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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

3. Implications of Economic Theory for Bioenergy Policy Design

Author : Alexandra Purkus

Published in: Concepts and Instruments for a Rational Bioenergy Policy

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The chapter “Implications of Economic Theory for Bioenergy Policy Design” develops the analytical framework which is used in Chap. 5 to derive recommendations for German bioenergy policy. First, neoclassical theory implications for bioenergy policy, as well as their limits, are discussed. To move towards more realistic theory-based policy recommendations, the analysis draws on the theory of second-best, information economics, the theory of economic order, and new institutional economics, and gives an outlook on ecological economics implications. For each of these theories, relevant findings are applied to bioenergy policy, leading to the derivation of theoretical guidelines for bioenergy policy design. It is demonstrated that a combination of theoretical approaches is necessary to generate recommendations which adequately reflect the complexity of the bioenergy policy problem. However, among the theories considered, new institutional economics approaches are found to be particularly fruitful. Here, the matrix of institutions which jointly influence allocation decisions by bioenergy actors is at the centre of the policy analysis. Among new institutional economics approaches, transaction cost and contract economics, the principal-agent approach, the theory of institutional change, and the public choice approach provide valuable insights for generating policy design recommendations in the presence of uncertainty, transaction costs, path dependencies and political feasibility constraints. Because of the advantages that an institutional perspective offers for the analysis of bioenergy policy, new institutional economics is chosen as the overall framework into which insights from other theories are integrated.

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previous chapter Allocative Challenges of Bioenergy Use
next chapter The Case of German Bioenergy Policy
Footnotes
1
Of course, the institutional constraints on the implementation of a global instrument would be massive—as an instrumental alternative for cost-effective GHG mitigation, regional or national emissions taxes could be aligned with a globally negotiated tax rate; whereas regional emissions trading systems could be linked, so that emission permits could be traded across regional systems (Stavins 1997).
 
2
Some parts of Sect. 3.1.2 have been used in Purkus et al. (2015).
 
3
See Lehmann and Gawel (2013) for a review of studies which analyse this effect.
 
4
What constitutes an unresolvable constraint, meanwhile, can change with time—first-best instruments that are considered unfeasible due to high transaction costs of monitoring, for example, may become practicable with advances in monitoring technology (McCann 2013).
 
5
Some parts of this section have been used in Purkus et al. (2015).
 
6
In the environmental context, for example, methods for estimating option value and quasi-option value (in the presence of irreversible impacts) have been applied to decisions involving the conversion of natural land; these attempt to correct the expected net benefits of the planned (e.g. industrial) development for the loss of options the associated conversion would entail, as uncertain future benefits of natural land are foregone (Perman et al. 2003: 448ff.; Weikard 2003). However, given extremely high information requirements about outcomes, probabilities, or the prospect of gaining additional information about conservation benefits in the future, calculated option values are rarely formally taken into account in decision making, although they generally imply lower levels of conversion than would otherwise be the case (Perman et al. 2003: 459).
 
7
Recently, this neglect in mainstream economic theory has come under criticism in the wake of the global financial crisis (cf. Priddat and Kabalak 2013).
 
8
If any information or belief about probabilities is lacking, it is assumed that decision makers can at least apply the “principle of insufficient reason”, which involves the assignment of equal probabilities to mutually exclusive outcomes. Following this, decision makers should adopt the strategy that yields the pay-off with the greatest expected value (Perman et al. 2003: 461).
 
9
Another example of a decision rule which has been applied to environmental uncertainty is Shackle’s (1969) model, which replaces probabilities with a measure of surprise, and attempts to balance best case against worst case scenarios for possible courses of action (Wätzold 1998: 96ff.; Young 2001: 88ff.).
 
10
Some parts of this section have been used in Purkus et al. (2015)
 
11
GHG accounting methodology and environmental impacts would have to be verified externally—otherwise there would be a high risk that market actors would make use of asymmetric information advantages (see Sect. 3.5.3) to produce beneficial environmental balances. In that case, uncertainties about the social costs of bioenergy use would rest largely with the state.
 
12
As practiced, for example, in UK sustainability certification for bioelectricity (cf. DECC 2013).
 
13
Although, given the diversity of theoretical approaches that fall under NIE, the degree to which these forms of “strong” uncertainty (cf. Dequech 1997) and the bounded rationality assumption are incorporated into analyses differs (Dequech 2006).
 
14
Property rights encompass a bundle of rights, such as the right to use a good and draw income from it, the right to change and transform a good, or the right to transfer a good (Richter and Furubotn 2003: 90).
 
15
An early focus was placed on the governance of natural resources under common property regimes (Ostrom 1990), but the formation of a new institutional environmental or ecological economics framework is still a work in progress (Paavola and Adger 2005; Ménard 2011).
 
16
In the case of environmental pollution externalities, for example, individuals whose utility is negatively affected by pollution could offer emitters compensation for reducing emissions, or they could agree on a compensation for accepting some level of pollution. Independent of the initial distribution of property rights, the resulting level of emissions would be Pareto-efficient (Coase 1960).
 
17
For example, while tradable permit schemes for emissions deliver lower overall abatement costs (cf. Sect. 3.1.2), transaction costs can be comparatively high (e.g. Ofei-Mensah and Bennett 2013).
 
18
The principal-agent approach is another strand of NIE which makes major contributions to contract theory, focussing on problems which arise from information asymmetries between contracting parties (see Sect. 3.5.3).
 
19
Trust and shared preferences between contractual parties can reduce the scope for opportunism, in the same way as social connectedness through membership in a common community or network can (Coggan et al. 2013: 225).
 
20
Nevertheless, perennial, specialised energy crops result in higher asset specificity than, for example, maize, with multiple utilisation options, exemplifying the diversity of transactions involved even at one specific stage of the value chain.
 
21
Highlighting the importance of long-term political commitment, the concept shows strong parallels to Eucken’s “continuity of economic policy” principle (see Sect. 3.4.2).
 
22
Among the major types of uncertainty in bioenergy policies making (cf. Table 2.​6), information asymmetries appear most relevant in the case of technology costs and primary production conditions. While adverse selection is discussed for technology governance and moral hazard for primary production choices, in practice both forms of asymmetric information problems are relevant in both cases, often showing some overlap (cf. Erlei et al. 1999: 166).
 
23
In North’s perspective, institutional change is regarded as the result of intentional efforts by humans to control their environment and reduce pervasive uncertainty (North 2005: 1ff.). A second major branch of theories on institutional change follows Hayek’s view (Hayek 1969) that institutions and order evolve spontaneously, as the unintentional product of human actions and interactions; whether or not this process leads to efficient outcomes, is the subject of some debate (cf. Leipold 1996; Brousseau et al. 2011). North’s perspective is adopted here due to its better applicability to problems of intentional policy design.
 
24
In this context, it seems important to note that the assumption of self-interestedness does not preclude behaviour which can be described as altruistic—an individual’s utility function may well include the welfare of other individuals as a component (Pappenheim 2001: 63).
 
25
Indeed, as Finon and Perez (2007) demonstrate, the choice of design parameters may cause the governance attributes of different renewable electricity support instruments to converge, even though instrument types such as feed-in tariffs, auctions and quotas with green certificate trading traditionally receive very different approval ratings by economists (e.g. Groscurth and Bode 2011; Frondel et al. 2013).
 
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Metadata
Title
Implications of Economic Theory for Bioenergy Policy Design
Author
Alexandra Purkus
Copyright Year
2016
Book
Concepts and Instruments for a Rational Bioenergy Policy

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31134-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-31135-7

Copyright Year: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31135-7_3

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