Equality in International Society

This book is about the concept of equality in international society. The starting point for this inquiry is the contention that while equality is an essential concept in modern political theory it is not so in international theory. In the political theory literature there are several accounts of equality, such as formal equality, moral equality, equality before the law, equal liberty, material equality, equal access, equality of opportunity, equality of outcome (Hoffman & Graham, 2006, 61–62); and in the history of political philosophy equality is often regarded not only as a central political idea but also as a vantage point for philosophical reflection. Accordingly, social contract theorists from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls treat equality as a starting point for normative political theory. The challenge is to formulate a psychologically realistic and formally structured concept of equality among moral and rational persons from which to theorise principles of political organisation. Hobbes’s understanding of the equality of fear is the point of departure for the journey from a state of war to orderly political relations (Hobbes, 1909, 94 [60]). For Rawls, the much more complex equality of the ‘original position’ is conditional for ‘justice as fairness’, which is the foundation for the theory of justice (Rawls, 1972, 11).

The title of this book involves two central concepts, equality and international society. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce these central concepts and to discuss the methodology used to analyse them. Moreover, the chapter elucidates the central principles underlying the inquiry to be carried out.

This chapter looks at the formation of the early modern state and international society. To borrow Frost’s phrase, it looks at the conception and early development of ‘the modern state domain’ (Frost, 1996, 78). It is claimed that the development of the early modern European state and international society took place simultaneously, as parallel processes, and that the linking between the two levels of community is essential for the understanding of both. The rest of the chapter explores how particular meanings of equality in international society make intelligible the place of the state within international society and hence make international society conceivable. Two different ways to justify equal treatment among states are reconstructed, offering two rather different yet related notions of the relations of states within international society. Both are examples of naturalist political thought and both display a range of critical normative dilemmas that still prevail when conceiving of contemporary international society and the way in which relations between communities are understood and organised.

The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes revolutionised the concept of equality in a way that has had an enduring importance for how we conceive of the state and its place in international society. Conventional wisdom narrates a ‘Hobbesian’ tradition of international thought that is largely viewed as realist, and hence linked intellectually to the heritage of Machiavelli and other classical realists. This tradition stresses things like international anarchy, security, deterrence and the primacy of national interests, while downplaying the role of international law and other institutions as well as the element of ethics and morality in international affairs. While realists sometimes justify political conduct from an ethical point of view, referring to patriotic or nationalist ethical reasoning, there is little interest among realists in the ethical relations of the political space outside the bounded community. Consequently, international relations are reduced to a ‘struggle for power and peace’ (Morgenthau, 1967). However, it has been shown that Hobbes’s international theory involves a much broader variety of theoretical positions and a number of ideas that are not conventionally associated with a ‘Hobbesian’ tradition (Malcolm, 2002; Prokhovnik & Slomp, 2011). This chapter shows that the way in which Hobbes theorised equality is central to his international theory.

In his proposal for a ‘Commonwealth of Europe’, Jean-Jacques Rousseau lists 19 sovereign powers to be entitled to one vote each in the government of the confederation of independent states. All decisions of the confederation, he argues, should be taken with ‘the unanimous consent of the Confederates’. Smaller countries and dominions are regarded as ‘possessions’ and are not entitled independent status or a vote of their own. Minor European states, for example the Republic of Genoa, are merely viewed as associates to larger states by means of a joint vote (Rousseau quoted in Williams, Wright & Evans, 1993, 102–104). Thus, Rousseau accepted divided sovereignty for some powers while others enjoyed full sovereignty. The position of Rousseau captures a great deal of the contradictions that seem typical of the international theory and practice in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Contrary to the contemporary notion of equality of states as a relatively fixed legal principle and sustained by legal positivist theory, there were several parallel and somewhat contradictory notions of equality in international society, developed from a variety of legal and political philosophies. One contradiction that can be observed in Rousseau’s proposal is the combination of equality and hierarchy. The combination of these contradictory principles resulted not only in the grading of states on the basis of size and power but also according to ethnicity, civilisation, culture, religion, nation and race.

John Lukacs has claimed that the twentieth century lasted only 75 years, from 1914 to 1989 (Lukacs, 1993, 1). In the history of equality of states the century is even shorter, only the 39 years from 1907 to 1946. The issue of equality of states was raised at the 1907 peace conference in The Hague. The debate came to a close in San Francisco in 1946, when the concept of sovereign equality was included in the UN Charter. Thus, in a few years the concept of equality in international society was lively discussed and a principle of sovereign equality was finally settled. Today, that principle is often described as one of the cornerstones of international society and as intimately related to sovereignty. However, the reasons and normative arguments behind that contention are rarely mentioned. This chapter is a response to that often-omitted discourse.

It is the purpose of the three following chapters to sketch out a concept of equality in international society that can overcome the drawbacks of sovereign equality while retaining the egalitarian core of the principle. It is the task of this chapter to investigate how equality in international society can be separated from sovereignty and what could be gained from doing that. The chapter starts with an investigation of the two central concepts of the contemporary consensual view about equality in international society, sovereign equality and equality before the law. Sovereign equality regulates the equal rights of states in the UN context, and equality before the law has long been regarded the minimal principle of equality in international society. The chapter reiterates and develops some of the critical arguments raised in the previous chapter but also vindicates a more egalitarian theory of equality in international society. The task is to begin to formulate a minimal principle of equality that is more inclusive than is equality before the law and that does not view equality as just a corollary to sovereignty. A first step in that direction is to disentangle equality from sovereignty, beginning with Hans Kelsen’s criticism of sovereign equality that was already launched in 1944 in response to a proposal by the three powers at the Moscow Conference.

The previous chapter argues that the minimal principle for equality in international society ought to be the principle of equal consideration of interests. It is shown that when applied to international society the principle will have considerable consequences. It rules out practices of discrimination and exclusion of interests, and vindicates a different rationale for the organisation of international society, suggesting the establishment of a sphere of deliberation that includes other actors than states and involves all affected by international society. Hence, two central areas can be specified:

The previous two chapters claim that equal consideration of interests could function as a minimal principle when theorising equality in international society. It is argued that this involves a widening of the realm of consideration and a broadening of the sphere of deliberation in international society. Based on this contention, an equal treatment principle is formulated that suggests a greater egalitarian commitment and engagement. While this principle is argued to be both possible and preferable to sovereign equality, it remains to be seen to what extent the framework sketched out is consistent with contemporary notions of international society. It is argued throughout the book that in order to be meaningful, concepts of equality have to be related to particular concepts of international society. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse to what extent there is such consistency and what conceptual problems remain to be settled or further developed. This does not, of course, answer all possible questions concerning the practical application and realisation of the framework suggested. Such an ambition implies stretching the task of this book too far. However, the attempt to relate a particular concept of equality to contemporary notions of international society shows how far from any practical account of international relations the framework stands.