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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

9. Evaluation and European Criminal Law: The Evaluation Model of the Commission

Author : Fernando Guanarteme Sánchez Lázaro

Published in: Towards a Rational Legislative Evaluation in Criminal Law

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The work of legislative evaluation developed by the Commission has, quite rightly, been subjected to significant criticism. In particular, objections have targeted the incongruency between the proposed evaluation criteria and the evaluation that is in fact performed, as well as evaluative imprecision and excessive formalism that is, quite frequently, limited to ensuring that the same words that appear in the European regulation in question have been introduced into the national criminal legislation, among other aspects. In view of this situation, this author seeks to show how the principles of proportionality and legality, in so far as they are common elements in the different European criminal legal orders, serve as common evaluation criteria. In relation to the principle of proportionality, the need to develop evaluation criteria is particularly urgent, given the extreme harshness of criminal Law drafted by the European criminal legislator. In view of the tendency to establish factual situation and legal consequence in an intuitive manner, a model is suggested that distinguishes between normative weight, degree of intervention/affectation, and the empirical basis of the factual situation and its legal consequence, following Robert Alexy’s weight formula. The purpose is to favor better equilibrium between one factor and another in the norm. In relation to the principle of legality, a model is suggested that allows continuous evaluation over time, following what has very recently been advanced by the Commission. In concrete, the proposed model allows control over the degree of certainty of European criminal laws, based on the distinction, coined by Philipp Heck, between core meaning and field of meaning, through control and evaluation of the semantic norms that the courts propose in their application. Along this same line, the advisability is underlined of considering, together with the precision of the semantic norms of the legal concepts, the degree of certainty permitted by the empirical confirmation of the objects referred to in those concepts. In this way, a dual model is formed that responds both to the degree of precision of the semantic norms and the empirical certainty of the object to which they refer, in the judgment of evaluation.

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Safferling underlines on p. 190: “die komplexe Mehrebenenstruktur des supranationalen Europarechts”.

On the margins of the regulation, more recently, however Weisser (2014), p. 438 ff.

In the terms of articles 83.1 and 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE).

In the same terms, Commission report to the Council based on Article 9 of the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector, COM (2007) 328 final, p. 4.

More recently, in this respect Muñoz de Morales Romero (2011a), p. 54 ff. and (2011b), p. 590 ff.; Nieto Martín (2011), p. 81; Rodríguez Ferrández (2011), p. 464 ff. Generally speaking, as well Becerra Muñoz (2013), p. 323 ff. Earlier, Sánchez Lázaro (2006), pp. 191 ff., 195 ff.; Vogel (2005), pp. 263, 265 ff. Among others, also Romeo Malanda (2012), p. 361 f., pointing to the need for a certain homogeneity—and corresponding evaluation.

Likewise, under article 23, it refers to the submission of a report from the Commission, “assessing the impact of existing national law … on the prevention of trafficking in human beings”. Also, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation—improving evaluation, COM (2013) 686 final, p. 2, underlining the need for EU policies to be evaluated “regularly and systematically”, as well as on p. 8, on the need to promote “an evaluation culture”; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps, COM (2013) 685 final, pp. 3 ff., 12 ff.; Communication from the Commission. Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM (2010) 573 final, p. 7; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Smart Regulation in the European Union, COM (2010) 543 final, p. 2 ff. Likewise, see European Parliament Resolution of 9 September 2010 on better lawmaking (P7_TA (2010)0311).

COM (2006) 187 final, p. 4. It is therefore a matter of an ex post evaluation model, that is, on the application of a previously drafted norm; for an explanatory work on this, see Muñoz de Morales Romero (2011a), p. 51 f.; Rodríguez Ferrández (2011), pp. 314 ff., 497 ff.; Communication to the Commission from Ms. Grybauskaité in agreement with the President. Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation, SEC(2007)213, pp. 7 ff., 13. Among others, finally, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving evaluation, COM (2013) 686 final, p. 2 ff.

Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament based on Article 10 of the Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, COM (2006) 187 final, p. 4. More succinctly, see Commission report to the Council based on Article 9 of the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector, COM (2007) 328 final, p. 5: “practical effectiveness, clarity and legal certainty, full application and compliance with the time limit for transposition”.

COM (2007) 328 final, p. 5, noting that alongside the general criteria, “criteria specific to this Framework Decision are also used, [that] are provided in the context of the analysis of the individual Articles which follows”. Likewise, see Muñoz de Morales Romero (2011b), p. 806, in relation to the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.

COM (2006) 187 final, p. 5, (author’s italics).

Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament based on Article 10 of the Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings COM (2006) 187 final, p. 6, (author’s italics). Critically, with a general nature Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving evaluation COM, (2013) 686 final, p. 5.

COM (2006) 187 final, p. 7 f., author’s italics.

Report based on Article 10 of Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA on combating trafficking in human beings, COM(2006)187 final, p. 7 f. (authors’ italics).

COM (2006) 187 final, p. 7.

And in the same terms, art. 6, in relation to “Penalties on legal persons”. Equally, in the Report to the Commission and to the Council, based on article 9 of the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003, on combating corruption in the private sector, COM (2007) 328 final, pp. 2 and 7.

Report from the Commission to the Council based on Article 9 of the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector, COM (2007) 328 final, p. 8 f.

Article 15 of which reads “Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work”, and paragraph 1 establishes that “Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation”.

COM (2007) 328 final, p. 5.

Cfr. Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 On combating corruption in the private sector, COM (2007) 328 final, p. 5 ff. On this point, likewise Muñoz de Morales Romero (2011b), p. 809 ff.

Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Based on Article 10 of the Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002, on combating trafficking in human beings, COM (2006) 187 final, p. 6. Of a general nature, see Safferling 2012, p. 188 ff., noting “dass in den europäischen Mitgliedstaaten tatsächlich unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von Strafrecht bestehen”; in relation to interpretative cultures Silva Sánchez (2007), p. 82. Widely, Muñoz de Morales Romero (2011b), p. 195 ff.

Along similar lines Muñoz de Morales Romero (2011a), p. 58 and 62; Schaut (2012), p. 28 ff.; Weisser (2014), p. 441. Of a general nature Vogel (2005), p. 268 ff.; Vogel (2002), p. 517 ff.

Romeo Malanda (2012), p. 356; also pointing out on p. 357, that “for that purpose, these minimum common elements that characterize European Criminal Law should be established on the basis of research into Comparative Law and in the framework of political consensus”. On the institutional deficit, see Silva Sánchez (2007), p. 81 ff.

On a general note, see Dworkin (1967–1968), p. 14 ff., in particular, p. 22 ff.; Dworkin (1978), pp. 14 ff., 46 ff.; Alexy (2007), p. 67 ff. Nevertheless, also Heinold (2011), passim. In relation to our paradigmatic discipline Ashworth (2009), passim; Roxin (1973), passim. Likewise, see Schünemann (2001), p. 23 ff.; Schünemann (2002), p. 512: “[ein Strafrechtsdenken], das (…) in der methodisch strengen Ausarbeitung rechtsstaatlicher Grundprinzipien wurzelt”. In a general sense, see Saffeling (2012), p. 195: “die Sprache des Strafrechts wird in Europa überall verstanden. Strafrecht ist insofern Teil einer europäischen Rechtskultur oder in den Worten des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: ‘Die Sicherung des Rechtsfriedens in Gestalt der Strafrechtspflege ist seit jeher eine zentrale Aufgabe staatlicher Gewalt’”. Recently, also, see Schaut, Andreas B.: Europäische Strafrechtsprinzipien, cit. n. 24, passim.

In concrete, art. 49 CFREU establishes: “Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties

1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national law or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be applicable.

2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles recognised by the community of nations.

3. The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.” In a general sense, pointing to the appropriateness for the purposes of evaluation of the juridical-penal objectives that are included in inter- and supranational instruments, because of their greater progressive consensus and level of recognition”, see Vogel (2005), p. 271. On their recognition by the different Member States, Gómez-Jara Díez (2003), pp. 8, 15 ff., 29 ff. Among others, see Pérez del Valle (2008), p. 11 ff.

In relation to the harm principle, equally informative Meyer (2012), p. 759 ff.

Specifically, also Vogel (2002), p. 529: “European juridical-criminal dogma is first and foremost dogmatism surrounding the definition of criminal offences, and its problems and questions are situated above all in the description of the offence”. Finally, on this point Weisser (2014), pp. 444 ff., 451 f.

Thus, Romeo Malanda (2012, p. 350): “the principle of criminal legality covers the principle of certain and strict criminal law (lex stricta and lex certa), which requires, among other mandates, that citizens can foresee the conduct for which they are criminally responsible. In this way, the principle of European criminal specificity does not require an absolute definition of the criminal behaviour, but the likelihood of that behaviour infringing a regulation and leading to a sanction. That likelihood will be determined by taking the literal meaning of the written norm/s into account as well as the jurisprudential precedents. Thus, the principle of legality is compatible with an objectively extensive interpretation and even with the parallel application in malam partem of the legislative text, provided that such a normative extension is already consolidated in the earlier jurisprudence. Moreover, the application of new crimes would also be accepted if the (criminal) penalty of the behaviour in question was foreseeable even though it had never been punished before (and even though it is not contained in a law of Parliament)”. In relation to the principle of culpability, see Safferling (2012, p. 197), pointing to the importance of “die kulturellen Substrukturen in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten”.

For an informative work on this point, see Navarro Frías (2010), passim.

On a general note Bernal Pulido (2007), p. 63: “given that the determination of the normative content of all juridical pronouncements is a logical assumption of its application, the fundamental rights cannot be applied if their content has not previously been determined, in other words, if all of the perplexities that arise because of the irreducible deficit of precision and semantic explicitness of the constitutional provisions that define them have not been dispelled”. More specifically, also Schaut (2012), p. 97 ff.

For a different understanding, for example see Judgment of the Constitutional Count (STC) 96/2012, of 7 May, Points of Law 10°; BVerfG, 2 BvR 392/07 de 26.2.2008, margs. 34 f., both with subsequent references. In this other sense, see likewise art. 5.1 TEU, “[t]he limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”; as well as paragraph 4: “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Regulatory Fitness and Performance (Refit): Results and Next Steps COM (2013) 685 final, pp. 3, 14. In the Spanish scholarshipdo, Muñoz de Morales Romero (2011b), p. 375 ff.; Rodríguez Ferrández (2011), p. 340 f.

To give two examples: STC 161/1997, of 2 October, points of law, 8 and 11, referring to “the ratio of proportionality between the rejection of the behaviour that defines it and the punishment… that is assigned to it”; BVerfG, 2 BvR 392/07 de 26.2.2008, marg. 37: “in the framework of the state punishment, it is assumed from the principles of culpability and proportionality, that the seriousness of a punishable act and the culpability of the author should be in just relation with the punishment. A threat of punishment, because of its class and extension, cannot be excessive for the behaviour that is the object of the penalty. The offence and the juridical consequence should first of all be duly calibrated (see Judgment of the Constitutional Court 90, 145 <173>, with subsequent references)”. In the doctrine, recently Rodríguez Ferrández (2011), p. 485 ff., with subsequent references.

For an informative work, see Alexy (2003), p. 771 ff.

Whereas clause nine; of a general nature, see also the Communication from the Commission Strategy for the Effective Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union COM (2010) 573 final, p. 5; as well as Saztger et al. (2012). Among others, critically Schünemann (2004a), pp. 383, 391 f.; Schünemann (2004b), p. 197; Schünemann (2006a), p. 62; Schünemann (2006b), p. 94 f.

Cfr. BVerfG, 2 BvR 392/07, de 26.2.2008, marg. 37. Along these lines, previously Beccaria: “the obstacles that separate men from crimes should be stronger as the crimes are more contrary to the public interest. Hence, there should be proportion between crimes and punishments”, cit. by Bernal Pulido (2007), p. 46. More recently, see Boldova Pasamar (2013), p. 46; Husak (2013), pp. 73, 145; Ossadón Widow (2009), pp. 463, 466 and 469. Among others, for an informative example, see Frisch (2014), pp. 489 ff., 493.

STC 82/2003, of 5 May, third point of law. In this regard, likewise, see STC 67/1997, of 7 April, second point of law; STC 341/1993, of 18 November, fifth and sixth points of law; all of these with subsequent references.

Cfr. art. 2.3 Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA, of 22 July.

On a general note Bernal Pulido (2007), p. 782: “the severity of the legislative intervention in fundamental law will be greater, insofar as that intervention prevents or complicates the exercise of more prima facie positions linked to the fundamental law that is affected or to other fundamental laws… the longer the legislative intervention prevents or complicates the exercise of the prima facie iusfundamental position, the greater the intensity of that intervention and the greater the weight that should be attributed to the fundamental law in its ponderation”.

Art. 286 bis: “1. Whosoever by himself or through an intermediary promises, offers or gives to directors, administrators, employees or collaborators of a mercantile company or society, association, foundation or organization, a benefit or advantage of any kind that is not justified, so that they favour him or a third party, failing to comply with their obligations in the purchase or sale or merchandise or in the contracting of professional services, may be punished by a term of imprisonment of between six months to four years, by special disqualification from working in industry or commerce for a time of between one and six years and by a fine amounting to three times the value of the benefit or advantage. 2. The same punishments will apply to the director, administrator, employee or collaborator of a mercantile company, or a society, association, foundation or organization who, by himself or through an intermediary, receives, requests or accepts an unjustified benefit or advantage of any sort, with a view to favouring third parties to whom he gives or from whom he expects the benefit or the advantage, failing to comply with their obligations in the purchase or sale of goods or in the contracting of professional services, will be punished with the same punishments”; among others, see Navarro Frías and Melero Bosh (2011), p. 1 ff.

On a general note Bernal Pulido (2007), p. 781 f.: “the greater the likelihood that the legislative intervention may prevent or complicate the exercise of the prima facie iusfundamental position, the greater the intensity of that intervention and the greater the weight that should be attributed to the fundamental law in its ponderation”.

Equally, see Cerezo Mir (1998), p. 111 ff.; Luzón Peña (2012), p. 169 f., margs. 44 ff.; Mir Puig (2011), p. 239 ff., margs. 60 ff.; Roxin (2006), § 11 margs. 148 ff.

Critically, on a general note, Nieto Martín (2011), p. 79 f.

In detail see Alexy (2003), p. 773 ff. In a different sense, subsequently in turn Pérez-Barberá (2014), p. 525: “but given that the evil of what is unjust and the punishment are incommensurable between each other, one must overcome this inevitable difficulty through rougher transversal categories, which the dogma –and the praxis- of criminal law do indeed do with categories of criminal intent, imprudence, attenuated and aggravated punishments, the consideration of the victim and social aspects in the framework of the determination of the punishment”.

Earlier, also Silva Sánchez (2007), p. 71 f. From another perspective, Pérez del Valle (2008), p. 11 ff.

COM (2006) 187 final, p. 4. More briefly, See Report from the Commission to the Council based on Article 9 of the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 On combating corruption on the Private Sector, COM (2007) 328 final, p. 5. Nevertheless, in relation to the directives, with nuances see Schaut (2012), p. 140 ff.

COM (2010) 573 final, p. 6; finally Weisser (2014), p. 445 f., with subsequent references.

Cfr. COM (2010) 573 final, p. 6; on the scope of this mandate of determination Weisser (2014), pp. 444 ff., 452, who excludes from it, on p. 447, “the general assumptions of criminal liability do not affect the extension of the description of the criminal behaviour. It is a question of circumstances without specific reference to a particular such as general reasons of justification or innocence or questions of prescription”, among others, the author points out on p. 451, that this duty likewise includes “the lower limits of punishable participation” as well as “the boundaries between unpunished acts of preparation and punishable criminal attempt”.

STC 89/1993, of 12 March, second point of law; in greater detail Ossadón Widow (2009), pp. 53 ff., 79 ff., conceptualizing legal language as a special language. Among others, see van Weezel (2011), pp. 75 ff., 82 ff.

STC 89/1993, of 12 March, third point of law; with subsequent references in van Weezel, Alex: La garantía de tipicidad en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional, cit. n. 59, pp. 75 ff., 82 ff. On the increasing weakening of the constitutional requirement of certainty, see in turn Navarro Frías (2010), p. 68 ff.; Greco (2013), p. 22 f., pointing to the present “the constitutional consecration of the liberation of the legislator from observance of the mandate of certainty”; Basak (2013), pp. 74 f., 78 ff.; earlier, Lenckner (1977), p. 253 ff.; Stächelin (1998), p. 213 ff.; Cuerda Riezu (2001), p. 172 ff. Nevertheless, Madrid Conesa (2013), p. 164, who only appreciates a breach of the constitutional requirement for certainty when referring to concepts “whose content and scope cannot be known with the help of methods of interpretation”, however, see p. 170.

Expressly in relation to the concept of medical treatment, in the sense of the crime of bodily harm under art. 147 Spanish Penal Code, the Sentence of the Supreme Court (STS) 546/2014, of 9 July, first point of law, understands that it is a “normative concept that, in the absence of a legal definition, should be reached through doctrinal and jurisprudential contributions that grant it the necessary legal certainty that is required by the interpretation of the offence”; STS 180/2014, of 6 March, second point of law; STS 34/2014, of 6 February, second point of law; all of which with subsequent references.

Among others, see STC 89/1993, of 12 March, third point of law, referring to the rest of the Order and in particular to international instruments.

It is, therefore, a semantic meaning of the norm that offers criteria for the orientation and evaluation of the application of this concept, cfr. Navarro Conicet and Manrique (2005), p. 810; on the legal definitions, broadly Ossadón Widow (2009), p. 251 ff., pointing to their necessity, on p. 566, when “the linguistic sign to define is novel and not very consolidated”, as well as “when its meaning is obscure or… has an uncertain conceptual extension”; among others, see Muñoz Conde (2013), p. 277 ff.

With subsequent references, see Sánchez Lázaro (2013), p. 307.

Among others, see SAP Barcelona, 5th section, of 30 June 2014, fourth point of law; AAP Salamanca 158/2012, 16 April, second point of law; SAP Barcelona 221/2010, 23 February, third point of law. Finally, in turn, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving evaluation, COM (2013) 686 final, pp. 2 ff., 6 f., pointing to the convenience of fitness checks; Smart regulation in the European Union. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2010) 543 final, p. 5 f.

STC 89/1993, of 12 March, third point of law.

Among others, on conventional nature see Navarro Conicet and Manrique (2005), pp. 809, 823 f., 833; Ossadón Widow (2009), p. 64 ff.; both with subsequent references.

Following Philipp Heck, recently Navarro Frías (2010), p. 80 ff.

In detail Navarro Frías (2010), p. 80 ff. Earlier, see also Noll (1973), p. 185 f. In a similar sense Ossadón Widow (2009), p. 67.

In favor of understanding it, in any case, as medical treatment, STS 153/2013, of 6 March, eleventh and following points of law; demanding that they be “objectively necessary” SAP Pontevedra 24/2009, of 18 May, sixth point of law; in a negative sense, SAP Malaga 589/2010, 24 November, first point of law: “if… no other medical intervention is assumed than the initial cure, although this consists in a suture point, we will not maintain that there has been treatment”, then falling into a certain contradiction; pointing out the need for “additional cures”, SAP Madrid 271/2004, of 12 April, second legal ground; all of which with subsequent references.

Rejecting its understanding as a medical treatment when it has a palliative sense, SAP Barcelona 804/2013, of 12 September, third legal ground; in a contrary sense, in turn, understanding it in all cases as medical treatment, SAP Leon 568/2013, of 26 July, second ground of law; both with subsequent references.

In a critical sense, see Navarro Conicet and Manrique (2005, p. 816): “if greater or lesser vagueness depends on the greater or lesser quantity of marginal cases, it appears that all of the concepts that are projected into open universes of discourse are equally vague because they all have a potentially unlimited class of marginal cases”.

COM (2013) 686 final, pp. 2 ff., 6 ff., noting on p. 8, the need to prepare “continuous evaluation plans”, frameworks “for compilation and control of data”, as well as on p. 9, “frameworks for follow up and evaluation”. Equally, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps, COM (2013) 685 final, p. 3: “Smart regulation is a continuous process, not a one off operation”; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Smart regulation in the European Union, COM (2010) 543 final, p. 3 ff.

In general, on the semantic argument, see Klatt (2004), passim; Klatt (2005), pp. 355, 359 ff. Among others, on the terminology to use in legal provisions, see Noll (1973), pp. 244 ff., 258 ff. More recently, Paredes Castañón (2003), p. 158 n. 187, who pointed out that the convenience of using “those terms and expressions”; Ossadón Widow (2009), pp. 87 ff., 95, 546 ff. Likewise, see Madrid Conesa (2013), p. 215 f.

Cfr. Muñoz Conde (2013), p. 33. Among others, for an illustrative example, see Pawlik (2014), 376 ff., recalling on p. 380: “each juridical institute from the general part and the core crimes from the special part have their own metadogmatic theoretical framework”.

STS 104/2014, of 14 February, proven facts.

Art. 2.3 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003, on combating corruption in the private sector.

Cfr. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2006) 187 final, p. 4; more recently, see the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Smart regulation in the European Union. COM (2010) 543 final, p. 9. On the differences between certainty and precision cfr. likewise, Navarro Conicet and Manrique (2005), p. 811 ff. In relation to the scientifically conformed concepts, see Torío López (2001), p. 817 ff.

Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2006) 187 final, p. 4. Ultimately, see the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Strengthening the Foundations of Smart Regulation—Improving Evaluation, COM (2013) 686 final, p. 2 ff.; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps, COM (2013) 685 final, pp. 3 ff., 12 ff.; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation—improving evaluation, COM (2010) 543 final, pp. 2 ff., 6 ff., pointing out on p. 7, that “the Commission will reinforce the assessment of impacts on fundamental rights, and will develop specific guidance for this.” In the doctrine, Weisser (2014), pp. 433 ff., 440 ff.; crítically, at the same time, Nieto Martín (2011), p. 78 ff. Among others, see Becerra Muñoz (2013), pp. 323 ff., 329 ff.; Muñoz de Morales Romero (2011b), p. 602 ff.; Ossadón Widow (2009), pp. 269 ff., 359 ff. Critically, Rodríguez Ferrández (2011), p. 267 ff., p. 279 ff. Generally, see also the Communication to the Commission from Ms. Grybauskaité in agreement with the President. Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation, SEC(2007)213, p. 3 ff. Earlier, Vogel (2005), p. 265 f.

On this point, Sánchez Lázaro (2014), p. 592 ff. Among others, also Schaut (2012), pp. 43 ff., 91 ff., 109 ff.

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Title: Evaluation and European Criminal Law: The Evaluation Model of the Commission
Author: Fernando Guanarteme Sánchez Lázaro
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Towards a Rational Legislative Evaluation in Criminal Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-32894-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-32895-9

Copyright Year: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32895-9_9