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Published in: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International 1/2020

01-01-2020 | CONTROL IN DETERMINISTIC SYSTEMS

Dynamic Models for Coordinating Private and Public Interests in Economic Corruption

Authors: G. A. Ugol’nitskii, A. B. Usov

Published in: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International | Issue 1/2020

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Abstract

Dynamic game-theoretic models of fighting against the corrupt behavior of subjects in the models for coordinating private and public interests are considered. The case of the economic impact of an upper-level subject on a lower-level subjects is investigated. An algorithm for finding equilibria in the case of impulsion is described. Examples of calculations for various sets of input data are presented. A meaningful interpretation of the results is discussed.

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Metadata
Title
Dynamic Models for Coordinating Private and Public Interests in Economic Corruption
Authors
G. A. Ugol’nitskii
A. B. Usov
Publication date
01-01-2020
Publisher
Pleiades Publishing
Published in
Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International / Issue 1/2020
Print ISSN: 1064-2307
Electronic ISSN: 1555-6530
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230720010128

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