1. Design, Pragmatism and Dewey

In his famous text Pragmatism: A New Name for an Old Way of Thinking, James claimed both that pragmatism demands that theories be unstiffened and equally that they be put to work, tested in the real world (see James 1975/1907).

For a discussion on issue of whether ‘practice–based’ design research—that is, research which incorporates aspects of practice—should be seen as a special form of knowledge production see Biggs (2002) and Biggs and Büchler (2007).

Though it is difficult to specify precisely when the field was established, McDonnell (2015) claims that we may reasonably date it to the immediate postwar period, i. e., 50–60 years ago (p. 108).

For a discussion of the motivating factors behind this move, see Chap. 3.

Of particular applicability here is the Research through Design conferences which were launched in 2013.

It is worth noting that Richard Rorty identifies Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey as the three greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, see Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979).

Both of these texts will be referenced again later.

While Peirce’s contributions and interests will be discussed later, it is worth highlighting here that the emergence of pragmatist thought is often linked to two of Peirce’s articles written in the 1870s, namely, “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”. A brief, helpful outline of the content of these articles is provided by Sleeper (1986, p. 49).

James’s three volume Principles of Psychology, published in 1890, is seen as foundational within the field of psychology (see James 1981a, 1981b).

The original lecture was entitled “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results”.

It is an often–overlooked fact that the 1907 Pragmatism is not a transcript of 1898’s “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results”, but rather a publication of lectures James delivered at Boston’s Lowell Institute between December 1906 and January 1907. However, a close examination of both reveals that each relies on a similar argument. As such, Pragmatism may be approached as a development and expansion of “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results”, but not a directly related text.

He also went on to argue that the principle points to a special, pragmatic theory of truth. On this view, truth is something that ‘happens’ to an idea. We experience it through its demonstration and verification in action. As James puts it: ‘ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience’ (1975/1907, p. 32, italics in original). Consequently, from a pragmatic perspective, truth is not to be understood as a presentation of an absolute ‘transcript of reality’ (ibid, p. 31), but merely as a functional, profitable belief which we can demonstrate as required and, in doing so, show that it works.

It is important to note that the pragmatism presented in the 1898 lecture and the 1907 Pragmatism is very much James’s own creation. While he acknowledges the work of Peirce, he improperly specifies the etymological root of the word as relating to the Greek word for ‘practical’ when, in fact, Peirce had drawn it from Kant’s distinction between praktisch and pragmatisch. On the Kantian view, these terms point to two separate and independent forms of reasoning: the former relates to moral action, while latter refers to what is empirical or experimental. See Thayer (1968, pp. 138–139).

In time, Peirce came to object strongly to James’s framing of pragmatism. He was so incised that he went on to write an article entitled “What Pragmatism Is” (1905), in which he disassociated himself entirely from James’s work and renamed his own philosophic perspective pragmaticism, a term he thought was ‘ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers’ (p. 166).

While pragmatism’s orientation towards evolutionary theory is easy enough to evidence on the basis that most of the movement’s key contributors referenced evolutionary concepts, the commitment to tolerance and understanding is more varied. We see aspects of both underlying key aspects of Peirce’s, James’s and Dewey’s thought. Peirce placed a great emphasis on the social aspect of knowledge, noting how, in science, individual insights are corrected through the long–term efforts of a wider community of inquirers (see Peirce 1992, pp. 52). He also argued that evolutionary theory required supplementation with a recognition that ‘love’, alongside brute force, guided evolutionary processes forward (see West 1989, pp. 52–53). Alongside Peirce, James was highly–tolerant of and, indeed, championed the co–existence of alternative perspectives. Reality, on his view, was to be seen as heterogeneous coming together of many realities, what he referred to as a ‘pluriverse’ (see James 1977). Finally, Dewey was deeply concerned with the organic communal processes which he saw as underpinning and, ultimately, securing political democracy. He was a passionate advocate of dialogue; dialogue between separate communities, and dialogue between communities and the institutions of government (see e.g., LW 2; Pappas 2008; Narayan 2016).

The Metaphysical club can be seen as an informal philosophic society. It is said to have included figures such as James, Peirce, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Nicholas St. John Green, Joseph Bang Warner, John Fiske, Francis Ellingwood Abbot, and Chauncey Wright. Interestingly, apart from Peirce, none of the other members left any record of their participation or membership, though third–party sources such as Henry James (William James’s brother) did mention the Metaphysical Club in correspondence (Menand 2002, pp. 201–203). In any case, the conversations initiated by the group are often positioned as pragmatism’s intellectual epicenter. For broad–ranging overviews see Menand (2002) and Wiener (1949). For Charles Sanders Peirce’s account see Peirce (1998, pp. 399–400).

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. was a lawyer and later a supreme court judge. He was committed to idea of experience as a guiding principle (particularly in law) and embraced the concept of experimentation as an all–encompassing framework. (For a selection of his key writings see Holmes 1992.) Chauncey Wright was a mathematician. From the publication of the Origin of the Species onwards, he championed Darwin’s work and was firmly committed to the theory of natural selection as a general principle of creation (Menand 2002, pp. 209–210). Compelling portraits of both of these men are presented in Menand (2002) and Wiener (1949).

Now largely forgotten, F.C.S. Schiller (1864–1937) was an Oxford academic who aligned his work with that of William James. Though he accepted pragmatist label, he preferred to use the term ‘humanism’ in reference to his own philosophy. It is arguable that, to an extent, he contributed to the development of classical pragmatism. While this is briefly noted below, an excellent account of his philosophy, general contributions and relationship with pragmatism is available in Porrovecchio (2011).

Dewey’s move to the University of Chicago to head up the department of philosophy is often seen as a pivotal moment in his career. While this is briefly discussed below, a highly engaging biographical account can be found in Martin (2002), for a detailed discussion of the Chicago years in particular (with some asides) see pp. 137–228.

Beyond this grouping, there remains a host of lesser–known figures—including philosophers such as Josiah Royce and C. I. Lewis, both of Harvard—who might reasonably merit inclusion within the broader story of classical pragmatism.

Many would now argue that Jane Addams deserves inclusion within this listing. I have sympathy with this view, not least due to her direct and regular contact with both Dewey and Mead, but more especially because her life’s work—in particular Hull House—stands an example of how one may apply ideas, philosophic and otherwise, in the direct and active pursuit of a program of positive transformation. Nonetheless, I hold off on her inclusion on the basis that her primary focus was social reform and not the elaboration of a philosophic project.

As will be noted below, Dewey’s position evolved over the course of his career, moving, in his words, from ‘absolutism’ to ‘experientialism’ (see LW 5, pp. 149–160). Cultural naturalism was the eventual final position that he arrived at, with the publication of Experience and Nature in 1925 (Alexander 1987, p. 58). For a helpful, systematic overview of Dewey’s various phases and their highlights, see Raymond Boisvert’s Dewey’s Metaphysics (1988).

Peirce referred to his rebalancing under the label of ‘agapism’. For more on this principle see Deledalle (1990, p. 70).

Perhaps the most concise way of lining up Peirce, James, Mead and Dewey would be to say that Peirce was an evolution–orientated but morally–infused scientific realist, James an individualistic humanist, Mead a biosocial behaviourist and, finally, Dewey a melioristic cultural naturalist. This, however, obscures the richness and depth of each individual perspective.

The two articles in question were “The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism” and “The Pantheism of Spinoza” (see EW 1, pp. 3–19). Most of Dewey’s biographers position the production of these texts as turning point in his early life (see e.g. Dykhuizen 1973 pp. 22–24; Martin 2002, pp. 50–52).

An astute observer will note a gap between Dewey’s years in Minnesota and Chicago. This gap marks a period between 1889 and 1894 where he returned to the University of Michigan from the University of Minnesota to take up a senior post as chair of philosophy which had been left vacant by the death of his mentor George Sylvester Morris (see Martin 2002: 117–120).

It will likely be observed that Hegel was also a key inspiration for Karl Marx. While Dewey flatly rejected Marxism and would eventually also disassociate himself from his early Hegelian alignment (See LW 5, pp. 147–160), a common reference point can be identified here.

George Sylvester Morris is but one of a number of Dewey’s early mentors. Others included H. A. P. Torrey, a professor at the University of Vermont who, Dewey claimed, guided him towards ‘philosophy as a life pursuit’ (LW 5, p. 149) and W. T. Harris, editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy who published Dewey’s first two articles. Jay Martin’s biography The Education of John Dewey (2002) provides an engaging insight into the influence of these various personalities on the young Dewey.

Hegelian philosophy is notoriously challenging, both conceptually and structurally. While several useful readers exist, helpful introductions can be found in Kaufmann (1966) and Finlay (1958).

According to James Good, if we examine the Hegelian aspect of Dewey’s thought over the course of his career, we can see that though he rejected Hegelism’s metaphysical and theological aspects early on, he remained committed, in the long–term, to the latter’s emphasis on the humanistic and historical (Good 2006).

Alongside a detailed expansion of earlier themes, this latter text offers a useful ‘pattern of inquiry’ as well as a novel approach to the issues of belief, knowledge and truth.

In his educational theories, Dewey relates the child and the school to the broader context of the society in which they are situated, as well as the sustainability and enhancement of democratic life.

From the late 1920s and through into the 1930s, he set out a series of forceful, polemic texts—including The Public and its Problems (1927), Individualism Old and New (1930), Liberalism and Social Action (1935) and Freedom and Culture (1939)—which together examine the tensions between the individual, the local community, the media, big business and the institutions of government Collectively, these works may be seen to form an extended argument calling for a full and thorough revitalization of social and political life in United States.

It is often noted that Dewey cycled through a number of possible labels for his particular philosophic vision. These included instrumentalism, experientialism, experimental empiricism, natural empiricism, naturalism, and cultural naturalism (for an extensive list of labels see e.g., Martin 2002, p. 493). The latter term, perhaps comes the closest to expressing, most clearly, the underlying commitments of Dewey’s work.

It is often claimed that Peirce and James exacted the most direct and profound influence upon Dewey’s work; from James, he is said to have drawn a particular understanding of experience and from Peirce, a theory of inquiry. With James, careful examination suggests that the influence was more limited than might at first seem the case. Dewey himself was insistent that it was specifically William James of the Principles of Psychology—as opposed to the James of The Will to Believe, Varieties of Religious Belief, A Pluralistic Universe or even Pragmatism—from whom he drew inspiration (LW 5, p. 157). Here, James presents experience as regulative of our modes of apprehending and understanding the world. According to Sleeper (1986), this can be seen as a primary source for Dewey’s logic. With Peirce, John Shook’s recent scholarship has revealed that Dewey is likely to have arrived at a similar conception of inquiry via his own independent efforts. Here, Shook argues that it was only after Peirce’s work was published in the 1930s that any meaningful engagement with the latter’s theory of inquiry took place (Shook 2000, p. 212).

There is an entire volume dedicated to the contemporary criticism Dewey’s work received (see Morgenbesser 1977).

In contrast to Rorty, Gale (2010) applauds Dewey’s metaphysics but calls into question the link Dewey draws between it and his wider philosophy. Alongside this, he also criticizes Dewey’s concept of philosophy as criticism, as presented in Experience and Nature (p. 16).

Roland Garret, for example, has systematically identified a number of contradictions in Dewey’s account of qualities (see Garret 1973).

John Herman Randall Jr. notes that Dewey used ‘the language of John Dewey’. This ‘owed its difficulty primarily to being the language of idealistic philosophy of social experience in which he grew up—a language now happily, but confusingly, forgotten’ (Randall 1953, p. 5).

In a reflection on John Dewey’s life and work, Horace Kallen noted that Dewey would not have been able to state a system in full because ‘if you wanted Dewey to state a system, he’d have to contradict himself. He’d have to set up a number of fixed points and a structured order of the universe, and deny practically all the fundamental concepts with which he identified. He thinks the functional thoughts, and writes the functional thoughts’ (Lamont 1959, p. 51).

There will of course be those who dispute the suggestion that design research has neglected Dewey’s work. For example, it certainly arguable that Donald Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner (1983) can be seen to have embedded Deweyan thought at the core of methodological formulations within design research. There is also, of course, the many references to his concept of ‘the public’ within participatory design discourse (see e.g., Bjögvinsson et al. 2012; Le Dantec 2016; DiSalvo 2009). Be this as it may, I maintain that there is no clear and comprehensive contextualization of Dewey’s thought in relation to the concerns of contemporary design research.

An example would be the frequent referencing of Peirce’s definition of abduction, or Dewey’s definition of inquiry.

Putnam and Brandom are not alone in proposing that it may be possible to position Wittgenstein within the bounds of the pragmatist tradition. Writing as early as 1968, H. S. Thayer, for example, gives over a section of his critical history of classical pragmatism to considering Wittgenstein’s links to the tradition. On his view, the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations is ‘very much in accord (sometimes coinciding remarkably) with the outlook and writings of Dewey and Mead’ (Thayer 1968, p. 313). More recently, offering a somewhat more balanced view, Sami Pihlström suggests that the later Wittgenstein may be seen as ‘both a pragmatist—after all, his language games are practical ways of being in the world, based upon practices or “forms of life”—and a Kantian transcendental thinker engaged in the question of how meaning is possible’ (Pihlström 2015, p. 27). For further recent scholarly discussions of the relationship between Wittgenstein and pragmatism, see Bakhurst and Misak (2017) and Boncompagni (2016).

See Thayer (1968) for a concise outline of these influences.

Reflecting on the possibility of developing a more international narrative around the genesis of classical pragmatism, a number of brief points are worth noting in relation to William James. Firstly, there is the clear connection between James and F.C.S. Schiller, who was German born but Britain–based and often considered the leading European pragmatist of the time. Porrovecchio (2011), who notes that Schiller had very early interactions with James dating back to at least the 1890s, questions the dominant narrative that the ‘founding instigators’ of were all American (p. xxii). Secondly, James was aware of and, indeed, met with Giovanni Papini and other representatives of the Italian pragmatist movement, including Giovanni Vailati, Mario Calderoni, and Giovanni Amendola (Eldridge 2015, p. 259). He even went so far as to write an article about their work (see James 1906). Thirdly and finally, though James attributes the origin of the ‘pragmatist principle’ to Peirce in Pragmatism (1975/1907, p. 28), it is important to note that he also makes glowing reference to the work of both Schiller and Papini (along with Dewey, of course).

Until recently, the major center of pragmatist study in the United States was the Center for John Dewey Studies at the University of Southern Illinois in Cardondale. Its former director, Jo Ann Boydston, managed the editing and publishing of the thirty–seven volume Collected Works of John Dewey (1967–1990). Regrettably, as of 2017, this center is now closed.