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Published in:
2011 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Fault Attacks on the Montgomery Powering Ladder
Authors : Jörn-Marc Schmidt, Marcel Medwed
Published in: Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2010
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Security-aware embedded devices which are likely to operate in hostile environments need protection against physical attacks. For the RSA public-key algorithm, protected versions of the Montgomery powering ladder have gained popularity as countermeasures for such attacks.
In this paper, we present a general fault attack against RSA implementations which use the Montgomery powering ladder. In a first step, we discuss under which realistic fault assumptions our observation can be used to attack basic implementations. In a second step, we extend our attack to a scenario, where the message is blinded at the beginning of the exponentiation algorithm. To the best of our knowledge this is the first fault attack on a blinded Montgomery powering ladder.