On Defining ‘Argument’: Comments on Goodman

The task of delineating precisely the meaning of the term "debate" may become similarly meaningful when we limit our attention to debates during the sittings of a parliament. And even the delineation of the meaning of a plain word like "bed" may turn out to be important and controversial if it is meant to serve as a guide for the layout of a carpentry catalogue.

If I, hereinafter, refer only to page numbers I am referring to the article "On Defining 'Argument'", Argumentation (2018) 32: 589–602.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) represent a paradigmatic work in which arguments are conceived in this way.

One of the reviewers of this paper rightly points out that the question whether we can isolate the "argument as object" definition without taking into account the "argument as activity" definition, as well as the question whether the relation of support among a set of propositions and another proposition can be understood without taking into account the intention to convince someone about a given conclusion, are worth careful attention. I am not going to address issues of this kind here. Generally, I presume that arguments as specific communicative episodes are prior with respect to arguments conceived as abstract objects. This, however, doesn't cast any doubts on the Aristotelian project of studying arguments as objects of a specific—relatively independent—sort.

With group beliefs touched upon by Goodman when he mentions groups of agents in his definition things get even less perspicuous.

Other authors also sometimes identify arguments as sets of propositions. For example, Grennan (1997, p. 3). Later on, however, Grennan stresses that an argument is a logical compound, not an aggregate and that arguments must contain not just a premise and a conclusion but also an argument indicator-word or phrase (p. 7).