Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
The Review of International Organizations
Published in: The Review of International Organizations 1/2009

01-03-2009

IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003

Authors: M. Rodwan Abouharb, David L. Cingranelli

Published in: The Review of International Organizations | Issue 1/2009

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

We examined the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) supervised programs on changes in government respect for physical integrity rights in developing countries between 1981 and 2003. A longer period under an IMF program increased government use of torture and extra judicial killing and also worsened the overall human rights conditions in developing countries. The use of a two-stage model ruled out the possibility that human rights practices would have worsened even if IMF programs had not been in effect. Previous studies of the impacts of IMF programs also found that they had worsened government respect for human rights. However, those studies did not control for the effects of selection. We found preliminary evidence that the worsened human rights conditions persisted even after the reforms in program lending of the late 1990s.
previous article Renewing IMF surveillance: Transparency, accountability, and independence
next article Who’s afraid of an EU tax and why?—revenue system preferences in the European Parliament

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
The ESAF was renamed to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999.
 
2
We include all four different types of IMF facilities.
 
3
The formal mission of the World Bank, when it was first established as a UN agency, was to address issues of economic development, while the IMF was to focus on helping to correct balance of payments problems. Since 1980, the missions of the two international financial institutions have become more similar, and there is increasing cooperation between them in developing country-specific strategies to promote economic development (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Blackmon 2008; Jayarajah et al. 1996).
 
4
IMF program lending had no effect on the frequency of a government’s use of political imprisonment or disappearances.
 
5
Some scholars have argued that a weak state is necessary for the protection of physical integrity rights. According to this view, a relatively limited government is fundamental to all human freedoms. Limited government reduces barriers to the functioning of the free market, allowing human beings to pursue their own interests in their own ways and allowing them to pursue opportunities that are likely to be lost if human freedom is restricted (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1984). With regard to the physical integrity human rights examined here, Cranston (1964) has argued that respect for these rights only requires forbearance on the part of the state.
 
6
Only two of those studies controlled for selection effects (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007).
 
7
For a more nuanced view, see Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007).
 
8
Subsequently, the HIPC was strengthened and renamed “the Enhanced HIPC Initiative” (Blackmon 2008).
 
9
Thorough reviews of studies examining the selection biases of the IMF can be found in Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007), Stone (2004) and Vreeland (2003).
 
10
See for example the findings of Landman (2005).
 
11
Note that the value of numbers of years under IMF programs maximizes at 22 rather than 23 because we exclude the first year a government enters into a program unless it is already under conditionality from a previous loan.
 
12
These are available from the authors upon request.
 
13
These results are available as a web appendix on the Review of International Organization’s website.
 
Literature
Abouharb, M. R., & Cingranelli, D. (2006). The human rights effects of World Bank structural adjustment lending, 1981–2000. International Studies Quarterly, 50(2), 233–262.CrossRef
Abouharb, M. R., & Cingranelli, D. (2007). Human rights and structural adjustment: The impact of the IMF and World Bank. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Achen, C. H. (1986). The statistical analysis of quasi experiments. Berkley: University of California Press.
Banks, A. S. (2002). Cross-national time-series data archive [computer file]. Binghamton, NY: Computer Solutions Unlimited.
Bird, G., & Willett, T. (2004). IMF conditionality, implementation and the new political economy of ownership. Comparative Economic Studies, 46(3), 423–450.CrossRef
Blackmon, P. (2008). Rethinking Poverty through the Eyes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. International Studies Review, 10, 179–202.CrossRef
Callaghy, T. (1990). Lost between state and market: The politics of economic adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria. In: J. Nelson (Ed.), Economic crisis and policy choice: The politics of adjustment in the third world (pp. 257–319). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (1999a). Measuring the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2), 407–418.CrossRef
Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (1999b). Respect for human rights after the end of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), 511–534.CrossRef
Commonwealth Secretariat (1989). Engendering adjustment for the 1990s: Report of a Commonwealth expert group on women and structural adjustment. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
Collier, D. (1991). The comparative method: Two decades of change. In: D. Rustow, & K. Erickson (Eds.), Comparative political dynamics: Global research perspectives (pp. 7–31). New York: Harper Collins.
Collier, P. (2003). Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of causation and Policy Interventions, World Bank.
Cranston, M. (1964). What are human rights?. New York: Basic Books.
Davenport, C., & Armstrong II, D. A. (2004). Democracy and the violation of human rights: A statistical analysis from 1976–1996. American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 538–554.CrossRef
Davies, J. C. (1969). The J-Curve of rising and declining satisfactions as cause of some great revolutions and a contained rebellion. In H. D. Graham, & T. R. Gurr (Eds.), Violence in America: Historical and comparative perspectives (pp. 547–576). Washington, DC, National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Davidson, J. (2002). Overcoming resistance to change. Public Management, 84(11), 20–23.
Dollar, D., & Svensson, J. (2000). What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programmes? The Economic Journal, 110, 894–917.CrossRef
Donnelly, J. (2003). Universal human rights in theory and practice. 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Dreher, A. (2006). IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality. World Development, 34(5), 769–788.CrossRef
Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2007). Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF conditions. The Journal of Law and Economics, 50(1), 105–124.CrossRef
Feierabend, I. K., & Feierabend, R. L. (1966). Aggressive behavior within polities 1948–1962: a cross-national study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10, 249–271.CrossRef
Franklin, J. (1997). IMF conditionality, threat perception, and political repression: A cross-national analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 30, 576–606.CrossRef
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Gibney, M., & Dalton, M. (1996). The political terror scale. In Human rights and developing countries (pp. 124–156). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Gurr, T. R. (1968). Psychological Factors in Civil Violence. World Politics, 20(2), 245–278.CrossRef
Haggard, S. (1995). Democracy and economic growth. In Structural adjustment: Retrospect and prospect (pp. 199–219). Wesport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Hayek, F. A. (1984). Principles and expedience. In The essence of Hayek pp. 299–317. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Heckman, J. J. (1988). The microeconomic evaluation of social programs and economic institutions. In Chung-Hua Series of Lectures by Invited Eminent Economists. No. 14. Taipei: The Institute of Economics Academia Sinica.
Isham, J., Kaufman, D., & Pritchett, L. H. (1997). Civil liberties, democracy, and the performance of government projects. World Bank Economic Review, 11(2), 219–42.CrossRef
Jayarajah, C. A. B., Branson, W. H., Sen, B. (1996). The social dimensions of adjustment: International Monetary Fund experience, 1980–1993. An International Monetary Fund Operations Evaluation Study.
Joyce, J. P. (1992). The economic characteristics of IMF program countries. Economics Letters, 38, 237–242.CrossRef
Kaufman, D. (2004). Human rights and governance: The empirical challenge. Paper presented at a conference co-sponsored by the Ethical Globalization Initiative and the NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. New York City: New York University March 1.
Keith, L. C., & Poe, S. C. (2000). The United States, the IMF, and human rights. In: D. F. Forsythe (Ed.), The United States and human rights (pp. 273–299). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Kienle, E. (2001). A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt. London: I. B. Tauris.
Killick, T. (1996). IMF programmes in developing countries: Design and impact. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Landman, T. (2005). Protecting human rights: A comparative study. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
McCormick, J., & Mitchell, N. (1997). Human rights violations, umbrella concepts, and empirical analysis. World Politics, 49(4), 510–525.CrossRef
McLaren, L. M. (1998). The effect of IMF austerity programs on human rights violations: An exploratory analysis of Peru, Argentina, and Brazil. Paper presented at the 1998 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
Mitchell, N., & McCormack, J. (1988). Economic and political explanations of human rights violations. World Politics, 40(4), 176–198.CrossRef
Moore, M. (1998). Death without taxes: Democracy, state capacity, and aid dependence in the fourth world. In M. Robinson, & G. White (Eds.), The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, M. (2007). How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance? Working Paper 280. Institute of Development Studies. University of Sussex: UK.
Pettifor, A. (2001). Global economic justice: Human rights for debtor nations. Journal of Human Development, 2(1), 47–51.CrossRef
Pion-Berlin, D. (1983). Political repression and economic doctrines. Comparative Political Studies, 16, 37–66.CrossRef
Pion-Berlin, D. (1984). The political economy of state repression in Argentina. In M. Stohl, & G. A. Lopez (Eds.), The state as terrorist: The dynamics of governmental violence and repression (pp. 99–123). Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Pion-Berlin, D. (1989). The ideology of state terror: Economic doctrine and political repression in Argentina and Peru. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Pion-Berlin, D. (1991). Between confrontation and accommodation: Military and government policy in democratic Argentina. Journal of Latin American Studies, 23, 543–566.CrossRef
Poe, S. C., & Tate, C. N. (1994). Repression of physical integrity in the 1980s: a global analysis. American Political Science Review, 88(4), 853–872.CrossRef
Poe, S. C., Tate, C. N., & Keith, L. C. (1999). Repression of the human right to physical integrity revisited: A global cross-national study covering the years 1976–1993. International Studies Quarterly, 43, 291–313.CrossRef
Policzer, P. (2004). How organizations shape human rights violations. In: S. C. Carey, & S. C. Poe (Eds.), Understanding human rights violations (pp. 221–238). Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Przeworski, A., & Vreeland, J. R. (2000). The effects of IMF programs on economic growth. The Journal of Development Economics, 62, 385–421.CrossRef
Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. New York: Anchor Books.
Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York: WW Norton.
Stone, R. (2004). The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. American Political Science Review, 98(4), 577–592.CrossRef
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) (2004). Structural adjustment: The SAPRI report. London: Zed Books.
Van de Walle, N. (2001). African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979–1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Vreeland, J. R. (2002). The effect of IMF programs on labor. World Development, 30(1), 21–139.
Vreeland, J. R. (2003). The IMF and economic development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
World Bank (1998). Development and human rights: The role of the world bank. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Metadata
Title
IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003
Authors
M. Rodwan Abouharb
David L. Cingranelli
Publication date
01-03-2009
Publisher
Springer New York
Published in
The Review of International Organizations / Issue 1/2009
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Electronic ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-008-9050-5

Other articles of this Issue 1/2009

The Review of International Organizations 1/2009 Go to the issue

BookReview

Review of Virginia Page Fortna. 2008. Does peacekeeping work? (Princeton: Princeton University Press)

BookReview

Anne Kent. 2007. Beyond compliance: China, international organizations, and global security (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press)

OriginalPaper

Financing the peace: Evaluating World Bank post-conflict assistance programs

OriginalPaper

Renewing IMF surveillance: Transparency, accountability, and independence

OriginalPaper

Who’s afraid of an EU tax and why?—revenue system preferences in the European Parliament

Premium Partner

    Image Credits