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Operations Research and Management Science in Higher Education: An Overview Read chapter Read first chapter

2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

10. Funding Research in Higher Education Institutions: The Game Theory Approach

Authors : Baruch Keren, Yossi Hadad, Yizhaq Minchuk

Published in: Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science in Higher Education

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter presents a unique model, based on game theory, that can help decision-makers in higher education (HE) institutions determine an optimal research budget. The model can then help them decide how to allocate that budget among academic units such as researchers, institutions, and departments. The model considers the management of the institution as a contest organizer and the academic units as contestants that compete with each other to win the contest. The prize of this contest is a desired research budget. The proposed model includes a form of two contestants with different abilities, as well as a form with unlimited (N) contestants with the same abilities. The model enables decision-makers to determine the size of the optimal research budget (the prize), and the optimal distribution mechanism (a contest or a budget division) of that prize among the contestants. To the best of our knowledge, determining the size of the Tullock contest prize according to the contestants’ abilities with comparison to a bargaining model has not previously been studied. This is an application that is new to the HE budget allocation process. The study includes a numerical example that demonstrates the model and its applicability.

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previous chapter Models for Planning and Budgeting in Higher Education
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Metadata
Title
Funding Research in Higher Education Institutions: The Game Theory Approach
Authors
Baruch Keren
Yossi Hadad
Yizhaq Minchuk
Copyright Year
2021
Book
Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science in Higher Education

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-74049-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-74051-1

Copyright Year: 2021

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74051-1_10

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