Doing Security

Security — or insecurity — has become a major public concern, an issue at the top of the political agenda and the subject of expanding academic enquiry. Fuelled by the rise of new terrorism, fears exacerbated by high profile crimes and growing anxieties over anti-social behaviour, for many people the need for more effective security has never seemed greater. In recent years there has been a proliferation of books and articles dedicated to security, examining governance, developing theory and identifying best practice in a variety of areas (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader and Walker, 2007; Gill, 2006). There are now dozens of academics, worldwide, researching and writing on the subject of security. One of the most significant areas of interest to emerge has been around the debates relating to nodal governance. This is the main topic of this chapter and its exploration here will provide a theoretical framework for the rest of the book. Before some of these discussions are considered, however, it is important to grapple with some important foundational concepts and issues, such as what is meant by security, the growing plurality of bodies involved in delivering it, the remarkable growth of private security and the reactions to that expansion.

Security failure encompasses a wide range of potential incidents that take place in different nodes and the consequences of which vary greatly. Failures of security in aviation resulted in the catastrophic events of 11 September 2001, while security failure in a supermarket might mean no more than the loss of £50 worth of razors. Another consequence might be nothing more dangerous than huge embarrassment and bad publicity, such as in the incident in which a member of Fathers 4 Justice breached security at Buckingham Palace to reach the Queen’s balcony in a Batman outfit in order to highlight the organization’s campaign for greater access for separated fathers to their children. At another extreme, security failure might result in the theft of goods worth millions of pounds, as in the Brinks Mat robbery of 1983, where £26 million of gold bullion was stolen. Security failure occurs all the time despite the millions of pounds spent to reinforce security systems. As Zedner (2003a: 158) argues,

…absolute security … is a chimera, perpetually beyond reach. Even if security were today obtainable … the potentiality for new threats means that the pursuit can never be said to be over … Just as the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries are unknowable, so there may be unknown vulnerabilities, revealed only when they are exploited. The central issue here is that security is not and can never be an absolute state. Rather it is a relational concept whose invisibility must be continually tested against threats as yet unknown.

The defeat of security in order to undertake a spectacular robbery, burglary or fraud has been the subject of many fictional films, dramas and books. Probably the most famous of such movies of the last few years is the ‘Ocean’s Eleven’ (2001) series (Ocean’s Twelve’ (2004) and ‘Ocean’s Thirteen’ (2007) quickly followed the success of the first film) in which Danny Ocean puts together a team of villains, all with expert skills, to undertake spectacular heists. These are recent examples of a genre with a long history. Equally dramatic heists are the theme of ‘The Italian Job’ (1969; with a re-make in 2003), ‘Heist’ (2001) and ‘The Ladykillers’ (1955; re-made by the Coen brothers in 2004) to name only a few. Despite the substantial exploitation of such ventures in fiction, there has been relatively little academic research either on those who undertake such major crimes or on the perpetrators of more mundane criminal acts in real life. This chapter aims to gain a greater understanding of malefactors in some of the most common areas of criminal behaviour. It will attempt to assess their decision-making strategies and in particular their views on security. It will consider the common crimes of theft, burglary, fraud and robbery as well as protest. As the famous quotation from Sun Tzu illustrates, knowing the enemy (malefactors in this case) brings benefits in defeating them.

In the exploration of security failure in the previous chapter, it was shown that the human element — often the security officer — is frequently seen as the cause of the failure. Either as a result of incompetence, lack of capacity, poor reputation or plain corruption it is the action (or inaction) of the security officer that appears to precipitate the failure. The quality of the human element is effectively ‘sub-prime’. However, it was also demonstrated that it is necessary to look at the broader socio-technical system to try and understand what conditions contributed to causing that human failure. If security guards are not properly trained to deal with a particular incident they cannot be blamed if they don’t deal with it properly. Those broader conditions are usually the responsibility of the security manager. It therefore seems entirely appropriate to examine security officers and security managers in a bit more depth. There is a small but growing body of research in this area, from which we can begin to recognise some of their strengths and weaknesses. These will in turn offer clues for Chapter 8 in identifying strategies to enhance the human element. We begin here, therefore, by looking at the existing research on security officers before moving on to examine security managers.

The previous chapters have illustrated at a base nodal level some of the weaknesses that contribute to poor security. In this chapter we move to consider some of the more macro level weaknesses which ultimately provide the foundations upon which much of the failure and success of security are built. The first area this chapter will consider is the inadequate regulatory framework that exists in the UK and in many other countries. The nature of security requires effective statutory regulation and it will be argued that in the UK, and in many other countries, there is a lack of such regulation, which ultimately contributes towards poor security. The second area explored in this chapter is the lack of a professional infrastructure for security. For security to be more effective, the ‘traits’ of a profession are required and this chapter will argue that in the context of the UK — as in many other countries — this is lacking. Finally the chapter looks at the emerging security inequity in society and argues that this also needs to be tackled, not just for the benefit of the less protected nodes, but for the benefit of all.

This part of the book is concerned with the process of identifying how security should be done. Below, this process begins with a model for the creation of a holistic security system at a nodal level, whereby the problem is defined, a solution is tailored to address it and a process established to enable ongoing evaluation to tweak the solution. The model proposed draws upon the principles of modern risk management and good practice in policy formulation, but it is further enhanced by the incorporation of some of the latest innovative thinking in security. The creation of the model begins with a discussion of the strategies and challenges of defining the problem in a node. The chapter then explores how a solution can be developed to address a particular problem, utilising both risk management strategies and economic decision-making tools to influence the system. The chapter then looks at some initiatives that can be used to ensure that the strategy remains current and is still applicable to the problems the node faces. The final section looks at a case study of the National Health Service Counter Fraud and Security Management Service (NHSCFSMS) to illustrate best practice in developing a holistic security system. Before we embark upon this, however, it is important to outline the ways in which security can be the new tool for competitive advantage for organisations.

In this chapter we begin to map out the strategies at a nodal level that can be pursued to create a security system that will reduce the risk of crimes and other deviant acts occurring, or even better, make them never happen. The aim will clearly depend upon the nodal context. In a shop the aim will be to reduce shoplifting to an absolute minimum without undermining potential sales, but in an airline the aspiration will be to make hijacking never happen. This chapter will start by setting out a three-dimensional theoretical framework based upon Lukes’s conception of power. Ultimately security systems are about power because they are concerned with getting a to do x or not to do x. The chapter will continue to explore some of the three-dimensional strategies (some of which are also two-dimensional). The next chapter will pick up on the most important first and second-dimensional strategies, which are largely rooted in the human element (usually but not always a security officer).

In the last chapter we outlined the three dimensions to an effective security system and looked in depth at the third-dimension strategies. In this chapter the main component of the first and second-dimension strategies will be explored: the human element. (Although it must be remembered that the human element also contributes to the third-dimension strategies, by reputation for example.) The importance of the human element has often been underestimated in the design of security systems (Lane, 2001). Drawing upon appropriate research this chapter will show how the presence (second dimension) and interventions (first dimension) of the human element can be enhanced. It must also be remembered that security officers are not always the human element and last resort, there are other personnel that also undertake this role, such as police officers, community support officers, wardens, military personnel and in some instances other staff members of an organisation. Technology may also be the last resort. Nevertheless security officers will be the focus of this chapter, though many of the comments could also relate to some of the other ‘security’ personnel.

This chapter will set out an agenda of reforms that can rebuild the foundations of security. As with the rest of the book this discussion will centre around the UK, although much also applies to other countries. The chapter will begin by considering ways in which regulation can be strengthened to improve the quality of the private security industry. It will then look at the creation of an appropriate professional infrastructure that could produce a more professional means of doing security. In particular, we argue here for a new model of security management — ‘Security Risk Management’. Finally the chapter explores the more contentious issue of security inequity and sets out a framework utilising ‘security unions’ to tackle this.

This book has sought to identify the weaknesses in the delivery of security and to set out a model for a more effective means of doing security. In doing so it should have stimulated new thinking about security and provided new insights on how security can be best delivered in society. In this final chapter some of the key findings from this book will be revisited, and it will seek to draw together the various reforms advocated throughout Part III to create a model for doing security. It will also set out an agenda of issues that require further research. We will end with a consideration of the final — and increasingly neglected — aspect of doing security, tackling social decay. Before we embark upon this, however, it would be useful to remind ourselves of the theoretical context in which this book has been pursued.