Skip to main content
Top

2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

13. Impact of R&D Cartelization with Endogenous Product Differentiation

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

We analyze the multistage model of a duopoly in which firms decide on the level of product differentiation, R&D investment and production. The decision of differentiation is strongly related to the cost-reducing technology spillover. We find that there is a positive relationship between the level of substitution and R&D investment, which transfers into higher production and lower market price. The critical aspect of the paper is the welfare analysis of the cartelization in the market. We show that cooperation in R&D investment coordinates high investment with closer substitution, and it increases both firms profits and consumer welfare. Moreover, from the consumers’ perspective, the total monopolization of the market is more efficient scenario than a fully competitive one. Hence, the gains from coordinated joint research far outlast the possible loss from monopolization of the market.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
For modeling reasons (mainly having a similar cost function that in original works), we assume that firms decide on the level of spillover and that level is transformed into substitution ratio by function h. However, as the economic context and real possibility seems more plausible in assuming that firms decide on the scope of differentiation, we will refer to that decision process in that manner.
 
2
In that case, it is a situation of a monopolist operating on two horizontally differentiated markets with two separate (but not entirely due for spillover) production facilities.
 
3
We can, without a loss in generality, reverse this logic and state that firms choose how distinct their products are and given that they will try to obtain as much spillover as possible. Both principles would lead to the same conclusions.
 
4
It shall be noted, that while there is no general proof to that statement, the following results are robust to the changes in the listed parameters’ values.
 
5
Note that since the marginal cost of R&D investment is increasing, it is optimal to allocate the total R&D investment between the firms equally.
 
Literature
go back to reference Becker, W., & Dietz, J. (2004). R&D cooperation and innovation activities of firmsevidence for the german manufacturing industry. Research policy, 33(2), 209–223.CrossRef Becker, W., & Dietz, J. (2004). R&D cooperation and innovation activities of firmsevidence for the german manufacturing industry. Research policy, 33(2), 209–223.CrossRef
go back to reference Belderbos, R., Carree, M., & Lokshin, B. (2004). Cooperative R&D and firm performance. Research policy, 33(10), 1477–1492.CrossRef Belderbos, R., Carree, M., & Lokshin, B. (2004). Cooperative R&D and firm performance. Research policy, 33(10), 1477–1492.CrossRef
go back to reference Camagni, R. (1993). Inter-firm industrial networks: the costs and benefits of cooperative behaviour. Journal of Industry Studies, 1(1), 1–15.CrossRef Camagni, R. (1993). Inter-firm industrial networks: the costs and benefits of cooperative behaviour. Journal of Industry Studies, 1(1), 1–15.CrossRef
go back to reference Cefis, E., Rosenkranz, S., & Weitzel, U. (2009). Effects of coordinated strategies on product and process r&d. Journal of Economics, 96(3), 193–222.CrossRef Cefis, E., Rosenkranz, S., & Weitzel, U. (2009). Effects of coordinated strategies on product and process r&d. Journal of Economics, 96(3), 193–222.CrossRef
go back to reference d’Aspremont, C., & Jacquemin, A. (1988). Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers. The American Economic Review, 78(5), 1133–1137. d’Aspremont, C., & Jacquemin, A. (1988). Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers. The American Economic Review, 78(5), 1133–1137.
go back to reference Davidson, C., & Deneckere, R. (1984). Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2(2), 117–132.CrossRef Davidson, C., & Deneckere, R. (1984). Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2(2), 117–132.CrossRef
go back to reference De Bondt, R., & Veugelers, R. (1991). Strategic investment with spillovers. European Journal of Political Economy, 7(3), 345–366.CrossRef De Bondt, R., & Veugelers, R. (1991). Strategic investment with spillovers. European Journal of Political Economy, 7(3), 345–366.CrossRef
go back to reference Dixit, A. (1979). A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers. J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ., 10, 399. Dixit, A. (1979). A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers. J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ., 10, 399.
go back to reference Harter, J. F. (1993), ‘Differentiated products with R&D’, The Journal of Industrial Economics pp. 19–28. Harter, J. F. (1993), ‘Differentiated products with R&D’, The Journal of Industrial Economics pp. 19–28.
go back to reference Horváth, R. (2002), Cooperation in research and development, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,. Horváth, R. (2002), Cooperation in research and development, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,.
go back to reference Hotelling, H. (1990). Stability in competition, in ‘The Collected Economics Articles of Harold Hotelling’. Springer, 50–63. Hotelling, H. (1990). Stability in competition, in ‘The Collected Economics Articles of Harold Hotelling’. Springer, 50–63.
go back to reference Kaiser, U. (2002). An empirical test of models explaining research expenditures and research cooperation: evidence for the german service sector. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(6), 747–774.CrossRef Kaiser, U. (2002). An empirical test of models explaining research expenditures and research cooperation: evidence for the german service sector. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(6), 747–774.CrossRef
go back to reference Kamien, M. I., Muller, E. & Zang, I. (1992), ‘Research joint ventures and R&D cartels’, The American Economic Review pp. 1293–1306. Kamien, M. I., Muller, E. & Zang, I. (1992), ‘Research joint ventures and R&D cartels’, The American Economic Review pp. 1293–1306.
go back to reference Lin, P., & Saggi, K. (2002). Product differentiation, process r&d, and the nature of market competition. European Economic Review, 46(1), 201–211.CrossRef Lin, P., & Saggi, K. (2002). Product differentiation, process r&d, and the nature of market competition. European Economic Review, 46(1), 201–211.CrossRef
go back to reference Park, J.-H. (2001), ‘Strategic R&D policy under vertically differentiated oligopoly’, Canadian Journal of Economics pp. 967–987. Park, J.-H. (2001), ‘Strategic R&D policy under vertically differentiated oligopoly’, Canadian Journal of Economics pp. 967–987.
go back to reference Piga, C., & Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2005). Endogenous R&D spillovers and locational choice. Regional science and urban economics, 35(2), 127–139.CrossRef Piga, C., & Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2005). Endogenous R&D spillovers and locational choice. Regional science and urban economics, 35(2), 127–139.CrossRef
go back to reference Prokop, J., & Karbowski, A. (2018). R&D spillovers and cartelization of industries with differentiated products, ZBW. Prokop, J., & Karbowski, A. (2018). R&D spillovers and cartelization of industries with differentiated products, ZBW.
go back to reference Singh, N., & Vives, X. (1984). Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. Singh, N., & Vives, X. (1984). Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly.
go back to reference Symeonidis, G. (2003). Comparing cournot and bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with product r&d. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(1), 39–55.CrossRef Symeonidis, G. (2003). Comparing cournot and bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with product r&d. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(1), 39–55.CrossRef
go back to reference van Wegberg, M. (1995), ‘Can R&D alliances facilitate the formation of a cartel? the example of the european it industry’. van Wegberg, M. (1995), ‘Can R&D alliances facilitate the formation of a cartel? the example of the european it industry’.
Metadata
Title
Impact of R&D Cartelization with Endogenous Product Differentiation
Author
Bartlomiej Wisnicki
Copyright Year
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38253-7_13

Premium Partner