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Journal of Quantitative Economics
Published in: Journal of Quantitative Economics 2/2018

25-02-2017 | Original Article

Electoral Cycles and Project Outcomes

Author: Saibal Ghosh

Published in: Journal of Quantitative Economics | Issue 2/2018

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Abstract

Using a novel dataset on announced project-level investments, we examine the determination of project outcomes and the role of elections. Using India as a case study, the findings suggest that projects announced by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibit a lower probability of completion. Furthermore, we show that projects announced by SOEs have a higher probability of being abandoned. Our results are consistent with the political view of government ownership where elected representatives make investment promises that are subsequently reneged.
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Footnotes
1
The start date of firm financials is defined as the end date minus the months covered by the financials.
 
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Metadata
Title
Electoral Cycles and Project Outcomes
Author
Saibal Ghosh
Publication date
25-02-2017
Publisher
Springer India
Published in
Journal of Quantitative Economics / Issue 2/2018
Print ISSN: 0971-1554
Electronic ISSN: 2364-1045
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40953-017-0080-9

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