1 Introduction
2 Detecting co-movements between equity and CDS bid-ask spreads
2.1 CDS and equity markets microstructure
2.2 Data description
2.3 Statistical analysis of co-movements
Mean | Median | Std. Dev. | Inter-quartile range | |
---|---|---|---|---|
All sample
| ||||
Pearson | 0.4151 | 0.4170 | 0.1675 | 0.2247 |
Kendall | 0.1469 | 0.1431 | 0.1004 | 0.1459 |
Spearman | 0.2188 | 0.2128 | 0.1444 | 0.2071 |
Year 2003
| ||||
Pearson | 0.5677 | 0.5867 | 0.1883 | 0.2618 |
Kendall | 0.3830 | 0.3997 | 0.1121 | 0.1328 |
Spearman | 0.5512 | 0.5782 | 0.1575 | 0.1792 |
Years 2004–2006
| ||||
Pearson | 0.0144 | 0.0095 | 0.1528 | 0.1412 |
Kendall | 0.0064 | −0.0042 | 0.0931 | 0.1009 |
Spearman | 0.0083 | −0.0079 | 0.1374 | 0.1497 |
Years 2007–2009
| ||||
Pearson | 0.2724 | 0.2780 | 0.1710 | 0.1372 |
Kendall | 0.1300 | 0.1322 | 0.1134 | 0.1103 |
Spearman | 0.1945 | 0.1960 | 0.1642 | 0.1578 |
3 What may determine co-movements in equity and CDS bid-ask spreads?
3.1 The funding channel (or supply channel)
3.2 The Hedging–Arbitrage channel (or demand channel)
4 Test (A): effects of systematic factors and hedge ratio on bid-ask spread co-movements
-
Systematic risk factors (Fama-French market, size, and book-to-market factors):Higher exposure of a firm to market, size, and book-to-market risk factors (MktRf, SMB, and HML) may cause higher inventory costs for dealers operating in both the CDS and equity market of the specific firm, which then translate in higher bid-ask spreads.
-
Cost of external funds (proxied by the spread between the 3-month LIBOR rate and the 3-month T-Bill yield, TED):24Dealers in different markets open and maintain their positions by borrowing external funds (the cost of funding also represents an opportunity-cost). Therefore, the higher funding cost can generate unwinding of positions across multiple markets, fire-sales, and large illiquidity discounts on assets. Additionally, the higher risk of assets’ devaluation can cause further pressure on dealership costs.
-
Market volatility (proxied by the S&P500 option implied volatility index, VIX):Higher volatility can increase inventory costs and cause dealers to impose larger bid-ask spreads across all markets where they provide liquidity.
4.1 Analysis of the variables and results of test (A)
BA Comm (K) | BA Comm (S) | Ret.Comm (K) | Ret.Comm (S) | Hedge Ratio | TED | VIX | Default | MktRf | HML | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
BA Comm (S) | 0.995381 | |||||||||
t-Statistic
|
361.1159
| |||||||||
p value
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |||||||||
Ret.Comm (K) | −0.068303 | |||||||||
t-Statistic
| −2.384421
| |||||||||
p value
|
0.0173
| |||||||||
Ret.Comm (S) | −0.072636 | 0.996432 | ||||||||
t-Statistic
| −2.536464
|
411.1636
| ||||||||
p value
|
0.0113
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| ||||||||
Hedge Ratio | 0.258303 | 0.251053 | −0.254563 | −0.256957 | ||||||
t-Statistic
|
9.312236
|
9.033028
| −9.167993
| −9.26028
| ||||||
p value
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| ||||||
TED | 0.109773 | 0.110083 | −0.100302 | −0.09801 | 0.215783 | |||||
t-Statistic
|
3.846441
|
3.857447
| −3.511029
| −3.429677
|
7.696638
| |||||
p value
|
0.0001
|
0.0001
|
0.0005
|
0.0006
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |||||
VIX | 0.188536 | 0.187813 | −0.22052 | −0.222179 | 0.551195 | 0.744990 | ||||
t-Statistic
|
6.686281
|
6.659684
| −7.874163
| −7.93645
|
23.00773
|
38.89642
| ||||
p value
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| ||||
Default | 0.177576 | 0.173902 | −0.249649 | −0.2503 | 0.521315 | 0.786631 | 0.950148 | |||
t-Statistic
|
6.284526
|
6.15039
| −8.979128
| −9.004082
|
21.27631
|
44.37234
|
106.1322
| |||
p value
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |||
MktRf | 0.053059 | 0.050337 | −0.033195 | −0.036412 | 0.041955 | −0.712126 | −0.450048 | −0.452300 | ||
t-Statistic
|
1.850539
|
1.755368
| −1.156763
| −1.269005
|
1.462509
| −35.32794
| −17.55239
| −17.66270
| ||
p value
|
0.0645
|
0.0794
|
0.2476
|
0.2047
|
0.1439
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| ||
HML | 0.037804 | 0.027749 | 0.040904 | 0.040836 | −0.085198 | −0.336986 | −0.414908 | −0.334351 | 0.312539 | |
t-Statistic
|
1.317575
|
0.966805
|
1.425807
|
1.423413
| −2.978123
| −12.46571
| −15.88202
| −12.35593
|
11.45919
| |
p value
|
0.1879
|
0.3338
|
0.1542
|
0.1549
|
0.0030
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |
SMB | 0.156487 | 0.153082 | −0.041619 | −0.046224 | 0.202025 | −0.212835 | −0.055779 | −0.024626 | 0.411131 | 0.286635 |
t-Statistic
|
5.518136
|
5.395145
| −1.450759
| −1.611635
|
7.184298
| −7.586482
| −1.945709
|
−0.857929
|
15.70788
|
10.42018
|
p value
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
0.1471
|
0.1073
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
0.0519
|
0.3911
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
X | Hedge Ratio | BA Comm (K) | BA Comm (S) | Ret.Comm (K) | Ret.Comm (S) | VIX | Default |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Y | |||||||
Hedge ratio | – | 0.59798 | 0.49305 | 5.84912 | 5.67158 | 22.0451 | 57.8109 |
– |
0.55010
|
0.61090
|
0.00300
|
0.00350
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |
BA Comm (K) | 26.3359 | – | – | 4.2486 | – | 29.6549 | 28.3934 |
\({<0.00001}\)
| – | – |
0.01451
| – |
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |
BA Comm (S) | 24.8627 | – | – | – | 3.89849 | 27.1447 | 26.2406 |
\({<0.00001}\)
| – | – | – |
0.02051
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |
Ret.Comm (K) | 45.5806 | 3.82037 | – | – | – | 52.9075 | 59.2915 |
\({<0.00001}\)
|
0.02220
| – | – | – |
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |
Ret.Comm (S) | 46.8871 | – | 3.18702 | – | – | 54.6119 | 60.9786 |
\({<0.00001}\)
| – |
0.04170
| – | – |
\({<0.00001}\)
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |
VIX | 3.08414 | 4.78519 | 4.14365 | 9.96393 | 9.52758 | – | 163.2780 |
0.04620
|
0.00850
|
0.01610
|
0.00005
|
0.00008
| – |
\({<0.00001}\)
| |
Default | 9.85346 | 2.0633 | 1.57617 | 5.81489 | 5.42138 | 123.675 | – |
0.00006
|
0.12750
|
0.20720
|
0.00310
|
0.00450
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| – |
Panel A
| |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Regression of Equity-CDS Bid-Ask Spread Commonality on Exogenous Risk Factors and Hedge Ratio
| |||||||||||
Spec.
| Int. | MktRf | Smb | Hml | TED | VIX |
\(H^{SS}\)
|
\(H^{SS,ORT}\)
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
|
LR Test
Firms FE
| |
Dep. Var. Kendall Corr. (CDS-Equity Bid-Ask)
| I | -0.0435*** | 16.3739** | 23.0302** | 10.4497 | 5.8369*** | 0.5434*** | 8.40% | 0.9582 | ||
−3.69
|
2.49
|
2.25
|
1.51
|
3.76
|
3.27
|
0.50
| |||||
I | −0.0436*** | 16.2548** | 22.8609** | 10.5402* | 5.8073*** | 0.5565*** | 8.53% | No FE | |||
−3.05
|
2.51
|
2.36
|
1.95
|
3.12
|
4.37
| ||||||
II | −0.0453** | 16.4088** | 22.9595** | 10.7479 | 5.6216*** | 0.0172 | 0.5195** | 8.21% | 0.9572 | ||
−2.57
|
2.47
|
2.22
|
1.49
|
2.59
|
0.13
|
2.05
|
0.51
| ||||
II | −0.0445** | 16.2556** | 22.8045** | 10.6950* | 5.7003** | 0.0082 | 0.5468*** | 8.34% | No FE | ||
−2.49
|
2.51
|
2.33
|
1.75
|
2.36
|
0.08
|
2.87
| |||||
I | −0.0375*** | 17.4499*** | 25.6136** | 6.7355 | 8.0275*** | 0.5953*** | 7.79% | 0.9501 | |||
−3.03
|
2.88
|
2.52
|
1.22
|
4.02
|
3.08
|
0.51
| |||||
I | −0.0374** | 17.3971*** | 25.5531*** | 6.7359 | 8.0407*** | 0.6034*** | 7.96% | No FE | |||
−2.57
|
2.78
|
2.62
|
1.24
|
4.28
|
3.62
| ||||||
II | −0.0542*** | 16.4333*** | 22.9797** | 10.7235 | 5.5677** | 0.1481** | 0.5104** | 8.17% | 0.9574 | ||
−4.13
|
2.60
|
2.27
|
1.74
|
2.14
|
2.00
|
2.31
|
0.51
| ||||
II | −0.0538*** | 16.2654** | 22.8097** | 10.6638* | 5.6515** | 0.1458** | 0.5400*** | 8.31% | No FE | ||
−3.25
|
2.51
|
2.33
|
1.75
|
2.34
|
2.03
|
2.84
|
Panel B
| |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Economic Significance of Regressors
| |||||||||||
Spec.
| MktRf | Smb | Hml | TED | VIX |
\(H^{SS}\)
|
\(H^{SS,ORT}\)
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
|
LR Test
Firms FE
| ||
Dep. Var. Kendall Corr. (CDS-Equity Bid-Ask) | I | 0.1674** | 0.1049** | 0.0728* | 0.2413*** | 0.1619*** | 8.53% | No FE | |||
2.51
|
2.36
|
1.95
|
3.12
|
4.37
| |||||||
II | 0.1674** | 0.1046** | 0.0738* | 0.2368** | 0.0068 | 0.1591*** | 8.34% | No FE | |||
2.51
|
2.33
|
1.75
|
2.36
|
0.08
|
2.87
| ||||||
I | 0.1791*** | 0.1172*** | 0.0465 | 0.3341*** | 0.1548*** | 7.96% | No FE | ||||
2.78
|
2.62
|
1.24
|
4.28
|
3.62
| |||||||
II | 0.1675** | 0.1046** | 0.0736* | 0.2348** | 0.1204** | 0.1385*** | 8.31% | No FE | |||
2.51
|
2.33
|
1.75
|
2.34
|
2.03
|
2.84
|
Panel A—Specification III
| |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FE
|
\(H^{SS}\)
|
\(H^{SS} \times Qrt_{2003:2}\)
|
\(H^{SS} \times Qrt_{2003:3}\)
|
\(H^{SS} \times Qrt_{2005:3}\)
|
\(H^{SS} \times Qrt_{2007:1}\)
|
\(H^{SS} \times Qrt_{2007:3}\)
|
\(H^{SS} \times Qrt_{2008:3}\)
|
\(H^{SS} \times Qrt_{2009:2}\)
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
|
Dep. Var. Kendall Correl. (CDS-Eq.BA)
| |||||||||
Firm | −0.8482 | 2.1646* | 1.4379* | −4.5545** | 16.3920*** | 5.3435** | 2.6917 | 1.8995** | 6.66% |
−0.93
|
1.88
|
1.70
| −2.28
|
4.36
|
2.57
|
1.47
|
2.07
| ||
No | −0.8861 | 2.2752* | 1.5041* | −6.2181*** | 9.4564* | 5.0820*** | 2.7864* | 1.9810** | 6.77% |
−0.94
|
1.94
|
1.79
| −3.53
|
1.83
|
3.69
|
1.76
|
2.11
|
Panel B—Specification IV
| |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FE
| Int. |
\(H^{SS}\)
|
SysRisk
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
|
LR Test FE
| ||||
Dep. Var. Kendall Correl. (CDS-Eq.BA)
| |||||||||
No | −0.0099* | 0.8441*** | 0.0065 | 5.28% | No | ||||
−1.91
|
6.20
|
1.59
| |||||||
Time | −0.0069 | 0.6211*** | 0.0087** | 16.29% | 3.4279 | ||||
−1.12
|
3.09
|
2.38
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| ||||||
Time | −0.0041 | 0.5770** | 0.0064 | 16.39% | 2.4831 | ||||
& Firm | −0.61
|
2.57
|
1.08
|
\({<0.00001}\)
| |||||
Time | 0.0015 | 0.5186** | 15.44% | 2.4195 | |||||
& Firm |
0.31
|
2.35
|
\({<0.00001}\)
|
4.2 Robustness checks on the hedge ratio as proxy for hedging–arbitrage trading
Panel A
| ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hausmann–Wu test
| ||||||||||
Spec.
| Int. | MktRf | Smb | Hml | TED |
\(H^{SS}\)
|
\(H^{SS}Fitted\)
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
|
Firms FE
| |
Dep. Var. Kendall correlation (CDS-Equity Bid-Ask)
| I | −0.0485*** | 18.4016*** | 11.2315 | 13.9285** | 6.3699*** | 0.4538* | 0.0864 | 7.09% | No |
−3.40
|
2.78
|
0.97
|
2.38
|
3.11
|
1.87
|
0.18
| ||||
I | −0.0479*** | 18.1460*** | 11.5873 | 13.0597** | 6.8498*** | 0.5391** | −0.1895 | 7.15 % | Yes | |
−3.90
|
2.64
|
0.98
|
2.17
|
3.14
|
1.96
| −0.34
|
Panel B
| ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2-Stages least squares estimation of the model
| ||||||||||
Spec.
| Int. | MktRf | Smb | Hml | TED |
\(H^{SS}\)
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
|
Firms FE
| ||
Dep. Var. Kendall correlation (CDS-Equity Bid-Ask)
| I | −0.0485*** | 18.1209*** | 11.0671 | 13.8245** | 6.4709*** | 0.5082*** | 7.30% | No | |
−3.38
|
2.69
|
0.95
|
2.40
|
3.45
|
2.67
| |||||
I | −0.0479*** | 18.4797*** | 11.7498 | 13.4410** | 6.5492*** | 0.4484** | 7.35% | Yes | ||
−3.97
|
2.64
|
1.00
|
2.30
|
3.43
|
2.15
|
Panel A
| ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel regressions: comparison between three alternative dependent variables
| ||||||||||
Specification
| Int. | MktRf | Smb | Hml | TED | VIX |
\(H^{SS}\)
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
| ||
Dep. Var Kendall correlation
| II |
Coeff
| −0.0445** | 16.2556** | 22.8045** | 10.6950* | 5.7003** | 0.0082 | 0.5468*** | 8.34% |
t-stat
| −2.49
|
2.51
|
2.33
|
1.75
|
2.36
|
0.08
|
2.87
| |||
Dep. Var. Spearman correlation
| II |
Coeff
| −0.0659*** | 23.5711** | 33.5391** | 14.1709 | 8.0997*** | 0.0239 | 0.7888** | 8.37% |
t-stat
| −2.63
|
2.48
|
2.23
|
1.39
|
2.63
|
0.13
|
2.37
| |||
Dep. Var. Pearson correlation
| II |
Coeff
| −0.0154 | 8.0886 | 39.5789*** | −6.3317 | 4.7113 | −0.1281 | 0.5321** | 3.61% |
t-stat
| −1.17
|
1.02
|
2.89
| −0.94
|
1.58
| −1.15
|
2.29
|
Panel B
| ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel regression—alternative hedge ratio (Vassalou and Xing 2004) | ||||||||||
Specification
| Int. | MktRf | Smb | Hml | TED | VIX |
\(H^{VX}\)
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
| ||
Dep. Var. Kendall correlation
| I |
Coeff
| 0.0090 | −5.7458 | 14.9055 | −9.0884 | 1.5265 | 1.2799** | 4.73% | |
t-stat
|
1.00
| −1.05
|
1.52
| −1.42
|
1.29
|
2.39
| ||||
II |
Coeff
| −0.0093 | −3.8054 | 11.6913 | −6.6383 | −0.5774 | 0.1705 | 1.0813* | 4.97% | |
t-stat
| −0.86
| −0.71
|
1.12
| −1.08
| −0.26
|
1.45
|
1.84
|
5 Test (B) on the determinants of CDS bid-ask spreads
-
The cost of hedging in the equity market.This cost should become more significant when the hedge ratio is substantial and when the CDS dealer faces an increasing demand for CDS protection from ‘noise-traders’ (e.g. bondholders).
-
The amount of informed trading across equity and credit markets.Asymmetric information should affect the CDS bid-ask spread via an increase in CDS dealers’ hedging activity and/or via informed arbitrage trading across the markets (when a CDS-equity mispricing arises).
-
The level of market volatility and funding cost.CDS dealers need to hold some capital to finance their activities and set the bid-ask spreads in the CDS markets in order to recover the cost of the funding needed. Higher market volatility augments the cost of keeping unbalanced positions and the risk of a freeze in funding availability.
5.1 Results of test (B)
Dependent variable: CDS bid-ask spread (\(BA^{CDS}_{it}\)) | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Int. |
\(h^{SS}_{it}\times BA^{E}_{it}\)
|
\((h^{SS}_{it}\times BA^{E}_{it}) \times (\Delta Bond \, Volume_{it})\)
|
\((h^{SS}_{it}\times BA^{E}_{it}) \times (Asym\, Info_{it-1})\)
|
\((h^{SS}_{it}\times BA^{E}_{it}) \times (Log\,CDS\, Mispricing_{it-1})\)
|
\(Asym\, Info_{it-1}\)
|
\(Log\,CDS\, Mispricing_{it-1}\)
|
VIX
|
FE
|
\(Adj.R^2\)
| |
Coeff | 0.052*** | 4.330*** |
Firms
| 32.98% | ||||||
t-stat |
62.92
|
4.61
| ||||||||
Econ. Sign. | 0.41 | |||||||||
Coeff | 0.054*** | 2.321*** |
Firms
| |||||||
t-stat |
79.87
|
3.03
|
+ Time
|
49.15%
| ||||||
Econ. Sign. | 0.22 | |||||||||
Coeff | 0.039*** | 2.756*** | 0.006 | 0.163*** | 0.0007*** |
Firms
| 41.70% | |||
t-stat |
12.34
|
3.39
|
1.43
|
2.65
|
4.32
| |||||
Econ. Sign. | 0.26 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.23 | ||||||
Coeff | 0.039*** | 2.564*** | 0.004 | 0.240*** | 0.0005* | 0.022*** | 0.0008*** |
Firms
| 50.18% | |
t-stat |
15.61
|
3.32
|
0.72
|
3.35
|
1.73
|
5.82
|
5.34
| |||
Econ. Sign. | 0.24 | 0.01 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.32 | 0.24 | ||||
Coeff | 0.039*** | 2.089*** | 0.010 | −0.051 | 5.126*** | 0.0004* | 0.014*** | 0.0008*** |
Firms
| 59.62% |
t-stat |
17.10
|
2.81
|
1.58
| −0.69
|
7.39
|
1.92
|
5.82
|
5.58
| ||
Econ. Sign. | 0.20 | 0.02 | −0.03 | 0.29 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.25 | |||
Coeff | 0.054*** | 1.365** | 0.009 | −0.033 | 5.140*** | 0.0003** | 0.018*** |
Firms
| 71.67% | |
t-stat |
17.10
|
2.14
|
1.57
| −0.56
|
8.21
|
1.99
|
5.80
|
+ Time
| ||
Econ. Sign. | 0.13 | 0.02 | −0.02 | 0.29 | 0.06 | 0.28 |