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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

14. Optimal Incentives for Takaful Operators

Authors : Suren Basov, Ishaq Bhatti

Published in: Islamic Finance in the Light of Modern Economic Theory

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK

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Abstract

In this chapter we are going to discuss the structure of the optimal incentives for takaful (Islamic insurance) operators (TOs). This is based on a recently published paper by Khan (2015). As emphasized by Khan, the main difference between conventional and Islamic insurance, relevant to the structure of optimal incentives, is that, while the conventional insurance contract is a contract of risk transfer, the Islamic insurance contract is one of risk-sharing.

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previous chapter Shariah Compliance, Positive Assortative Matching and the Performance of IFI’s
next chapter Can Short-Selling Prohibition Be Optimal?
Footnotes
1
The interested reader is referred to Khan (2015) for details.
 
Literature
Basov, S., and M.I. Bhatti. 2013. Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs. The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics (Contributions) 13: 1–14.CrossRef
Khan, H. 2015. Optimal incentives for takaful (Islamic insurance) operators. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 109: 135–144.CrossRef
Mas-Colell, A., M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Metadata
Title
Optimal Incentives for Takaful Operators
Authors
Suren Basov
Ishaq Bhatti
Copyright Year
2016
Book
Islamic Finance in the Light of Modern Economic Theory

Print ISBN: 978-1-137-28661-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-1-137-28662-8

Copyright Year: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-28662-8_14