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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

6. Judicial Corruption: Magistrates, Judges and Prosecutors

Author : Graham Brooks

Published in: Criminal Justice and Corruption

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter considers the reach of judicial and state prosecutorial corruption. It starts with a review of what is judicial corruption, then, raises the possibility that independence itself is part of the problem of judicial corruption. This is followed by a discussion on the difference between extortion and bribery in the judiciary and how it can and does occur. I then reflect on the attempts to prevent judicial corruption before finally examining the avenue for potential corruption for prosecutors.

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Metadata
Title
Judicial Corruption: Magistrates, Judges and Prosecutors
Author
Graham Brooks
Copyright Year
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16038-8_6