2013 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Formally Verified System Initialisation
Authors : Andrew Boyton, June Andronick, Callum Bannister, Matthew Fernandez, Xin Gao, David Greenaway, Gerwin Klein, Corey Lewis, Thomas Sewell
Published in: Formal Methods and Software Engineering
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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The safety and security of software systems depends on how they are initially configured. Manually writing program code that establishes such an initial configuration is a tedious and error-prone engineering process. In this paper we present an automatic and formally verified initialiser for component-based systems built on the general-purpose microkernel seL4. The construction principles of this tool apply to capability systems in general and the proof ideas are not specific to seL4. The initialiser takes a declarative formal description of the desired initialised state and uses seL4-provided services to create all necessary components, setup their communication channels, and distribute the required access rights. We provide a formal model of the initialiser and prove, in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL, that the resulting state is the desired one. Our proof formally connects to the existing functional correctness proof of the seL4 microkernel. This tool does not only provide automation, but also unprecedented assurance for reaching a desired system state. In addition to the engineering advantages, this result is a key prerequisite for reasoning about system-wide security and safety properties.