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2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. General Features of Domestic Lobbying in Japan

Author : Eric Romann

Published in: Nonmarket Strategy in Japan

Publisher: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

This chapter reviews the main characteristics of Japan’s political economy, political system, and lobbying patterns from a traditional domestic standpoint with the implications for foreign firms attempting to navigate this landscape.
A prime general feature is that, as a power game, Japan is not so different from other parts of the world, but nevertheless, presents some institutional, organizational, and cultural specificities: prior consultations, behind-the-scenes consensus building, early consolidation of bills before vote, weight of the bureaucracy. In Japan, the traditional channels for influence are collective (industry or peak associations) or pecuniary via contributions to parties. Direct individual lobbying is less developed and often takes the form of solicitations to the authorities rather than proactive propositions of alternatives. From an organizational point of view, rare are the firms having a specific public affairs section despite the close but more ambiguous and dispersed concept of shôgai. For foreign firms in Japan, the accurate understanding of the behind-the-scenes processes is a real challenge that requires investment not always judged worth in terms of business return. Moreover, grassroots or public advocacy strategies are limited, while foreign firms are not allowed to activate financial leverages. Consequently, they have to concentrate on collective action, hire/use well-connected people, and provide valuable information/expertise.

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Footnotes
1
According to Abegglen, the term “Japan Inc.” was already in use in the 1930s and was found by him in the Asahi Evening News. The real popularity of the term came with Kaplan’s book and is due to its appealing descriptive power for the public and reporters. Abegglen meant a complex combination of cooperation and competition, but the posterity remembered only the sensationalist image of a collusive scheme.
 
2
In his analysis, Johnson distinguishes the regulatory state such as the US, and the developmental state such as Japan where the state, centered on the MITI, leads the economic development. This pattern occurs where industrialization is late and produces very different business–government relationships.
 
3
Administrative Procedure Act (Act No. 88 of 1993), Chap. 6.
 
4
Implementation Guidelines for ex-ante Evaluation of Regulation, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
 
5
Daikin had several cases. In Europe, in 2005, they realized that a new regulation limiting the use of HFCs (Hydrofluorocarbons, gases used as refrigerants in air conditioners) was about to be passed, in which case they could lose a significant part of their business. They initiated actions which were successful and were the starting point of a proactive CPA strategy worldwide with a number of issues following. But, within Japan, the bureaucracy was and still is reluctant to deal individually with firms, asking for a collective demand from the relevant industry association. However, the association members, general electric appliance manufacturers with differentiated products range, do not share the same interests as Daikin, whose strategy is centered on a specialization in air-conditioning. Therefore, they are not supportive despite the benefits they enjoy for their air-conditioning divisions (free-ride), thanks to the continuous actions by Daikin worldwide in an environment becoming increasingly sensitive for greenhouse gases.
 
6
A series of bribes and contributions made by the US aerospace company Lockheed in an attempt to sell its aircrafts that had ramifications in several countries, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Japan. In Japan, the Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, was arrested.
 
7
Historically in Japan, private persons were not supposed to address the government directly; this legacy is still alive in some public officials’ mindset who cannot completely do away with the feeling that their position places them above criticism.
 
8
In firms such as Daikin, there is a clear organizational distinction between the team dealing with public affairs worldwide and the shôgai office which is in charge of the relations with the industry association within Japan.
 
9
In 1988, a human resources company, Recruit, offered shares of one of its subsidiaries, Cosmos, to politicians and business leaders before it went public, leading to a significant insider profit for the beneficiaries. Several high-level politicians had to resign.
 
10
Under the multi-member SNTV system, electoral districts were constituted of three to six seats. The candidates with the highest votes fill the positions. In a four-member district, for example, the top four vote-getters were elected and the candidate who came fifth lost. Each voter was allowed to cast a ballot for only one candidate in a multi-member district, making elections an area of competition between the parties and among the candidates within the same party. A voter could not transfer his vote in any preferential manner. With this system, politicians had to compete on a personal and clientelistic basis rather than on policies. Moreover, the urban areas were underrepresented compared to rural ones. The new organization consists of two parallel tiers, a Proportional Representation (PR) and a First Past The Post (FPTP) single-member district system. Each voter cast one vote in each tier.
 
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Metadata
Title
General Features of Domestic Lobbying in Japan
Author
Eric Romann
Copyright Year
2020
Publisher
Springer Singapore
Book
Nonmarket Strategy in Japan

Print ISBN: 978-981-15-7324-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-15-7325-5

Copyright Year: 2020

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7325-5_4