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Published in:
2009 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Distinguishing Attack on the Secret-Prefix MAC Based on the 39-Step SHA-256
Authors : Hongbo Yu, Xiaoyun Wang
Published in: Information Security and Privacy
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In this paper, we present the first distinguishing attack on the LPMAC based on step-reduced SHA-256. The LPMAC is the abbreviation of the secret-prefix MAC with the length prepended to the message before hashing and it’s a more secure version of the secret-prefix MAC. In [19], Wang
e
t al. give the first distinguishing attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 without the related key, then they improve the techniques to give a distinguishing attack on the LPMAC based on 61-step SHA-1 in [23]. In this paper, we utilize the techniques in [23] combined with our differential path on step-reduced SHA-256 to distinguishing the LPMAC based on 39-step SHA-256 from the LPMAC with a random function. The complexity of our attack is about 2
184.5
MAC queries.