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Published in:
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2023 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

1. Introduction

Author : Bernadette Zelger

Published in: Restrictions of EU Competition Law in the Digital Age

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter sheds light on the monograph's main topic, line of reasoning and arguments. While setting the scene by elaborating on the fundamental role and function of competition law in a democratic society, the underlying conceptual approaches of Article 101 and 102 shall be illustrated.

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next chapter Competition Law, Economics and the ‘More Economic Approach’: The Necessity of a Broader Perspective
Footnotes
1
Case C-519/04 P, Meca Medina [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:492 (Meca Medina), para 42; Case T-93/18, International Skating Union v Commission [2020] ECLI:EU:T:2020:610 (GC Decision ISU), para 77.
 
2
Re-imagining Work—Green Paper Work 4.0, German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (April 2015), p. 16, available at <https://​www.​bmas.​de/​EN/​Services/​Publications/​arbeiten-4-0-greenpaper-work-4-0.​html> (‘Green Paper Work 4.0’) accessed 6 February 2023.
 
3
Colomo (2020b), p. 16.
 
4
Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice) [2014] OJ C291/1.
 
5
As recognised by Sauter, such might result in the fact that competition law is ‘more favourable to flexibility than to coherence’; see Sauter (2016), p. 87. Furthermore, also Talbot recognises the deliberate room left ‘for the establishment of a strong enforcement agency with discretion to calibrate the implementation of the rules in a way it deemed appropriate’, see Talbot (2016), p. 271.
 
6
As the role of effects in by effect cases seems rather obvious: they need to be proved.
 
7
As mentioned above, e.g. the role of digital markets, FAANG as multi-sided platforms etc.
 
8
Case T-612/17 Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping) [2021] ECLI:EU:T:2021:763 (Google Shopping GC); Case T-604/18 Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Android) [2022] ECLI:EU:T:2022:541 (Google Android GC); Case T-334/19 Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google AdSense) pending.
 
9
Colomo (2014), p. 5; Ackermann (2017), p.523; Colomo (2018a), p. 13.
 
10
Wils (2014), p. 9.
 
11
Ackermann (2017).
 
12
Ezrachi (2017), p. 59.
 
13
Colomo (2014), p. 5.
 
14
See e.g. Jones (2010), pp. 655–656.
 
15
Peeperkorn (2017), para 5.
 
16
Gerard (2012), p. 18; Kroes (2005); Report by the EAGCP, ‘An economic approach to Article 82’ (July 2005).
 
17
Peeperkorn (2016), pp. 389, 393. Arguably, one reason for that might be the influence German competition law and the country’s civil law tradition had on the evolvement and development of European competition law.
 
18
Ibid, see also Yi Heng (2016), p. 179; Monti (2010), p. 1.
 
19
Ezrachi (2017), p. 49.
 
20
See below Sect. 2.​2.​1.
 
21
Blair and Sokol (2005), p. 14.
 
22
Ezrachi (2017), p. 59.
 
23
Colomo (2018b), pp. 21 and 23; Maher (2000), p. 161; Talbot (2016), p. 271.
 
24
Colomo (2014), p. 23.
 
25
Gerber (1992), p. 435.
 
26
Witt (2016b), p. 439.
 
27
See for example Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak II [1994] ECLI:EU:T:1994:246, para 37; O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013), pp. 256 et seq.
 
28
Wils (2014), p. 13.
 
29
Witt (2016b), p. 439; Zalewska-Glogogwska (2017), p. 130; Talbot (2016), p. 271.
 
30
In the context of the free movements of goods, for example, take the ECJ’s decisions in: Case C-8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:82; Case C-120/78, Rewe/Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:42 (Cassis de Dijon); Case C-267/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECLI:EU:C:1993:905.
 
31
On the concept of ‘by object’ or ‘by effect’ infringements see, for example, General Court Decision of 12 December 2018 (T-691/14), on appeal Cases C-201/19 P etc. Servier and Others v Commission, pending (Servier); Case C-591/16 Lundbeck v Commission [2021] ECLI:EU:C:2021:243 (Lundbeck). See also e.g. Killick and Jordan (2014); Nazzini and Nikpay (2014). On the controversy regarding a too formalistic approach vs. a more economic approach in the application of Article 102 TFEU see, for example, Colino (2017), p. 18; Colomo (2014), p. 5; Whish and Bailey (2018), p. 182; opposite view: Wils (2014).
 
32
See in this respect for example: Pablo Ibàñez Colomo, ‘What I talk about when I talk about the “form-based” approach to Article 102 TFEU’ (Chillin’ Competition, 17 December 2014) <https://​chillingcompetit​ion.​com/​2014/​12/​17/​what-i-talk-about-when-i-talk-about-the-form-based-approach-to-article-102-tfeu/​> accessed 6 February 2023.
 
33
Jones (2019), pp. 215 et seq.
 
34
Ibid.
 
35
Case 56/65 Societé Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (STM), para 249.
 
36
STM (n 35), p. 249; Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van Beestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:343 (T-Mobile), para 30; Whish and Bailey (2021), p. 125.
 
37
See e.g. Lundbeck (n 31); Case C-179/16 Hoffmann-LaRoche v AGCM [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2018:25 (Hoffmann-LaRoche v AGCM).
 
38
Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/7 (Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities).
 
39
Colomo and Lamadrid (2017), p. 9.
 
40
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co v Commission [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (Hoffmann LaRoche); Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 with respect to predatory pricing (AKZO).
 
41
AKZO (n 40), paras 70, 71.
 
42
Case T-814/17 Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v Commission [2020] ECLI:EU:T:2020:545 (Lithuanian Railways); Case C-42/21P Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v Commission [2023] ECLI:EU:C:2023:12 (Lithuanian Railways ECJ).
 
43
Case C-413/14 P Intel v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:632 (INTEL) Opinion of AG Wahl ECLI:EU:C:2016:788, para 80.
 
44
Colomo (2014), p. 4.
 
45
A ‘qualified rule’—as defined by Colomo—means that the finding of a breach of the rule (i.e. competition law) can be rebutted by the respective undertaking concerned.
 
46
Ibid.
 
47
Colino (2017), p. 18; Colomo (2014), Whish and Bailey (2021), p. 204; opposite view: Wils (2014).
 
48
Hoffmann LaRoche (n 40).
 
49
Case T-203/01 Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission [2003] ECR II-407 (Michelin II).
 
50
Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v Commission [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (British Airways) and Case T-219/99 British Airways plc v Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:343 (British Airways GC).
 
51
Guidance on Article 102 Enforcement Priorities (n 38).
 
52
Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:T:2014:547 (Intel); Nihoul (2014), p. 521.
 
53
See e.g. Colino (2017), p. 18.
 
Literature
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Ezrachi A (2017) Sponge. J Antitrust Enforcement 5:49–75
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Yi Heng AS (2016) The distinction between “object” and “effect” in EU competition law and concerns after Groupement des cartes bancaires (C-67/13P). ECLR 179–185.
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Monti G (2010) Article 82 EC: what future for the effects-based approach? J Eur Compet Law Pract 1:1
Metadata
Title
Introduction
Author
Bernadette Zelger
Copyright Year
2023
Book
Restrictions of EU Competition Law in the Digital Age

Print ISBN: 978-3-031-31338-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-31339-4

Copyright Year: 2023

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31339-4_1

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