1. Introduction: Setting the Stage

Lewellen (1995), p. 3.

See Ellis (1985), pp. 647, 648 n. 7. Note that the inclusion of the European Union (EU) created the G-9.

Ellis (1985), p. 647, n. 1.

Id. This has been the subject of vigorous debate at the WTO whose discussion of the so-called “Singapore issues” examines the need for greater investment, trade facilitation, and more transparency in government procurements.

Leipziger (2001).

See Lewellen (1995), p. 65.

N. Kristof and E. Wyatt, “Who Went Under in the World’s Sea of Cash,” New York Times (February 15, 1999) at Al.

Salacuse (1999), pp. 875, 883, n. 39.

See Sarkar (2001), p. 469. See also Nichols (1999), pp. 229, 235, who uses “the term ‘emerging economies’ rather than the term ‘emerging markets’ because the term ‘emerging markets’ implies that the systems under scrutiny should only be viewed only as prospective buyers, whereas the term ‘emerging economies’ suggests that such systems should be treated as integral components of the global economy.” (Citation omitted).

Carrasco and Thomas (1996), p. 539.

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) is an IMF-sponsored comprehensive approach to debt reduction for poor countries that requires the participation of all multilateral and bilateral creditors that was launched in 1996. It was later supplemented in 2005 by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in support of the Millennium Development Goals. The HIPC Initiative is a two-step process that has: (1) a decision point (e.g., the eligibility to borrow from the International Development Agency (IDA) of the World Bank and completion of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper); and (2) a completion point whereby the host country has satisfactorily completed agreed upon reforms and implemented the PRSP for a year. As of October 2017, the following countries were expected to qualify for assistance under the enhanced HIPC Initiative as heavily indebted poor countries: Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Three of these countries are at a pre-decision point, namely, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan.

See, e.g., N. Onishi Sr N. Bannerjee, “Chad’s Wait for Its Oil Riches May be Long,” New York Times (May 16, 2001), at Al.

W. Arnold, “Malaysia’s Internet Road Show,” New York Times (August 23, 2001).

See Alvin and Toffler (1993), pp. 248–249. The authors set out a new paradigm whereby the world is divided (yet again) into three parts. The First Wave economies are composed of natural resources-based rural economies that rely principally on agricultural commodities for their livelihood. These economies also tend to lack industries as well as “exportable knowledge-based services.” (Id. at 248). Second Wave economies rely heavily on manual labor and mass manufacturing. They also tend to rely heavily on imports of raw materials and need export markets for their mass-manufactured goods, and tend to be more urbanized. In contrast, Third Wave economies are “post-nations” who are neither agrarian nor industrial economies, but constitute the “newest tier of the global system,” with access to knowledge that is convertible to wealth. (Id. at 249).

See e.g., World Bank, “Protectionist Challenges to the U.S.–China Trade Imbalance Rise,” (July 18, 2008).

In fact, there may be a scientific basis for this, as Dr. Richard Nesbitt, a social psychologist at the University of Michigan, has been discovering. His studies reveal that cultural differences may actually determine the way in which a person thinks. For example, there are striking dissimilarities between Japanese and American observers of an animated underwater scene as the Japanese were far more likely to describe the background and context (e.g., the bottom was rocky, and the water was green), whereas the Americans tended to focus on the largest fish or objects (e.g., there is a trout swimming on the left). In sum, the preliminary conclusions reached dealt with a profound difference in philosophical approach whereby Western-educated persons tended to exhibit and be more comfortable with adversarial debate, formal logical argument, an intolerance for contradictions, and analytical deduction. In contrast, non-Western educated persons preferred a dialectical approach where contradictions were expected and tolerated, if not encouraged, and an appreciation for complexity and context. Further, the studies concluded that “neither approach is written into the genes: many Asian-Americans, born in the United States, are indistinguishable in their modes of thought from European-Americans.” (Erica Goode, “How Culture Molds Habits of Thought,” New York Times (August 6, 2000).

Fukuyama (1992), p. 215. He further identifies the following cultural factors of a nation’s national, ethnic, and racial consciousness: religion; a highly unequal social structure; and the lack of the ability to create a civil society as possible impediments to democratization.

Of course, this area is rife with contradictions since autocratic rule is not necessarily incompatible with free enterprise as demonstrated by the examples of Augusto Pinochet encouraging financial liberalism in Chile, and China establishing free trade zones along the coastline along with fully integrated local and international capital markets.

See generally Montesquieu (1989). (The first edition was published in 1748).

Many commentators have struggled with the idea of explaining and dealing with corruption in the developing world context. The only definition that l have been able to formulate may be deceptive in its simplicity, but simply posits that corruption rewards bad conduct and, in effect, punishes good conduct. Personal connections are valued over meritorious conduct, thus subverting any incentive (or even the means by which) to achieve anything worthwhile based on one’s own merit and strengths. Thus, “bad conduct” in the form of bribes, nontransparent practices, and cronyism are favored over “good conduct” or, in other words, meritorious actions. Over time, this weakens the political, economic, and ultimately, the social fabric of the society in question.

Former President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe forced the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Anthony Gubbah, to resign, since he was apparently enraged at the Court’s rulings that black Zimbabweans stop their illegal occupations of hundreds of white Zimbabwean-owned farms. These occupations have nonetheless prompted the exodus of foreign investors and local professionals, a general strike, and other unrest including bombings and arrests of opposition leaders. See R. L. Swarns, “Zimbabwe’s Judges Are Feeling Mugabe’s Wrath,” New York Times (February 4, 2001); and R. I. Rotberg, “Zimbabwe’s Spreading Misery,” New York Times (May 14, 2001). Of course, since black farmers now had the land but displaced white farmers had the experience, Zimbabwe was forced to solicit a partnership between the two. See Keith Sieff, Zimbabwe’s white farmers find their services in demand again.” The Guardian (September 25, 2015). N.B. Robert Mugabe died on 6 September 2019. See “Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s Strongman Ex-President, dies aged 95,” BBC News (September 6, 2019).

See e.g., David McKenzie, et al., “Robert Mugabe Resigns After 37 Years as Zimbabwe’s Leader,” CNN World (November 21, 2017); see also Columbus Mavhunga, “Zimbabwe Parliament warns Mugabe: Turn up for hearing or face jail time,” CNN World (May 29, 2018), where Mugabe was sought for questioning on the loss of $15 billion in diamond revenue.

See “Land reform will continue to be one of South Africa’s biggest problems,” The Economist (April 25, 2019).

de Soto (2000), pp. 171–172.

Umozuike (1983), pp. 902, 903.

Huntington (1993), p. 22.

Said (2000), p. 587.

Huntington (1996), pp. 310, 318.

The resistance to Western universalism, particularly to American hegemony, was rather pointedly made clear in a nineteen-member conference held in Ottawa, Canada, on June 30, 1998. Canadian officials organized the conference (to which U.S. officials were specifically not invited) in order to facilitate closer cooperation among the invitees to protect their respective cultures from the onslaught of the U.S. entertainment industry. At the conference, the participants emphasized that culture was an important component of a nation’s identity and not simply another commodity that should be made subject to treaties on international free trade, in particular, the OECD-sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investment. See A. de Palma, “19 Nations See U.S. as Threat to Cultures,” New York Times (July 1, 1998), at Bl.

Rather pointedly, Huntington states that: “Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. Both deny the uniqueness of Western culture. The global monoculturalists want to make the world like America. The domestic multiculturalists want to make America like the world. A multicultural America is impossible because a non-Western America is not American. … The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity” (Huntington 1996, p. 318).

The idea that only “Western” cultural ideals can legitimately constitute what is “American” simply cannot be supported. Indeed, this argument misses the point completely since American “Westernized” culture is able to incorporate and assimilate non-Western cultures with such shocking success. In fact, immigrant cultures in America clearly assimilate with the mass culture over time, and in some cases, very speedily. This incorporation is possible because the underlying theme is to succeed in a Western-based, capitalist world. “Culture” in this context is immaterial. It is the ideals and cultural specificities of other cultures that are sacrificed in this process, not those of Western culture.

Hobbes (1968), pp. 186, 188.

See Cao (1997), pp. 545, 558–559.

If centrifugal force is applied to “culture” in order to disaggregate it into separate components or elements, it seems certain elements of culture are “heavier” than others. For example, different ethnic food is almost universally appreciated and tends not to raise eyebrows. Therefore, international cuisines can be seen a lighter element of culture, one that can be universally shared without negative repercussions.

Slightly “denser” elements of culture are literature, film (especially if subtitles are involved), music, dance, and art. The globalization (and commercialization) of these elements has helped create common ground for their understanding, sharing, and appreciation. Now, it is not uncommon to see Irish dance, view Mexican art, watch Czech films, read Japanese poetry (an English translation, of course), and listen to Caribbean music.

However, there are elements to culture that do not have as much transferability as others. Fashion, for example, can be somewhat problematic. Wearing saris or other native dress in many Western countries is subtly disapproved of. The preservation of language, while valued by the ethnic enclave who claims it as part of their heritage, can be seen as overtly or vaguely threatening by others outside the culture. Religion, the rights and status of women, morality, and ethics are also very subtle indicia of culture, which also may not cross international time zones very well.

For an excellent discussion of the dangers of globalized legal norms, see generally Gopal (1996), pp. 231–237. Indeed, I was struck with the power of that concept while on a USAID diplomatic mission to Chile to discuss the creation of a new legal center to study both criminal and civil law changes in Latin America. This experience led me to make the following observation: “The intensity of their examination of common law systems of due process, jury trials, and the provision of court-appointed defense counsel made me shiver in realizing that this may be the end of Lex Romana. The legal conceptual framework of civil law systems that devolved from Roman conquests in Spain during the second century BCE, and which were subsequently transmitted to Spanish colonies in the New World in the fifteenth century AD, is beginning to erode. The civil law systems prevalent in Latin America are gradually, but unmistakably, succumbing to the unbearable pressure being exerted by the legal hegemony of the common law-based systems of the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition.” Sarkar (2001), p. 469.

Aslan (2010). For a deeper dive into similar philosophic inquiries, see Herman (2013).

See D. Kellner, “Globalization and the Postmodern Turn,” available at http://​www.​gseis.​ucla.​edu/​courses/​ed253a/​dk/​GLOBPM.​htm, at 2.