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Studies in Comparative International Development
Published in: Studies in Comparative International Development 1/2022

12-04-2021

No Accounting for Bad Contracting: Private Military and Security Contracts and Ineffective Regulation in Conflict Areas

Authors: Ori Swed, Adam Materne

Published in: Studies in Comparative International Development | Issue 1/2022

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Abstract

The proliferation of contracts outsourcing military functions to private companies raises serious oversight concerns vis-à-vis regulation and accountability. As the industry is emerging, regulation of these outsourced function is considered weak. While critics predict an unchecked industry, supporters have defended the lack of an adequate accountability mechanism by touting self-regulation as a potential solution. Following this discussion, we examine whether the frequency of contractor violations and legal repercussions within the overall contracting industry differed between those in the burgeoning security-contracting community and those in the traditional contracting community. We utilize a preexisting dataset of American contractors’ misconduct to compare military contacting to non-military contracting and military contractors to non-military contractors. Our results indicate that contracting military functions is associated with higher levels of violations and lower levels of legal repercussions, while military contractor companies themselves are not associated with higher levels of violations or legal repercussion. These findings support calls for improved oversight of conflict area’s contracting in order to prevent contractors’ misconduct with impunity.
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Footnotes
1
Formally knowns as International Peace Operations Association (IPOA).
 
2
Duplicates were identified in one of two ways: an instance in the FCMD was considered duplicative if it met the strict definition of a duplicate (it was identical in wording and content in every field) or if it met a more lenient standard (if the content referred to the same incident, was associated with the same contractor, and did not provide new allegations of misconduct to a previously documented case).
 
3
Analysis with OLS, which is more common and easier to interpret, yields identical trends.
 
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Metadata
Title
No Accounting for Bad Contracting: Private Military and Security Contracts and Ineffective Regulation in Conflict Areas
Authors
Ori Swed
Adam Materne
Publication date
12-04-2021
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Studies in Comparative International Development / Issue 1/2022
Print ISSN: 0039-3606
Electronic ISSN: 1936-6167
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-021-09327-8

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