Skip to main content
Top

2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

9. Legal Implications of Membership

Author : Gerd Droesse

Published in: Membership in International Organizations

Publisher: T.M.C. Asser Press

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This chapter shows that, based on the club principle, membership has multiple legal implications and ramifications. One of the major benefits of membership in international organizations is that members have the right to participate in organizations’ decision-making procedures and be represented in the organizations’ governing bodies. However, traditional state–centric representation mechanisms based on a three-tier governance structure involving governing bodies composed exclusively or predominantly of state-appointed representatives increasingly have become questionable with regard to their functionality, inclusiveness and legitimacy. Substantial benefits may be gained from transforming organizations into multi-actor structures which give, in addition to states and international organizations, also other stakeholders a voice in decision-making. Moreover, there are new trends relating to organizations’ decision-making procedures which may be considered being given a wider application in international organizations. In this context, this chapter focuses on the challenges faced by international organizations regarding their legitimacy, the functionality of their traditional three-tier systems, and their decision-making procedures. As regards organizations’ funding mechanisms, three issues are raised. First, to enhance their effectiveness and impact, international organizations should explore alternative sources of funding, including the private sector, philanthropy, civil society, foundations, and crowd sourcing. Second, new funding mechanisms need to be designed for organizations producing global public goods. Third, special issues apply in the case of international financial institutions, whose capital structures and governance structures are intrinsically linked with membership concepts as they involve the members in their quality of shareholders. The legal structures of concessional windows of international financial institutions, on the other hand, are based on membership concepts only in those cases where they were established as international organizations with international legal personality and legal capacity under national law, but not in those instances where concessional resources are administered under one legal personality together with ordinary capital resources. Depending on the legal structure of concessional windows, different constraints and challenges apply for enhancing their effectiveness by leveraging resources on capital markets. Moreover, linkages exist between membership structures and operational modalities and procurement.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Footnotes
1
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §§383–702.
 
2
Rocabert et al. 2014, p. 1.
 
3
Ibid.
 
4
Droesse 2020.
 
5
Wessel and Dekker 2015, p. 294.
 
6
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §66.
 
7
Ibid.
 
8
“Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century: Report of the High-Level Commission on Modernization of World Bank Group Governance (hereinafter “Zedillo Report”)”, p. 31. http://​siteresources.​worldbank.​org/​NEWS/​Resources/​WBGovernanceCOMM​ISSIONREPORT.​pdf.
 
9
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §66.
 
10
Ibid., §§1688–1689.
 
11
See Droesse 2011c, p. 91.
 
12
Foch 2013.
 
13
Bailin 2001.
 
14
Warren 2017.
 
15
G20 Communiqué: London Summit – Leaders’ Statement, 2 April 2009, para 20: “In order for our financial institutions to help manage the crisis and prevent future crises we must strengthen their longer term relevance, effectiveness and legitimacy. So, alongside the significant increase in resources agreed today we are determined to reform and modernise the international financial institutions to ensure they can assist members and shareholders effectively in the new challenges they face. We will reform their mandates, scope and governance to reflect changes in the world economy and the new challenges of globalisation, and that emerging and developing economies, including the poorest, must have greater voice and representation.” (emphasis added) https://​www.​imf.​org/​external/​np/​sec/​pr/​2009/​pdf/​g20_​040209.​pdf.
 
16
Ibid.
 
17
Sverdrup and Nahem 2017.
 
18
Cited according to A. Ward. Norway seeks representation at the G20. Financial Times, 9 Nov. 2009. https://​www.​ft.​com/​content/​1f2e17fa-cc44-11de-8e30-00144feabdc0?​mhq5j=​e1.
 
19
Cited according to Financial Times of 9 Nov. 2009.
 
20
Ibid.
 
21
Kharas 2009.
 
22
Kharas 2009.
 
25
See Droesse 2011c, p. 127.
 
26
For example, Article 28.1 of the ADB Charter provides: “All the powers of the Bank shall be vested in the Board of Governors.” Section 8 of ADB’s By-Laws contains a general delegation of powers to the Board of Directors, as follows: “The Board of Directors is authorized by the Board of Governors to exercise all the powers of the Bank with the exception of those expressly reserved to the Board of Governors by para 2 of Article 28 and other provisions of the Agreement.”
 
27
Wessel and Dekker 2015, p. 304.
 
28
Martinez-Diaz 2009, p. 395.
 
29
Ibid., 387–401.
 
30
Ibid., 399.
 
31
Ibid., 399.
 
32
Ibid., 401.
 
33
Ibid., 403–404.
 
34
Zedillo Report. Summary of Findings, x.
 
35
Ibid.
 
36
Ibid., xv–xvi.
 
37
Committee on IMF Governance Reform. Final Report. 24 March 2009. https://​www.​imf.​org/​external/​np/​omd/​2009/​govref/​032409.​pdf.
 
38
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §237.
 
39
Ragazzi 2011, p. 488.
 
41
 
42
See paras 15–20 of GEF Instrument.
 
44
Paragraph 5 of the Governing Instrument of the Green Climate Fund.
 
45
See Droesse. 2017, pp 52–53.
 
46
Governing Instrument, para 16.
 
47
Global Fund. “Partnership Forum”. Overview. https://​www.​theglobalfund.​org/​en/​partnership-forum/​.
 
48
The Global Fund. 2016. Bylaws of the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund Bylaws). Article 6.1.
 
49
“A number of Partnership Forum consultations were held in 2015 to support the development of the Global Fund Strategy 2017–2022. The consultations included three regional Partnership Forums with over 300 participants from 128 countries, a 12-week online consultation with over 1,200 participants from 143 countries, and dozens of focused meetings and consultations on specific aspects of the strategy.” Global Fund. Partnership Forum. Overview.
 
50
Global Fund Bylaws, Article 6.2.
 
51
High Level Panel for the African Development Bank. 2007. Investing in Africa’s Future: The ADB in the 21st Century. Report of the High Level Panel. 37. http://​www.​afdb.​org/​fileadmin/​uploads/​afdb/​Documents/​Publications/​27842402-EN-HLP-REPORT-INVESTING-IN-AFRICAS-FUTURE.​PDF.
 
52
Zedillo Report, 13.
 
53
Droesse 2011d, p. 297.
 
54
Droesse 2011c, pp. 164–165.
 
55
WMO Constitution, Article 7(b).
 
56
WMO Constitution, Article 13(c).
 
57
ILO Constitution, Article 3, para 1 provides: “The meetings of the General Conference of representatives of the Members shall be held from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once in every year. It shall be composed of four representatives of each of the Members, of whom two shall be Government delegates and the two others shall be delegates representing respectively the employers and the workpeople of each of the Members.” (emphasis added).
ILO Constitution, Article 7, para 1 provides: “The Governing Body shall consist of fifty-six persons, twenty-eight representing governments, fourteen representing the employers, and fourteen representing the workers.” http://​www.​ilo.​org/​public/​english/​bureau/​leg/​download/​constitution.​pdf.
 
58
Vogel-Polsky 1966, p. 71.
 
59
Paragraph 1 of the “Agreement for the Establishment of the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue” (KAICIID Agreement) expressly establishes “the Centre as an international organization”. Moreover, para 2 of that Article provides: “The Centre shall possess international legal personality.” https://​www.​kaiciid.​org/​node/​2001.
 
63
For the composition of the Global Fund Board, see Global Fund. Board. Members. https://​www.​theglobalfund.​org/​en/​board/​members/​.
 
64
Decision 1/CMP.3 Adaptation Fund. FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, 14 March 2008. http://​unfccc.​int/​resource/​docs/​2007/​cmp3/​eng/​09a01.​pdf#page=​3.
 
65
See para 6, Decision 1/CMP.3, which determines the composition of the Adaptation Fund Board.
 
66
See Droesse 2011a, p. 21, with further references.
 
67
Droesse 2011a, pp. 31–32.
 
68
GCF Governing Instrument, para 72.
 
69
GCF Governing Instrument, para 61.
 
70
The independent redress mechanism is covered by para 69 of the GCF Governing Instrument. “An interesting new approach has been adopted in case of the independent redress mechanism of the Green Climate Fund, which is being added to the existing mechanisms. In line with the functions of other accountability mechanisms, it is to address “the grievances and complaints by communities and people who have been directly affected by the adverse impacts through the failure of the project or programme funded by the Fund to implement the Fund’s operational policies and procedures, including environmental and social safeguards.” However, in addition to that function, the independent redress mechanism is to the address “the reconsideration of funding decisions in accordance with paras 6–10 of the Arrangements between the Fund and the Conference of the Parties.” Thus, in case of the Green Climate Fund, the accountability mechanism will have a two-pronged function relating to the review of grievance of aggrieved communities and the review of funding proposals.” Droesse 2020. See: GCF. 2017. Decision on the Updated Terms of Reference of the Independent Redress Mechanism (Revised). (B.BM-2017/10. 25 September 2017), 3. https://​www.​greenclimate.​fund/​documents/​20182/​620292/​B.​BM-2017_​10_​-_​Decision_​of_​the_​Board_​on_​updated_​Terms_​of_​Reference_​of_​the_​Independent_​Redress_​Mechanism_​_​Revised_​.​pdf/​dc4fef96-fd30-4aae-bcf6-dd9088d7123b.
 
71
Decisions 3/CP.17, para 18.
 
73
See GCF Governing Instrument, paras 20 and 21.
 
74
Ragazzi 2011, p. 493. For further details, see Ragazzi 2011, pp. 493–495.
 
75
See “IMF Governance – Summary of Issues and Reform Options”. 1 July 2009. http://​www.​imf.​org/​external/​np/​pp/​eng/​2009/​070109.​pdf.
 
76
Conforti and Focarelli 2016, pp. 34–36.
 
77
Guzman 2013, p. 1005.
 
78
See Droesse 2011c, p. 149.
 
79
Paragraph 14 of the Governing Instrument provides: “Decisions of the Board will be taken by consensus of the Board members. The Board will develop procedures for adopting decisions in the event that all efforts at reaching consensus have been exhausted.” As no agreement on this matter could be reached, the “additional rules of procedure of the Board to supplement the procedural rules contained in the Governing Instrument” were not adopted. See introductory remarks of GCF. Rules of Procedure. https://​www.​greenclimate.​fund/​documents/​20182/​574763/​GCF_​policy_​-_​Rules_​of_​Procedure.​pdf/​9d55fae7-f4df-45fe-a3f3-754bc0d98e67.
 
80
See, with further references: Posner and Sykes 2014, pp. 195–228.
 
81
See Droesse 2011c, pp. 149–161, with detailed further references.
 
82
Ibid., 149.
 
83
Relating to adjustments as specified in Article 2, para 9(a) of the Montreal Protocol.
 
84
This refers to: “Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into force of the Protocol for it, or any time thereafter within ten years of the date of entry into force of the Protocol [.…]”.
 
85
Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility, para 25(c)(i).
 
86
Droesse 2011c, p. 158.
 
88
In accordance with Article 17, the IMO Convention epitomizes a composition of governing bodies based on the interest which governments have in the work of the organization. It provides:
In electing the Members of the Council, the Assembly shall observe the following criteria: (a) Eight shall be States with the largest interest in providing international shipping services; (b) Eight shall be other States with the largest interest in international seaborne trade; (c) Sixteen shall be States not elected under (a) or (b) above which have special interests in maritime transport or navigation, and whose election to the Council will ensure the representation of all major geographic areas of the world. See with detailed references on the status of the Convention: United Nations Treaty Collection. https://​treaties.​un.​org/​pages/​viewdetails.​aspx?​src=​treaty&​mtdsg_​no=​xii-1&​chapter=​12&​lang=​en.
 
89
Each member has one vote in the IMO Assembly, Council and Safety Committee, see IMO Convention, Article 57(a).
 
90
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §§925–1138.
 
92
Schermers and Blokker 2011, §926.
 
93
Ibid.
 
94
Droesse 2011a, p. 35.
 
95
UNDP. 2012. “Evaluation of UNDP Partnership with Global Funds and Philanthropic Foundation, Recommendations 2 and 5”, xxiii and xxiv.
 
96
Climate Policy Observer. In-Depth: The Adaptation Fund From Kyoto To Paris. http://​climateobserver.​org/​depth-adaptation-fund-kyoto-paris/​.
 
97
Droesse 2011d, pp. 206–207.
 
98
Brookings. Global Health Financing Initiative. Snapshot Series. Airline Solidarity Contribution. https://​www.​brookings.​edu/​wp-content/​uploads/​2016/​07/​airline.​pdf. See also Innovative Financing for Development. The I-8 group Leading Innovative Financing for Equity [L.I.F.E.]. (Douste-Blazy, Coordinator). Cited as I-8 group Innovative Financing for Development. http://​www.​un.​org/​esa/​ffd/​documents/​InnovativeFinFor​Dev.​pdf.
 
99
UNITAID. 2016. UNITAID at 10, Accelerating Innovation in Global Health, 10. https://​unitaid.​eu/​assets/​Unitaid-at-10-booklet-EN.​pdf.
 
100
Bermudez and Douste-Blazy 2009, p. 15.
 
101
University of Cambridge and World Green Economy Organization. 2018. 2018 World Green Economy Report, p. 9.
 
105
Bradlow 2010, p. 1.
 
106
Sureda 2004, p. 219.
 
107
Droesse 2011d, pp. 196–197.
 
109
Mistry 1995.
 
110
A similar reform was implemented in the IMF. See Press Release: IMF Executive Board Approves Major Overhaul of Quotas and Governance. 5 Nov. 2010, https://​www.​imf.​org/​external/​np/​sec/​pr/​2010/​pr10418.​htm.
 
111
See World Bank Group. 2010. “Voice Reform: Enhancing Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries in 2010 and Beyond”. Development Committee (Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries), DC2010-0, 19 April.
 
113
The formula for the allocation of basic votes is reproduced in Droesse 2011b, p. 339.
 
114
See Development Committee. World Bank Group Voice Reform: Enhancing Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries in 2010 and Beyond (DC2010-0006, 19 April 2010). http://​siteresources.​worldbank.​org/​DEVCOMMINT/​Documentation/​22553921/​DC2010-006(E)Voice.​pdf.
 
115
Droesse 2011c, pp. 61–62.
 
116
Ibid.
 
117
Ibid., 66–69.
 
118
Droesse 2011b, pp. 299–398.
 
119
See Weill-Hallé et al. 2011, pp. 464–465, with further references.
 
120
Independent Evaluation Office of IFAD. 2013. “IFAD’s institutional efficiency and efficiency of IFAD-funded operations. Corporate-Level Evaluation”. https://​www.​ifad.​org/​evaluation/​reports/​cle/​tags/​operations/​y2013/​2589509.
 
121
See Droesse 2011c, pp. 93, 95–96, 120–121.
 
122
Ibid., 121.
 
123
Ibid., 152.
 
125
Droesse 2011d, pp. 201–202.
 
126
Brookings. “Snapshot Series”. International Finance Facility for Immunization. https://​www.​brookings.​edu/​wp-content/​uploads/​2016/​07/​iffim-1.​pdf.
 
127
For the ADF, see: Droesse 2011b, pp. 299–398; Droesse 2012, pp. 265–314.
 
128
Article 10 of the ADB Charter provides:
1. The ordinary capital resources and the Special Funds resources of the Bank shall at all times and in all respects be held, used, committed, invested or otherwise disposed of entirely separate from each other. The financial statements of the Bank shall show the ordinary operations and special operations separately.
2. The ordinary capital resources of the Bank shall under no circumstances be charged with, or used to discharge, losses or liabilities arising out of special operations or other activities for which Special Funds resources were originally used or committed.
3. Expenses appertaining directly to ordinary operations shall be charged to the ordinary capital resources of the Bank. Expenses appertaining directly to special operations shall be charged to the Special Funds resources. Any other expenses shall be charged as the Bank shall determine.
 
129
Erquiaga 2016, p. 69.
 
130
Ibid.
 
131
ADB Board of Governors. Resolution No. 372: Enhancing ADB’s Financial Capacity For Reducing Poverty in Asia and the Pacific. https://​www.​adb.​org/​sites/​default/​files/​institutional-document/​160051/​bog-resolution-372.​pdf.
 
132
Erquiaga 2016, p. 69.
 
133
See, with detailed explanations: Erquiaga 2016, p. 70.
 
134
AfDB. Investing in Africa’s Future, 27–28.
 
135
Shihata 2001, p. 119.
 
136
IDA. “WBG Collaboration: Proposal for an IFC-MIGA Private Sector Window in IDA 18 (8 June 2016).” http://​documents.​worldbank.​org/​curated/​en/​2516114681980097​17/​pdf/​106374-BR-Box396267B-OUO-9-IDA-SecM2016-0120.​pdf. See IDA 18. Report from the Executive Directors of the International Development Association to the Board of Governors. Additions to IDA Resources: Eighteenth Replenishment [cited IDA 18 Deputies Report], para 128: “Private Sector Window. To support private sector development in IDA countries, Participants endorsed the creation of a SDR1.8 billion IFC-MIGA PSW in IDA18. The PSW will draw on IFC’s and MIGA’s long-standing experience in emerging markets, and further step up their support to IDA-only countries while also providing greater attention to FCS (Section III.A. ‘Creating Opportunities for the Private Sector’).” http://​documents.​worldbank.​org/​curated/​en/​3486614866544550​91/​pdf/​112728-correct-file-PUBLIC-Rpt-from-EDs-Additions-to-IDA-Resources-2-9-17-For-Disclosure.​pdf.
 
137
IDA. IDA 18 Deputies Report, para 135.
 
139
Shihata 2001, p. 100.
 
140
See Shihata 2000, p. 99.
 
141
Ibid., 100.
 
142
Ibid.
 
143
Shihata 1990, p. 30.
 
144
EBRD Articles of Agreement, Article 20 provides: “General powers 1. The Bank shall have, in addition to the powers specified elsewhere in the Agreement, the power to; (i) borrow funds in member countries or elsewhere, provided always that (a) before making a sale of its obligations in the territory of a country, the Bank shall have obtained its approval; and (b) where the obligations of the Bank are to be denominated in the currency of a member, the Bank shall have obtained its approvals.”
 
145
Shihata 1990, p. 30.
 
146
Ibid., 27.
 
148
Erquiaga 2016, p. 63.
 
149
Article 23(d) of the Agreement establishing the African Development Bank provides that the AfDB shall have power to: “Invest funds not needed in its operations in such obligations as it may determine and invest funds held by the Bank for pensions or similar purposes in marketable securities.” No reference is made as to the currency of investments.
 
150
Article VII, Section 1(iii) of the IADB Charter shall have the power “with the approval of a three-fourths majority of the total voting power of the member countries, invest funds not needed in its operations in such obligations as it may determine.” It is not mentioned that the investment has to be in the currency of a member country.
 
151
Bradlow 2010, p. 1.
 
152
See Droesse 2011d, p. 207.
 
153
See the section entitled: “Financing Limited to Member Countries”. In Droesse 2011d, pp. 191–194.
 
155
The GCF Governing Instrument, para 3 provides: “The Fund will pursue a country-driven approach and promote and strengthen engagement at the country level through effective involvement of relevant institutions and stakeholders.”
 
156
Thus, the Operations Manual of the Asian Development Bank provides: “ADB finances a project in a DMC only if the government has no objection. Accordingly, the government’s no-objection for each financing must be obtained before the first disbursement by ADB of such financing, and preferably before the financing is submitted to the Board of Directors for approval.” ADB. Operations Manual Bank Policies (OM). OM Section D10/BP issued on 2 Jan. 2013.
 
157
GCF Governing Instrument, para 41.
 
159
IFAD. 2013. Synthesis report: Strengthening Institutions and Organizations. An Analysis of Lessons Learnt from Field Application of IFAD’s Sourcebook on Institutional and Organizational Analysis for Pro-Poor Change, 7. https://​www.​ifad.​org/​documents/​10180/​a4c30900-e274-4c97-81e7-595256b3441c.
 
160
See Droesse 2011d.
 
161
Formosa, A. and Weller, C. Public procurement: the next weapon to fight climate change? The Guardian. 21 Jan. 2014. https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​public-leaders-network/​2014/​jan/​21/​public-procurement-weapon-climate-change.
 
162
Ibid.
 
163
World Bank. 2016. Procurement Guidance: Sustainable Procurement. An introduction for practitioners for practitioners to sustainable procurement in World Bank IPF projects, 3. http://​pubdocs.​worldbank.​org/​en/​7887314793953906​05/​Sustainable-Procurement-Guidance-FINAL.​pdf.
 
164
Ibid., 5.
 
165
Ibid., 9 ss.
 
166
See inter alia: EU, 2016. Buying Green, Third edition. file:///C:/Users/WGEO_Org/Documents/Buying-Green-Handbook-3rd-Edition.pdf; EIB, 2009. EIB Green Procurement Guidelines and Objectives. http://​www.​eib.​org/​attachments/​documents/​eib_​green_​procurement_​guidelines_​and_​objectives_​2009_​en.​pdf; EBRD. Green Building Investment Factsheet: Public Buildings. file:///C:/Users/WGEO_Org/Documents/Green%20Procurement/EBRD%20green%20buildings%20factsheet.pdf. See also the Green Procurement Guidelines (For Suppliers), Ver. 5, 2010 of NEC Display Solutions, Ltd. file:///C:/Users/WGEO_Org/Documents/Green%20Procurement/NEC%20Procurement%20Guidelines.pdf.
 
167
Spend Matters Network 2016.
 
Literature
go back to reference Bradlow DD (2010) International Law and the operations of International Financial Institutions. In: Bradlow DD, Hunter DB (eds) International Financial Institutions. Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 1–30 Bradlow DD (2010) International Law and the operations of International Financial Institutions. In: Bradlow DD, Hunter DB (eds) International Financial Institutions. Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 1–30
go back to reference Bermudez J, Douste-Blazy P (2009) Innovative financing for development. UNITAID, pp 13–23 Bermudez J, Douste-Blazy P (2009) Innovative financing for development. UNITAID, pp 13–23
go back to reference Conforti B, Focarelli C (2016) The law and practice of the United Nations, 5th edn. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 34–36CrossRef Conforti B, Focarelli C (2016) The law and practice of the United Nations, 5th edn. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 34–36CrossRef
go back to reference Droesse G (2011a) Introductory remarks and overview of publication: proliferation, fragmentation, and earmarking of Concessional Financing. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: multilateral channels of Concessional Financing. Asian Development Bank, Manila, pp 1–37 Droesse G (2011a) Introductory remarks and overview of publication: proliferation, fragmentation, and earmarking of Concessional Financing. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: multilateral channels of Concessional Financing. Asian Development Bank, Manila, pp 1–37
go back to reference Droesse G (2011b) Concessional Financing of the Asian Development Bank: the Asian Development Fund and other channels of ADB Concessional Financing. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: multilateral channels of Concessional Financing. ADB, Manila, pp 299–398 Droesse G (2011b) Concessional Financing of the Asian Development Bank: the Asian Development Fund and other channels of ADB Concessional Financing. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: multilateral channels of Concessional Financing. ADB, Manila, pp 299–398
go back to reference Droesse G (2011c) Organizational structures, institutional frameworks, and decision-making procedures of Multilateral Concessional Financing. In: Funds for development: multilateral channels of Concessional Financing. ADB, Manila, pp 59–177 Droesse G (2011c) Organizational structures, institutional frameworks, and decision-making procedures of Multilateral Concessional Financing. In: Funds for development: multilateral channels of Concessional Financing. ADB, Manila, pp 59–177
go back to reference Droesse G (2011d) Modalities of Multilateral Concessional Financing. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: Multilateral Channels of Concessional Financing. ADB, Manila, pp 179–297 Droesse G (2011d) Modalities of Multilateral Concessional Financing. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: Multilateral Channels of Concessional Financing. ADB, Manila, pp 179–297
go back to reference Droesse G (2012) The replenishments of the Asian Development Fund: institutional development in the Asian Development Bank and the role of the legal counsel in resource mobilization. In: Quereshi AH, Gao X (eds) International Economic Organizations and Law. The perspective and role of the legal counsel. Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 265–314 Droesse G (2012) The replenishments of the Asian Development Fund: institutional development in the Asian Development Bank and the role of the legal counsel in resource mobilization. In: Quereshi AH, Gao X (eds) International Economic Organizations and Law. The perspective and role of the legal counsel. Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 265–314
go back to reference Droesse G (2017) Green climate fund and its role in promoting and funding sustainable investment. In: Dispute resolution and climate change. The Paris Agreement and beyond. International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, pp 52–55 Droesse G (2017) Green climate fund and its role in promoting and funding sustainable investment. In: Dispute resolution and climate change. The Paris Agreement and beyond. International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, pp 52–55
go back to reference Droesse G (2020) Governance changes in International Organisations: new trends and developments. In: de Cooker C (ed) Governance: International Organizations adapting to changing environments. Bruylant/Larcier, Brussels (forthcoming) Droesse G (2020) Governance changes in International Organisations: new trends and developments. In: de Cooker C (ed) Governance: International Organizations adapting to changing environments. Bruylant/Larcier, Brussels (forthcoming)
go back to reference Guzman A (2013) International Organizations and the Frankenstein problem. Eur J Int Law 24:999–1025CrossRef Guzman A (2013) International Organizations and the Frankenstein problem. Eur J Int Law 24:999–1025CrossRef
go back to reference Martinez-Diaz L (2009) Boards of Directors in International Organizations: a framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design. Rev Int Organ 4:383–406CrossRef Martinez-Diaz L (2009) Boards of Directors in International Organizations: a framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design. Rev Int Organ 4:383–406CrossRef
go back to reference Mistry PS (1995) Multilateral Development Banks: an assessment of their financial structures, policies and practices. FONDAD, The Hague Mistry PS (1995) Multilateral Development Banks: an assessment of their financial structures, policies and practices. FONDAD, The Hague
go back to reference Posner EA, Sykes AO (2014) Voting rules in International Organizations. Chicago J Int Law 15:195–228 Posner EA, Sykes AO (2014) Voting rules in International Organizations. Chicago J Int Law 15:195–228
go back to reference Ragazzi M (2011) The Global Environment Facility: institutional and operational aspects. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: Multilateral Channels of Concessional Financing. ADB, Manila, pp 485–500 Ragazzi M (2011) The Global Environment Facility: institutional and operational aspects. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: Multilateral Channels of Concessional Financing. ADB, Manila, pp 485–500
go back to reference Schermers HG, Blokker NM (eds) (2011) International Institutional Law: unity within diversity, 5th edn. Martinus Nijhoff, Boston Schermers HG, Blokker NM (eds) (2011) International Institutional Law: unity within diversity, 5th edn. Martinus Nijhoff, Boston
go back to reference Shihata IFI (1990) The European Bank for reconstruction and development. A comparative analysis of the constituent agreement. Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, London, p 30 Shihata IFI (1990) The European Bank for reconstruction and development. A comparative analysis of the constituent agreement. Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, London, p 30
go back to reference Shihata IFI (2000) The World Bank legal papers. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p 99 Shihata IFI (2000) The World Bank legal papers. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p 99
go back to reference Shihata IFI (2001) Techniques to avoid proliferation of international organizations—the experience of the World Bank. In: Blokker NM, Schermers HG (eds) Proliferation of International Organizations: legal issues. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp 111–134 Shihata IFI (2001) Techniques to avoid proliferation of international organizations—the experience of the World Bank. In: Blokker NM, Schermers HG (eds) Proliferation of International Organizations: legal issues. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp 111–134
go back to reference Sureda AR (2004) The law applicable to the activities of International Development Banks. In: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, vol 308. Brill/Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, pp 9–252 Sureda AR (2004) The law applicable to the activities of International Development Banks. In: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, vol 308. Brill/Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, pp 9–252
go back to reference Vogel-Polsky E (1966) Du Tripartitisme à l’Organisation Internationale du Travail. de l’Institut de Sociologie de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles. Vogel-Polsky E (1966) Du Tripartitisme à l’Organisation Internationale du Travail. de l’Institut de Sociologie de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles.
go back to reference Weill-Hallé VP, Licul C, Villanueva IG (2011) Multilateral Concessional Financing of the international fund for agricultural development. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: multilateral channels of Concessional Financing, pp 457–484 Weill-Hallé VP, Licul C, Villanueva IG (2011) Multilateral Concessional Financing of the international fund for agricultural development. In: Droesse G (ed) Funds for development: multilateral channels of Concessional Financing, pp 457–484
go back to reference Wessel RA, Dekker IF (2015) Identities of states in International Organizations. Int Organ Law Rev 12:293–318CrossRef Wessel RA, Dekker IF (2015) Identities of states in International Organizations. Int Organ Law Rev 12:293–318CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Legal Implications of Membership
Author
Gerd Droesse
Copyright Year
2020
Publisher
T.M.C. Asser Press
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-327-6_9