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2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. Empirical Methodology and Baseline Regression Results

Authors : Daniel Oto-Peralías, Diego Romero-Ávila

Published in: Colonial Theories of Institutional Development

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter describes the estimation methodology and the data. The model of colonial empires contains testable predictions. Among former colonies of European powers that adopted an ‘economically-oriented’ style of imperialism a negative relationship between initial endowments and current institutions is expected, whereas for colonial empires adopting a ‘politically-oriented’ style no such relationship is expected. These hypotheses are tested via an interaction model in which the effect of endowments on current institutions for each colonial empire can be differentiated. As far as the data are concerned, among all possible indicators of institutional quality, we choose rule of law. Regarding the measure of endowments, we choose population density in 1500, which represents the precolonial level of development and a crucial factor of production in colonial times. The estimation of a basic additive model provides evidence that institutions depend significantly on colonizer identity and endowments, which is consistent with the endowment and colonial origin views. However, since heterogeneity in the relationship between endowments and current institutions across colonial empires is expected, we estimate a baseline interaction model. The evidence indicates that not all colonial powers reacted in the same way to the level of precolonial endowments. Britain followed an ‘economically-oriented’ style of imperialism and, as such, we observe that the evidence fits well the endowment view, since there is a negative and highly significant relationship between initial endowments and current institutions among British colonies. France, by contrast, adopted a ‘politically-oriented’ style of imperialism and, as such, we find that the endowment view does not hold, as reflected in the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term. Regarding the Spanish colonial empire, which is a hybrid between both styles, our model predicts partial applicability of the endowment view, which is congruent with a reported negative coefficient on the interaction term that is smaller (in absolute terms) than that on British colonies and only marginally significant. Portuguese former colonies also show a pattern consistent with the categorization of the empire as ‘economically-oriented’, since endowments exert a negative effect on institutions.

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Footnotes
1
Other studies such as Dollar and Kraay (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004), and Bardhan (2005) have already used rule of law as an indicator of essential institutions for economic development. In contrast, Easterly and Levine (2003) use the average of the six indicators of Kaufmann et al. However, we prefer not to do that because the aggregation of composite indicators (i.e., indicators that result from the aggregation of other indicators) is inadequate, because at the end one does not know what the aggregate indicator exactly represents. Also, taking a simple average implies the loss of the statistical advantages of the aggregation method used by Kaufmann et al. (see Arndt and Oman 2006).
 
2
We would also like to mention that we did not pursue the separation of German, Dutch, Italian and Belgian colonies, which are now grouped into ‘other empires’. This is because German, Italian and to a lower extent Belgian colonization had a relatively short duration; and applicable to these four colonial powers, their colonization efforts led to the occupation of very few colonies each, whereas major colonial powers’ colonialism was more widespread and generally involved much more extension. In statistical terms, the extremely short number of colonies for each of the ‘minor’ colonial powers and the potential loss of degrees of freedom prevent us from pursuing this any further.
 
3
Compared to other possible indicators of precolonial prosperity, we prefer to use indigenous population density. As a matter of fact, precolonial urbanization rate may be a better proxy for pre-existing wealth, but it implies a drastic reduction of the sample (for example, it does not include sub-Saharan Africa).
 
4
For this endowment variable, there were not sufficient observations to construct the scatterplot in the Portuguese colonies’ group.
 
5
This evidence for the Other Empires’ group would capture the ‘economically-oriented’ styles of imperialism of the Dutch and Belgium empires.
 
6
However, as stressed above, this evidence must be taken as suggestive given the small number of Portuguese colonies in the sample.
 
7
We also employ formal tests of differences in the effects of endowments in different empires. Wald tests clearly reject at the 1% level the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients between the interaction terms for British and French colonies. We also reject the equality of coefficients between the interaction terms for Spanish or Portuguese colonies relative to French colonies. Rejection of equality of coefficients at the 5% level or better generally holds even after controlling for a wide variety of factors, as done in the next chapter.
 
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Metadata
Title
Empirical Methodology and Baseline Regression Results
Authors
Daniel Oto-Peralías
Diego Romero-Ávila
Copyright Year
2017
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54127-3_4

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