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Published in:
2015 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Indivisible Human Rights and the End(s) of the State
Author : Daniel J. Whelan
Published in: Human Rights Protection in Global Politics
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
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The rhetoric of indivisible human rights has a long history, dating back at least to the initial division of the draft International Covenant on Human Rights into separate treaties in the early 1950s. Prior to that, there was no need to speak of the relationship between the two ‘grand categories’ of human rights as being ‘indivisible’ — the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes both sets of rights, and all of the influential antecedents of the Universal Declaration had included a catalogue of key economic and social rights alongside ‘traditional’ civil and political rights. But the Declaration, by its very nature, was void of legally binding obligations or measures of implementation. When the time came to translate its principles into binding treaty law, divisions emerged over the different obligations that were deemed appropriate for the realization of the two sets of rights.