Ireland's UN Peacekeeping Policy During the Cold War Era

Three areas pertinent for an understanding of Irish UN peacekeeping policy should be examined prior to a deeper examination of peacekeeping in the Cold War era. First, what is “peacekeeping” and how does it differ from “peace enforcement”? What is meant by a state’s “peacekeeping decision making policy?” Second, how does the UN debate and opt to field a peacekeeping operation? What is the relationship of peacekeepers to UN conflict resolution? Third, how is the Irish Government structured and how do the components interact in a foreign policy decision? Ireland applies Irish language terms to its Governmental structure so it is important to understand the meaning of these terms in order to follow Irish Government documents across a decision making process.

Ireland faced three potential obstacles to developing a UN peacekeeping policy after the founding of the global organization. First, Ireland was a neutral state although many argued Irish “neutrality” referred more to non-alignment rather than a Switzerland type of political and military neutrality. Would Irish state neutrality conflict with the early UN concept of being a collective security organization? Could Irish soldiers deploy under a request from the UN for peacekeepers? Second, Ireland did not hold membership in the UN. Ireland desired to enter the UN as a member after its inception in 1945 but found its requests blocked by Cold War politics and a Soviet veto. The Soviets vetoed Irish membership for nine years until a major compromise that permitted the simultaneous admission of sixteen countries in 1955. Third, the Irish Constitution placed the state military under Ireland’s Parliament (Dáil) which in turn passed annual legislation for the Government to provide oversight. Related to this point, the Irish army could not legally operate outside the boundaries of the state. Would the lack of a permanent military bill and use of annual temporary bills have an impact on deployed Irish peacekeepers?

After joining the UN in December 1955, Ireland found itself under possible consideration for the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in 1956. Two of the potential problems reviewed in Chapter 2 were resolved between 1954 and 1955. But questions related to whether Ireland was ready to deploy its soldiers overseas less than a year after joining the UN remained. In turn, Ireland opted to not volunteer peacekeepers for the 1956 UNEF operation and the UN did not officially approach the Irish delegation on a contribution of troops. However, Ireland proved ready to experiment with a rudimentary peacekeeping policy to support the UN with unarmed personnel in the 1958 United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and to field unarmed observers with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) which was originally mandated and deployed in 1948. The narrative of the chapter follows the debates and discussion of the Irish Government and Dáil in this period and includes the detailed interaction between Ireland and the UN on the matter.

Ireland proved eager to participate in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) bound for the Congo in 1960. However, Irish neutrality and the Irish Defence Act 1954 could possibly prevent the deployment of armed Irish soldiers from the country. The Government, Dáil, and military debated this issue and settled on the development of a policy to guide decisions in military deployments while maintaining political neutrality—Ireland could participate in an international peacekeeping operation if: (1) Ireland receives a formal request from the UN; (2) the Irish Government approves the deployment; and (3) the Irish Dáil approves the deployment. Ireland codified the policy within the 1960 Defense (Supplemental) Act. This chapter follows the debates and discussion of the Irish Government and Dáil on this matter and includes the detailed interaction between Ireland and the UN as well as other countries.

How did the Irish peacekeeping policy work within the Irish political system during its first post-Congo test? Detailed information on the Government decision making process and debate within the Dáil is examined as Dublin mulled whether to deploy a peacekeeping contingent to Cyprus. The case study, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), represents an operation where members of the Irish Government were split on whether to participate. The chapter examines the details of the internal discussions and questioning within the Government in order to formulate a response in favor of deployment in accordance with the peacekeeping policy applied in 1960. It also covers the transfer of individual Irish peacekeepers to the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM).

How did Irish peacekeeping policy work within the Irish political system following the introduction of a new Government? How would the new Government (a Fine Gael and Labour Party coalition) handle the United Nations’ request for peacekeepers? Would it follow the policy developed by the previous Government or modify it to fit their party needs or agenda? The case study, the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in the Sinai, represents an operation where the Irish Government was overwhelmingly in favor of participation and is the first time the peacekeeping policy was enacted by a political party other than Fianna Fail. Also, in contrast to the four-month period needed to approve Irish personnel for Cyprus, the process was accelerated for UNEF II to less than two weeks due to the international emergency. The chapter examines the details of the internal discussions and questioning between Government members in order to formulate a response in favor of deployment in accordance with Irish peacekeeping policy. Then the debate within the Dáil is highlighted.

This chapter examines the attempts by the United Nations to persuade Ireland to return a contingent to Cyprus after Irish peacekeepers were withdrawn in 1973 in favor of participation in the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II). Irish peacekeepers left UNEF II in 1974 due to the domestic emergency within Ireland that year. While Ireland desired to return to a contingent sized peacekeeping deployment, it was not initially keen to do so in Cyprus at that time. This chapter follows the attempts to persuade Ireland to provide peacekeepers for Cyprus and the following Irish debate. After discussions that leaned toward a declination, a new Irish Government accepted the request only to have it in turn declined by the UN. This case study represents the first time the Government changed between political parties (Fine Gael to Fianna Fail) during a single peacekeeping decision making process. Confusion between Ireland and the UN resulted in heated messages and later a political compromise which preserved Ireland’s peacekeeping process despite considerable political embarrassment.

How did the Irish peacekeeping policy function within the Irish political system as Dublin returned to major participation in United Nations peacekeeping after the withdrawal from the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) four years earlier and the failure to deploy to Cyprus the previous year? The chapter reviews the details of the internal discussions and questioning between Government members in order to finally formulate a response in favor of deployment in accordance with peacekeeping policy rules. Then the debate within Dáil is highlighted.

This chapter examines Ireland’s peacekeeping policy as applied to three United Nations observer missions mandated and deployed at the end of the Cold War—a period of time when the United States and Soviet Union were cooperating to solve or mitigate a host of regional conflicts and security issues. The reviews examine the details of the internal discussions between Government members in order to formulate responses to the deployments in accordance with Irelan’s peacekeeping policy. The debate within the Dáil is highlighted for each operation. Discussion among Government members illustrates how Ireland “worked the UN system” to ensure Irish peacekeeping policy rules were met in order to obtain a legal domestic affirmation for participation. The operations are the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) 1988; the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observation Group (UNIIMOG) 1988; and the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) 1989.

The UN request for Irish peacekeepers in Namibia is unique during the time between 1955 and 1989. It was the first time the UN asked Ireland for Civilian Police. This proved to be a concern for Ireland since Civilian Police were governed by two documents from the 1920s which prohibited their deployment outside the country to perform police duties with other agencies while employed in their Garda (Irish police) role. Thus, the Garda were legally barred from deploying in support of UN operations just as the military faced in 1960. This chapter follows the Government and legislative processes to alter the legislation and permit Garda overseas deployments. At the same time, the chapter follows the discussions to deploy a logistics unit and military observers to Namibia in accordance with Ireland’s peacekeeping decision making policy.

This chapter outlines the foundation of Ireland’s UN peacekeeping policy during the Cold War and then provides a summary of its evolutionary development from the text of this study. At the conclusion of the Cold War, Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping Policy during the Cold War can be described as the following process.  First, Ireland must receive an official UN request for Irish personnel.  Second, the Irish Government must approve the request.  Third, the Irish legislature must approve the request if the peacekeepers are armed and/or exceed specific minimum numbers of personnel. The chapter then follows how Ireland modified the initial policy to meet changes in the domestic or international political system including those related to UN needs.