference to initial mutual understandings and expectations, the courts cannot later impose their own understanding of fairness, at least not easily. On the other hand, protecting minority shareholders in this way cannot be used to safeguard vague hopes and one-sided expectations. Instead, the minority must provide credible evidence that there were informal agreements established to supplement the statutes. In this context, however, it has been criticised that such an approach may also lead to a significant increase in procedural costs, as it would require considering the entire history of the relationship between the majority and minority members. See Fleischer (2014), p. 56 et seq. Also consider Davies et al. (2012), p. 725 et seq.

See Sect. 3.4.2.

Austrian legal restrictions should in practice not affect agricultural cooperatives.

See Hansmann et al. (2006). Also consider Cheffins (2012), p. 499 et seq.; Armour and Whincop (2001), p. 994 et seq.

See Bono (2012), p. 38. Further evidence shows that, for example, not only supply obligations but also agreed-upon planning might help reduce the free rider problem. It is necessary to invest in member-commitment and reduce dependency on non-member supply. See Ton and Gábor (2012), pp. 15 and 18.

See Art. 153 para. 1 letter b Reg. 1308/2013.

See Art. 153 para. 1 letter b in conjunction with Art. 152 para. 1 letter c (ii) Reg. 1308/2013. See also Art. 160 Reg. 1308/2013 (Producer organisations in the fruit and vegetables sector).

Under certain conditions, member states may make the rules and financial contributions that apply to members of a representative producer organisation compulsory for all producers of the products concerned, even if they are not members.

On these issues, see also Saija (2013), p. 53 et seq.; Rook Basile (2017), p. 446 et seq.; Albisinni (2014b), p. 6 et seq.; Belliggiano (2009), p. 44.

See Sect. 3.3.4.

For details, Costato and Russo (2015). 386 et seq. and Gottfried Holzer, Agrarrecht (Studium & Praxis, 4th edn NWV, Wien 2018). 191 et seq.

See Arts. 152 et seq. Reg. 1308/2013 and in particular Arts 152 para. 1 letter c (i) and (ii) and 153 para. 1 letter b.

See Kramer (2006), p. 126; Fici (2017), p. 23 et seq.; Fici (2013a), p. 21 et seq.

The statutes may allow the admission of a special category of user members. Such members may only be admitted if they receive training or are otherwise integrated into the cooperative. See Art. 2527 para. 3 CC.

This is hardly conceivable in a consumer corporative, for instance. See Zoppini (2004), p. 449. Also consider Kräkel (2012), p. 354 et seq.

Based on expertise and sophisticated means of production means.

See Zanotti (2013), p. 227. Also consider Sect. 5.​6.

See Kühl (2012), p. 36.

See Sect. 3.4.1.

To guarantee the promotion of members’ needs, which was basically the principle goal, the concept of promotion must be partly conceded to introduce mechanisms which allow increased earnings by conducting business with non-members. See Ortmann and King (2007), p. 60 et seq.; Astl and Steinböck (2014e), p. 162; Ragazzini (1992), p. 835 et seq. In general, Birchall (2011), p. 161 et seq.; Grosskopf (1990), p. 105 et seq.

See Sect. 3.4.1.

In this context it has been stressed that one explanation for the presence of (or absence of problems in) cooperatives is the public support they enjoy. This can lead to low taxes, subsidised interest rates, protective markets (allowing cooperatives to exploit their market power and providing technical assistance). However, as has been correctly observed, cooperatives differ from each other, so it is not easy to analyse and comment upon them. Next, public support may also encourage inefficiency, to the detriment of national economy. However, this support can also contribute to efficient production. See Nilsson (2001), p. 340 et seq.; Iliopoulos (2013). Also consider, Sexton and Iskow (1993); Molk (2014), p. 945 et seq.

See Sect. 3.4.1.

And their impact on costs of collective decision-making.

In general, corporate law deals with conflicts between majority and minority members. See Armour et al. (2009a), p. 36. For details Enriques et al. (2009), p. 89 et seq.

Ultimately, only user members may direct the cooperative. See Art. 2526 para. 2 CC. On this issue, see Conte and Vannini (2008), p. 152. See also Paolucci (2019f), p. 85 et seq.

See Zoppini (2004), p. 450. For example, according to Art. 2545 quarter CC, indivisible reserves may only be used to cover losses if divisible reserves have already been used.

See Sect. 5.​3.

See Iliopoulos (2014), p. 162 et seq.

On this issue, see for example Welser (2013). Also consider Armour and Whincop (2004), p. 89; Schwartz (1992).

See Hansmann (1999), p. 399. Also consider Svendsen (2007), pp. 119 and 132.

See Sect. 5.​4.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 345. Also consider Hansmann (1996), p. 136 et seq.

See Nilsson (2001), p. 344 et seq. Also consider Conte and Vannini (2008), p. 151.

See Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq. For the SE see Lutter (2015), p. 81 et seq.; Oechsler and Mihaylova (2014), p. 50 et seq.

For details, see Sect. 3.4.2.

Member states may provide that a legal body that does not have its head office in the Community also may participate in the formation of an SCE. For details, see Art. 2 para. 2 SCE-R.

See, e.g., recital 2 SCE-R, which states that “it is essential that companies of all types the business of which is not limited to satisfying purely local needs should be able to plan and carry out the reorganisation of their business on a Community scale.”

See Schöpflin (2018b), p. 1244 et seq.; Greda (2014), p. 837; Ebers (2004), p. 43 et seq.; Korte (2012), p. 330. However, a preliminary draft of the SCE regulation provided for a de facto cross-border activity. See Art. 9 para. 2 draft march 1992, requiring that the SCE is “carrying on genuine and effective cross-border activities.” For the SE, see Lutter (2015), p. 82; Hirte (2002), p. 10. See also Merkt (1992), p. 655.

For the SE, see Lutter (2015), p. 82.

For the SE, see Hirte (2002), p. 10.

The multiple-nationality principle has become the subject of increasing criticism. Some extant literature even calls for its abolition as part of a revision of the SE regulation. However, one must keep in mind that it will be difficult to reach a political consensus on this issue. Thus, cross-border activities are relevant when forming an SCE, but not for its later existence. For the SE, see Lutter (2015), p. 82; Oechsler and Mihaylova (2014), p. 80 et seq.

Recitals 6, 11 or 12 of the SCE-R also may be invoked. They refer to a supportive environment that facilitates cross-border activities, but this does not mean that an SCE is obligated to do so.

The results from recent research show that few cooperatives choose to internationalise their memberships. Cross-border cooperatives are primarily a North-West European phenomenon. See Van der Sangen (2012), p. 82 et seq.

See Nilsson and Madsen (2007).

See Nilsson and Madsen (2007), p. 27 et seq. See also Bijman et al. (2014), p. 170.

See Nilsson and Madsen (2007), p. 28. See also Bijman et al. (2014), p. 170 et seq.

See Nilsson and Madsen (2007), p. 28. See also Bijman et al. (2014), p. 171.

See Nilsson and Madsen (2007), p. 28. See also Bijman et al. (2014), p. 171.

See Bijman et al. (2014), p. 171.

Similarly, for example, according to Italian tax law, an agricultural entrepreneur’s cultivated land must be located within the territory of Italy; otherwise, the earnings gained from activities conducted on it cannot be considered farm income, but must be classified as other income. This implies that the cultivated land cannot be classified as agricultural land, i.e., the concerned activity cannot be considered agricultural activity.