European Identities During Wars and Revolutions

The collapse of the Soviet Union compelled the former Soviet states to redefine themselves not only domestically, but also in the international arena, through their foreign policies. Each country’s national identity, self-perception, relative location and belonging to a region had to be identified, confirmed or created in the process of nation-building. The notion of belonging to Europe has actively emerged among some countries, presented as belonging not only to a political, but also to a cultural community. As a result, the interrelationship between the national and European visions of the community had to be “negotiated specifically in the context of national and European identity discourses” and the process is still ongoing. Among the post-Soviet non-EU member countries, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia accommodated European identity constructions in their domestic discourses to different extents. This process of “restructuring of belonging” was embedded not only within democratic and market-economic transitions but also operated in a highly dynamic regional and international context. How these reconstructed images of the Self as European have been changing under crises events, and the extent and conditions of change within the turbulent environment are to be studied in this book. This question is explored by a comparative analysis of these discourses under similar crises in Georgia and Ukraine during the period 2003–2014. This chapter starts with a discussion of the peculiar features that the European identity concept acquires in the mentioned group of the post-Soviet states and the crisis events that are linked to its change over time. It then introduces the reader to the cases of Georgia and Ukraine and the selected crises of color revolutions and wars involving Russia. The final parts lay out the book’s theoretical and empirical approach and overall structure of the book.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a critical juncture for European identity discourses that not only instigated the identity debates in general but also incited the revival of the European belonging concept. Georgia and Ukraine were among those former Soviet states that gazed toward Europe in terms of cultural but also political affinity. But the emergence of “European” national identity was not short of contestation externally as well as domestically. Being at the verge of European and Eastern cultural influences with different identities exported from external actors (Europe and Russia) opened up these states as an arena of contestation where European identities had to compete with alternative identity versions. In addition, these states hold their identity discourses at the verge of Europe that made their construction of European identity dubious and dependent on Western confirmation and acceptance. Hence, in the 1990s, the European identity discourses in Georgia and Ukraine emerged but also evolved with a highly reactive character toward foreign policy developments, particularly with Russia and the West. This chapter seeks to examine the ideas of countries’ Europeanness but also alternative perspectives in the context of Georgian and Ukrainian foreign policies from the early days of independence up until the color revolutions. This background setting can provide an understanding of in what type of identity and foreign policy dynamic the selected crisis events erupted. Afterward, it moves on to provide a detailed discussion of color revolutions and wars in each country, the events during which European identity discourses will be studied in the next chapters.

In this chapter the public discourse on European identity before and during the Rose Revolution and August War is analyzed. It is demonstrated that the domestic balance of power is decisive for understanding public identity discourses, its major categories, a balance between them as well as their change. It is shown that when a change takes place under crises or when they become critical junctures for the identity discourse, elite power structure or power relations also change. On the other hand, lack of change in the identity discourse correlates with a stable elite power structure, while the elite groups tend to interpret critical events within the existing identity content. To demonstrate this argument, the European identity discourse is conceptualized within the elite power structure before and during the selected crisis events.

In this chapter a comparative analysis of European identity discourse in Ukraine before and during each crisis is presented along with a comparative analysis of elite power structure. By situating findings, either change or no change in the discourse, within the elite power structure, this chapter demonstrates that the dynamic of the discourse corresponds to the dynamic in the elite power relations. More specifically, the balance between the identity categories reflects the balance within the domestic power structure, and under crises their changes are concurrent. Correspondingly, the discourse shows continuity under crises when the domestic structure of power also remains stable.

The longitudinal analysis of European identity discourses in Georgia and Ukraine showed that the three categories persisted over time. Even though occasionally some new elements appeared as different events unfolded and they had to adjust to the new realities, their core identity components remained. Similarly, the actors behind the three categories in both countries interpreted the two selected crises within the pre-existing identity content so that they reaffirmed their understanding of the Self and Other. However, despite the persistence of identity content within each category, what changed was the balance between these categories and the frequency of expressing their identity content. Two crises, namely, the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the War in Ukraine constituted critical junctures for European identity discourses in those countries because they significantly affected the degree of contestation within the overall discourse. Both marked shifts in the balance between the identity categories. The two events resulted in the monopolization of the discourse by the country as European category, while the other two categories, even though persisted, became marginalized. But why did the two similar events, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the War in Georgia, not cause the same outcomes? What conditions did the two identified critical junctures meet so that they resulted in change? The answer lies within the dynamics of power relations during these crises. This chapter shows that crises instigate change in identity discourses, and thus account for critical junctures when power rotation, as necessary, and power concentration, as sufficient conditions, are also met.

This book asked the question: Under what conditions do crises instigate change in European identity discourses in the post-Soviet states? Empirical analysis showed that when crises hit contested identity discourses, they are capable of reinforcing some identity constructions while delegitimizing others. Two events, the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the War in Ukraine resulted in a significant strengthening of the country as European category while delegitimizing the alternative ones to the level that they became marginal. Therefore, these two crises constituted critical junctures for European identity discourses. However, different outcomes under similar crises have also shown that exogenous shocks on their own are not sufficient for change. Despite all the events mobilizing identity discourses, they alone were not enough for change. This confirmed the argument that external shocks are not exogenous but rather endogenous events, and that actors should interpret them as challenging for identities for a change to take place. Two similar events, namely the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the war with Russia in Georgia did not instigate such change in European identity discourses that could have accounted for critical junctures. Based on the examination of these two sets of similar crises in Ukraine and Georgia, this study argued that a shift in power relations acts as a scope condition for a change under crises (critical junctures).