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2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

1. Introduction

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Abstract

This chapter presents the main arguments and the structure of the book. It applies various theoretical tools to explore the advantages and disadvantages of performance management systems, the ways in which they can be improved, and the strategies through which they can be designed and integrated into the policy-making process. The integration of the theoretical tools results in a performance management policy approach that highlights both the ways in which policy makers can use, and be enriched by, performance management mechanisms, and the ways in which policy theories and practices may help design and implement effective performance management mechanisms. This approach and the book as a whole emphasize the role of public accountability, learning, and entrepreneurship as essential components of effective management and governance.

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Metadata
Title
Introduction
Author
Shlomo Mizrahi
Copyright Year
2017
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52350-7_1

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