Germany’s Role in European Russia Policy

While multiple internal and external crises in the EU revealed the increasingly influential role Germany has assumed, the academic and political debate lacks consensus on how to conceptualise Germany’s changing position. This study aims to contribute to the discussion about a new German power in Europe through the analysis of Germany’s influence on the EU’s Russia policy. Does the case of European Russia policy provide sufficient evidence for more assertive forms of power used by Germany? Assuming that power is a necessary concept for the study of member states’ influence in the EU, the introduction demonstrates how a theory-based taxonomy of power can be productively applied as a theoretical framework to the analysis of Germany’s influence. For this purpose, the power taxonomy of Barnett and Duvall is introduced, which encompasses different power conceptualisations from a variety of theoretical schools. The case studies focus on the period after the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004. Four cases are chosen which suggest diverging degrees of German influence and different contexts of policy making.

During the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, it was France rather than Germany that assumed a leadership role throughout the crisis as the EU’s Council Presidency. While Germany supported French crisis mediation efforts, it was not in the front row and lacked the instruments of institutional power that France had available, including the legitimising effects of the Presidency. German influence was thus minor compared to France’s. Yet, Germany still exerted influence and was setting the boundaries for the EU’s response against the more forward-leaning Eastern member states. The outcome of the EU’s policy towards the crisis represented the lowest common denominator and EU-Russia relations quickly returned to business as usual without substantial policy shift, to the opposite: The German credo of more, not less cooperation became the EU’s policy in the following years.

Germany used the window of opportunity under newly elected Russian President Medvedev to conclude a bilateral German-Russian Modernisation Partnership in 2008, setting the agenda for the EU and member states. The modernisation paradigm became official EU policy with the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation in 2010, together with twenty-two bilateral agreements concluded by member states with Russia. The modernisation paradigm was based on German “Ostpolitik” (Eastern policy) assumptions that Russia could be transformed into a more democratic and reliable actor through increased economic interaction. Germany’s approach in the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation was perceived as a “constructive case of bilateralism”. Although the modernisation policy lost its relevance after President Putin’s return to power in 2012, the modernisation agenda played a crucial role in defining the EU-Russia relationship during the Medvedev period from 2008–2012.

The Meseberg initiative was the most ambitious German policy initiative in the area of security policy with Russia: Germany concluded a bilateral memorandum on behalf of the EU, yet without the EU’s formal endorsement, encouraged by the context of a seemingly reform-minded President Medvedev and a pro-European government in Moldova. This demonstrated Germany’s confidence that it could grasp a win-win opportunity: Solving a conflict in the neighbourhood and at the same time proving that Russia can be a constructive actor in the neighbourhood. To that end, Germany applied a more assertive approach through issue linkage to incentivise the EU and Russia to make progress in relations. However, the Meseberg initiative became an example of only minor German influence on EU policy: Neither has the initiative been implemented by the EU, nor was the conflict in Transnistria solved with Russia’s support. The Meseberg initiative demonstrated the limits of Germany’s approach: Germany was criticised for its bilateral “deal-making” with Russia and member states were reluctant to take ownership. Instead of advancing the EU-Russia relationship, the initiative contributed to frustration on both sides.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict represents the height of Germany’s influence on EU Russia policy. For the first time, Germany embraced a leading role in a security crisis with Russia, with France as junior partner. Germany’s leadership resulted in a greater cohesive power than France’s leadership in the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, keeping the EU united on sanctions and crisis mediation. As a result, the EU’s response exceeded the lowest common denominator. However, this major German influence has not been achieved through compulsory power instruments. On the contrary, Germany relied extensively on institutional and productive power instruments to establish a common European stance through agenda setting, coalition building and paradigm framing. The Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrated the potential of German power, but also the relevance of legitimacy for a leadership role: Of particular importance to Eastern EU member states was the perception of norm-guided German behaviour. By prioritising crisis mediation over bilateral relations with Russia, Germany was perceived as a legitimate leader in a crisis that represented a caesura in the EU-Russian relationship without a quick return to business as usual. Despite this success, Germany’s continuous support for Nord Stream 2 and the lack of conflict resolution undermined its credibility in the following years.

Regardless of success or failure, Germany has continuously attempted to shape the EU’s Russia policy after the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004. However, Germany’s role in EU Russia policy represents a more complex “Machtpolitik” (power politics) than the concept of hegemony suggests. The comparison of policy initiatives and crisis situations demonstrates that Germany was willing to choose from the full menu of instruments available, including more assertive ones, which confirms that Germany has become a “normalised power”. However, for Germany to gain support for its positions within the EU, the use of institutional and productive power instruments proved to be more effective. This is explained by the fact that these instruments provide the important dimension of legitimacy for Germany’s role, an important precondition for power. In the German context, the concept of responsibility plays a particularly important role to legitimise German power and influence. Acknowledging that power is an important concept for analysis, the question is raised whether a specific conceptualisation of power is necessary for European Studies. The chapter concludes that Germany’s influence on Russia policy can be more adequately conceptualised by the term “policy dominance”. Situated between leadership and hegemony, policy dominance designates a continuous engagement over a longer period of time in a policy field with the aim to set policies (or oppose others’) and to shape the paradigm, as Germany did in the EU’s Russia policy.