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Handling Heterogeneous Disagreements Through Abstract Argumentation (Extended Abstract) Read chapter Read first chapter

2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Optimizing Affine Maximizer Auctions via Linear Programming: An Application to Revenue Maximizing Mechanism Design for Zero-Day Exploits Markets

Authors : Mingyu Guo, Hideaki Hata, Ali Babar

Published in: PRIMA 2017: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective approach for revenue maximizing mechanism design. The AMA mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually rational (if the agents’ valuations for the outcomes are nonnegative). Every AMA mechanism is characterized by a list of parameters. By focusing on the AMA mechanisms, we turn mechanism design into a value optimization problem, where we only need to adjust the parameters. We propose a linear programming based heuristic for optimizing within the AMA family. We apply our technique to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploit markets. We show that due to the nature of the zero-day exploit markets, if there are only two agents (one offender and one defender), then our technique generally produces a near optimal mechanism: the mechanism’s expected revenue is close to the optimal revenue achieved by the optimal strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism (not necessarily an AMA mechanism).

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Footnotes
1
The authors also proposed a restricted version of AMA called the VVCA mechanisms. A VVCA mechanism is only characterized by 2n parameters, which makes it much easier to optimize over. On the other hand, due to the fact that the VVCA family is only a tiny subset of the whole AMA family, we lose revenue by focusing only on it.
 
2
In our model, we allow payments. After all, the objective is to maximize revenue.
 
3
If we allow randomized mechanisms, then an outcome is a nonincreasing function o(t), with \(o(0)=1\) and \(o(1)=0\). o(t) represents the probability for the exploit to be alive at time t.
 
4
We have to emphasize that this is not an uncommon constraint when it comes to using numerical methods for maximizing mechanism revenue.
 
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Metadata
Title
Optimizing Affine Maximizer Auctions via Linear Programming: An Application to Revenue Maximizing Mechanism Design for Zero-Day Exploits Markets
Authors
Mingyu Guo
Hideaki Hata
Ali Babar
Copyright Year
2017
Book
PRIMA 2017: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-69130-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-69131-2

Copyright Year: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69131-2_17

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