Skip to main content
Top
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 2/2015

01-09-2015

Further results on dictatorial domains

Author: Anup Pramanik

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 2/2015

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This paper generalizes the results in Aswal et al. (Econ Theory 22:45–62, 2003) on dictatorial domains. This is done in two ways. In the first, the notion of connections between pairs of alternatives in Aswal et al. (2003) is weakened to weak connectedness. This notion requires the specification of four preference orderings for every alternative pair. Domains that are linked in the sense of Aswal et al. (2003) with weak connectedness replacing connectedness, are shown to be dictatorial. In the second, the notion of connections for alternative pairs is strengthened relative to its counterpart in Aswal et al. (2003). However, a domain is shown to be dictatorial if the induced graph is merely connected rather than linked. This result generalizes the result in Sato (Rev Econ Design 14:331–342, 2010) on circular domains.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Footnotes
1
A strict ordering is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation.
 
2
This is the standard notion of a connected graph, i.e. a graph where there is a path between any two vertices. A path between two vertices \(a\) and \(b\), is a finite sequence of distinct vertices \((a=a_1,a_2,\dots ,a_k=b)\) such that for all \(i\in \{1,\dots ,k-1\}\), \(\{a_i,a_{i+1}\}\) is an edge in the graph. A complete definition can be found in West (2001).
 
3
A graph \(G=(N, E)\) is a star graph if there exists a vertex \(a\in N\) (the center of the star) such that \((i)\) for all \(b\in N{\setminus }\{a\}\), \(\{a,b\}\) is an edge in \(G\) and \((ii)\) for all \(b,c\in N{\setminus }\{a\}\), \(\{b,c\}\) is not an edge in \(G\).
 
4
In view of Proposition 1 and the fact that a \(\gamma \) domain is minimally rich, it suffices to show that if \(f: {{\mathbb {D}}}^2 \rightarrow A\) is strategy-proof and unanimous, then \(f\) is dictatorial.
 
5
If \(G\) is a connected graph and there exists a node \(a\) in the graph such that there are no two edges \(\{a,b\}\) and \(\{b,c\}\) with \(a\ne c\), then \(G\) is a star graph. In particular, \(a\) is the center of the star graph \(G\).
 
Literature
go back to reference Aswal N, Chatterji S, Sen A (2003) Dictatorial domains. Econ Theory 22:45–62CrossRef Aswal N, Chatterji S, Sen A (2003) Dictatorial domains. Econ Theory 22:45–62CrossRef
go back to reference Dogan E, Sanver M (2007) On the alternating use of “unanimity” and “surjectivity” in the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. Econ Lett 96:140–143CrossRef Dogan E, Sanver M (2007) On the alternating use of “unanimity” and “surjectivity” in the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. Econ Lett 96:140–143CrossRef
go back to reference Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41:587–601CrossRef Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41:587–601CrossRef
go back to reference Sato S (2010) Circular domains. Rev Econ Des 14:331–342 Sato S (2010) Circular domains. Rev Econ Des 14:331–342
go back to reference Satterthwaite M (1975) Strategy-proofness and arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10:187–217CrossRef Satterthwaite M (1975) Strategy-proofness and arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10:187–217CrossRef
go back to reference West D (2001) Introduction to graph theory. Prentice Hall, New Jersey West D (2001) Introduction to graph theory. Prentice Hall, New Jersey
Metadata
Title
Further results on dictatorial domains
Author
Anup Pramanik
Publication date
01-09-2015
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 2/2015
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0889-0

Other articles of this Issue 2/2015

Social Choice and Welfare 2/2015 Go to the issue

Premium Partner