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2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

9. Financial Market Regulation

Authors : Reto Francioni, James H. Freis Jr., Alexandra Hachmeister

Published in: Equity Markets in Transition

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

A well-functioning financial system is indispensable for economic growth. To that end, the overall objective of the current regulatory reform process is to guarantee, globally, financial market stability. In this context, one of the most important preconditions for stability is a system of working financial market infrastructure (FMIs). Every analysis of financial markets must naturally account for its infrastructure regulations.

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Footnotes
1
Financial market stability is a multidimensional construct with the most important factors being system stability and investor/customer protection and the core element of guaranteeing fair, safe, and sound markets through the elimination of risks for market infrastructure and participants that might also affect the internal market and the real economy.
 
2
A comprehensive analysis regarding the development and impact of the Bretton Woods system and its key performers can be found in Benn Steil, 2013: “The Battle of Bretton Woods,” Princeton University Press.
 
3
See [17].
 
4
FSF/[2], p. 1.
 
5
For an analysis of procyclicality effects leading to the financial crisis of 2009 refer to [10].
 
6
http://​www.​bis.​org/​publ/​othp07.​pdf: [14], p. 5. What is described here relates also to the change in the overall market risk structure that has to be adequately covered by regulation and surveillance as well as, on participant’s side, by monitoring and operations.
 
9
Similar to banks, shadow banks perform term transformations by financing long-term assets with short-term loans (breaking the “golden rule” of duration symmetry), outside the banking system and without access to central bank liquidity. Basic capital requirements that are valid for banks can thus be avoided.
 
10
Descriptive illustration of the securitization process provided by the International Monetary Fund in Jobst, 2008: http://​www.​imf.​org/​external/​pubs/​ft/​fandd/​2008/​09/​pdf/​basics.​pdf.
 
11
Financial innovation, however, is not by itself an impairing factor for financial markets—on the contrary. The problem lies—as usual—in the specific construction, use, and rating of those instruments. For a detailed analysis of and outlook on the securitization market see [3].
 
12
The term “new (financial) order” was coined in 2003 by Yale Professor and Nobel Laureate Robert J. Shiller: “The New Financial Order proposes a radically new risk management infrastructure to help secure the wealth of nations: to preserve the billions of minor—and not so minor—economic gains that sustain people around the world” ([18], p. IX).
 
13
Blair et al., 2012, p. 473. [6], p. 2.
 
14
Blair et al., [13], p. 475.
 
16
The list of principles is available online: http://​www.​bis.​org/​cpmi/​publ/​d101a.​pdf.
 
17
See [5], p. 5.
 
21
For a more detailed review of the history of the development of the international financial standard setting bodies, see Mario Giovanoli, “A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects of International Financial Standard Setting,” in Mario Giovanoli, ed., International Monetary Law: Issues for the New Millennium (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000).
 
22
The G-10 central banks were for decades the institutions which governed the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, which hosts the secretariats of a number of the international standard setters including the FSB, BCBS, and IAIS. The G-10 consisted of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the USA, and the UK; Switzerland was later added as its 11th member. The G-10 groupings have more recently evolved largely to reflect broader G-20 participation.
 
29
See James H. Freis, Jr., “The G-20 Emphasis on Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets,” in Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos, eds., International Monetary and Financial Law: The Global Crisis (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010).
 
32
De Larosière (2009:): 38: 46–48.
 
34
Systemic risk as defined by European law is the “risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy” (Article 2(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010).
 
36
De Larosière (2009): 48ff.
 
41
See [19], 395, based on Art 290f. TFEU.
 
42
The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (March 2008), available at http://​www.​treasury.​gov/​press-center/​press-releases/​Documents/​Blueprint.​pdf.
 
43
See id. at 14 (proposing consolidation by objective, resulting in three regulators responsible for market stability, prudential regulation, and business conduct, respectively).
 
44
The majority of the 50 states themselves maintain regulators divided by the various sectors, although a minority have more recently introduced consolidated regulators within a state’s jurisdiction. One prominent example is the Ney York State Department of Financial Services, which was created in 2011 by combining the state’s previously independent banking and insurance supervisors. See www.​dfs.​ny.​gov.
 
45
The FFIEC recommends uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examinations of financial institutions by the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and in relevant areas by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. See https://​www.​ffiec.​gov/​about.​htm. See also the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, www.​csbs.​org.
 
46
Congressional Research Service, Who Regulates Who and How? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Policy, January 2015, Summary.
 
47
Ibid. Summary.
 
48
See James H. Freis Jr., An Outsider’s Look into the Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: A Guide toSecurities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz Deutschland, 19 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 77–79 (1996), http://​lawdigitalcommon​s.​bc.​edu/​iclr/​vol19/​iss1/​2.
 
52
Ibid. 23.
 
56
Congressional Research Service, Who Regulates Who and How? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Policy, January 2015, 21–22.
 
57
Ibid, 23.
 
62
See FT Lexicon: This term is most often used to denote banks and firms that would substantially damage the financial system and the rest of the economy should they “fail,” i.e., go bankrupt.
The logic is therefore that these organizations would receive a “bailout” of some kind from the government—at the very least, protecting creditors against losses and perhaps also enabling management to stay in place (and, in some cases, the full payment of wages and bonuses).
 
63
See [13], p. 475.
 
65
Namely: European Banking Committee (EBC), European Securities Committee (ESC), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (EIOPC) and Financial Conglomerates Committee (FCC).
 
67
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS).
 
68
Regulation (EC) No 764/2008: “The principle of mutual recognition, which derives from the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, is one of the means of ensuring the free movement of goods within the internal market. Mutual recognition applies to products which are not subject to Community harmonisation legislation, or to aspects of products falling outside the scope of such legislation. According to that principle, a Member State may not prohibit the sale on its territory of products which are lawfully marketed in another Member State, even where those products were manufactured in accordance with technical rules different from those to which domestic products are subject.”
 
69
The principle of full harmonization was first laid out by the Court of Justice of the European Communities as well. In its judgment regarding Joined Cases C‑261/07 and C‑299/07 on Directive 2005/29/EC (Unfair Commercial Practice) it is concluded that: “The Directive is based on the principle of full harmonisation. This means that Member States can no longer implement or apply either less or more restrictive or prescriptive consumer protection measures in the area it harmonises. As the Preamble to the Directive explains, in order to remove internal market barriers caused by regulatory disparities and to increase legal certainty for both consumers and businesses, it was necessary to replace existing national systems with a uniform regulatory framework at Community level.” (https://​webgate.​ec.​europa.​eu/​ucp/​public/​index.​cfm?​event=​public.​guidance.​showArticle&​elemID=​52).
 
70
U. U.S.C. § 500 et seq.
 
71
United States-European Union Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue Joint Statement of Jan 2015: http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​finance/​general-policy/​docs/​global/​150115-us-eu-joint-statement_​en.​pdf.
 
74
Systematic internalizer as defined by the Commission “means an investment firm which, on an organised, frequent and systematic basis, deals on own account by executing client orders outside a regulated market or an MTF” (EU Directive 2004/39 EC (Art 4, Abs 1, Satz 7)).
 
76
Peter Gomber/Axel Pierron, 2010: MiFID—Spirit and Reality of a European Financial Markets Directive; Peter Gomber/Benedikt Jäger, 2014 [8]: MiFID: Eine systematische Analyse der Zielerreichung.
 
81
70 FR 37,496 (29 June 2005).
 
82
See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1.
 
83
See70 FR. at 37,496.
 
84
See SEC Division of Trading and Markets, Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 611 and Rule 610 of Regulation NMS (4 April 2008 Update), available at https://​www.​sec.​gov/​divisions/​marketreg/​nmsfaq610-11.​htm.
 
85
Regulation available online: http://​eur-lex.​europa.​eu/​legal-content/​EN/​TXT/​PDF/​?​uri=​CELEX:​32012R0648&​amp;from=​DE, details on specific aspects of the Regulation and according application are provided in Chap. 5 (Clearing).
 
86
According to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 financial counterparties include investment firms, credit institutions, insurance/assurance/reinsurance undertakings, occupational retirement provisions, and alternative investment funds.
 
88
For details please refer to Chap. 5 Clearing.
 
90
Delayering stands for reducing intermediation or reducing the necessary layers needed to access settlement in central bank money cross border.
 
91
Clearstream, the T2S Opportunity: Unlocking the Hidden Benefits of Target2 Securities, http://​www.​clearstream.​com/​blob/​68228/​9f9261051598b77e​44bddf291d655859​/​t2opportunity-pdf-data.​pdf.
 
94
Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1326-2223. As a type of omnibus legislation, the individual provisions of the law are codified across many different provisions of the US Code, including as amendments within different provisions of the preexisting banking and securities laws.
 
96
Dodd-Frank Act § 113(i).
 
98
See MetLife, Press Release, MetLife to Ask Federal Count to review SIFI Designation (15 January 2015), https://​www.​metlife.​com/​about/​press-room/​index.​html?​compID=​155136; GE, Press Release, GE to Sell Most Capital Assets, Embrace Its Industrial Core (10 April 2015), http://www.gereports.com/post/116017450895/ge-to-sell-most-ge-capital-assets-embrace-its#.
 
99
http://​financialresearc​h.​gov/​about; http://www.gereports.com/post/116017450895/ge-to-sell-most-ge-capital-assets-embrace-its#.
 
101
Ibid.
 
102
Dodd-Frank ActDodd-Frank Act § 312.
 
103
Dodd-Frank Act § 403.
 
105
Dodd-Frank Act § 619.
 
106
Id. at 47.
 
107
Dodd-Frank Act § 730.
 
108
Dodd-Frank Act § 733.
 
109
Dodd-Frank Act § 724.
 
110
Dodd-Frank Act § 723.
 
111
Dodd-Frank Act § 804.
 
115
Dodd-Frank Act § 1027(h), (i), (j).
 
117
Dodd-Frank Act § 1302.
 
118
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 752.
 
119
See Davis Polk, Dodd-Frank Progress Report (Fourth Quarter 2015) at 2, available at http://​www.​davispolk.​com/​Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report/​.
 
121
De Larosière, 2009: par. 201.
 
122
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector,” COM (2010) 716 final (8 December 2010), pp. 9–10.
 
123
Id. at 12–14.
 
124
See, e.g., US Department of Justice, Press Release, “Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses” (9 February 2012), http://​www.​justice.​gov/​opa/​pr/​federal-government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest.
 
125
The Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), a sophisticated, white-collar law enforcement agency, was established by Congress in 2008 to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse linked to the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). See www.​sigtarp.​gov.
 
129
Cicero analysis [4]: Unblocking the EU’s capital markets.
 
132
C.f. Chap. 2.
 
133
See SEC Division of Trading and Markets, Memorandum to the Markets Structure Advisory Committee re Rule 611 of Regulation NMS (30 April 2015), available at https://​www.​sec.​gov/​spotlight/​emsac/​memo-rule-611-regulation-nms.​pdf.
 
Literature
13.
go back to reference Hüpkes, E. (2012): The Architechture of International Financial Regulation. In: Blair, M; Walker, G.; Willey, S. (Eds.): Financial Markets and Exchanges Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hüpkes, E. (2012): The Architechture of International Financial Regulation. In: Blair, M; Walker, G.; Willey, S. (Eds.): Financial Markets and Exchanges Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
19.
go back to reference Willey, S. (2012): The European System of Financial Supervision. In: Blair, M; Walker, G.; Willey, S. (Eds.): Financial Markets and Exchanges Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Willey, S. (2012): The European System of Financial Supervision. In: Blair, M; Walker, G.; Willey, S. (Eds.): Financial Markets and Exchanges Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Metadata
Title
Financial Market Regulation
Authors
Reto Francioni
James H. Freis Jr.
Alexandra Hachmeister
Copyright Year
2017
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45848-9_9