Thus far, only a few studies have investigated resilience capabilities in organizational resilience research. Therefore, to describe the capabilities behind the individual resilience stages, we cannot rely solely on this research stream. Instead, we have to expand our search activities to other related areas (e.g., crisis management and innovation management) as well as to disciplines that address other resilience levels (e.g., public administration). In particular, we have to integrate findings from research areas that specify individual resilience stages: e.g., studies on high reliability organizations (HROs) (anticipation), crisis management (coping), and organizational learning from unexpected events (adaptation). Below, we will elaborate on the main capabilities of each resilience stage and give examples of resilience-enhancing practices. After that, we address relationships and interactions of the different resilience stages as well as main antecedents and drivers.
3.2.1 Anticipation capabilities
Anticipation is the first dimension of organizational resilience and describes its preventive aspects relative to a disturbance. It refers to the ability to detect critical developments within the firm or in its environment and to adapt proactively (Somers
2009; Ferreira et al.
2011; Teixeira and Werther
2013). This does not mean that resilient organizations can prevent every failure or crisis. Crises often do not announce their arrival. However, some firms are able to see the unexpected faster than others, and they are able to immediately react to it while others “wait and see”. Madni and Jackson (
2009) indicate that systems need anticipation capabilities to avoid threatening situations or at least minimize potential negative consequences. They define anticipation as “the ability to ‘look down the line’ to determine how the environment is expected to change with a view to making decisions and taking actions in the present that promote desirable outcomes and circumvent disruptions in the future” (p. 187). Based on prior studies that include the notion of anticipation in their definition of resilience (Kendra and Wachtendorf
2003; Somers
2009; Burnard and Bhamra
2011), we assume that the anticipation stage comprises three specific capabilities: the ability to observe internal and external developments, the ability to identify critical developments and potential threats, and—as far as possible—to prepare for unexpected events.
Observation and identification are closely related and, thus, considered together. Researchers agree that those capabilities are important for resilience. They argue that organizations must recognize early signals of crisis to respond quickly and, thus, avoid escalation (e.g., Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Bansal
2016). However, they use different concepts to describe these capabilities. For example, Burnard and Bhamra (
2011) use the notion of threat detection which is related to both the environmental feedback controls and the assessment of operating conditions. In the literature, these capabilities are also discussed as the acquisition of weak signals and environmental scanning (e.g., Ansoff
1975; Day and Schoemaker
2005; Ilmola and Kuusi
2006; Uskali
2005). As Ansoff (
1975) mentions, discontinuities can be identified through a systematic perception of weak signals, i.e., information about emerging issues without knowing their actual importance and scope. The activity used to look for weak signals is called environmental scanning (Hiltunen
2008). It is defined as an activity for acquiring information that involves exposure to and perception of information (Aguilar
1967). “The activity could range from gathering data in the most deliberate fashion—as by an extensive market research program—to undirected conversation at the breakfast table or the chance observation of an irate housewife throwing your product into trash barrel” (Aguilar
1967, p. 18). Although some authors point to environmental scanning as source or part of the resilience process (Burnard and Bhamra
2011; Demmer et al.
2011), little is known about how resilient organizations actually acquire external information. However, the absorptive capacity literature gives some useful insights into successful practices of (external) knowledge acquisition. For example, Lewin et al. (
2011) describe the ability to recognize and identify the value of outside knowledge as an external metaroutine of absorptive capacity and provide examples of underlying practiced routines, such as market research, end-user surveys, and the use of gatekeepers. With a focus on potentially threatening developments, such routines might also be useful for the development of organizational resilience. In the resilience context, Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Bansal (
2016) could show that sustainable business practices—that means organizational practices with a positive effect on social and natural environments—help firms to sense and mitigate threatening situations. For example, investments in reliable high-quality goods can lead to trustful customer relationships in which sensitive information are shared openly. In addition to the observation and identification of actual changes and upcoming crisis, a focus on potential future developments is important. For example, scenario planning practices can help firms to think about different futures—even if they are unrealistic or unthinkable—and ways to handle them (e.g., Hillmann et al.
2018). In sum, observation and identification capabilities help firms to see and react to changes before their full impact becomes visible.
Preparation is a term that has been used by Weick et al. (
1999) to describe an ability specific to HROs. HROs are technologically complex organizations operating in high-risk environments, in which even small failures can have dramatic consequences (e.g., nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, or chemical firms). In such organizations, failure prevention takes top priority and “performance reliability rivals productivity as a dominant goal” (Roberts
2010, p. 102). However, preparation capabilities are not only important for HROs but also for resilient organizations (e.g., Kendra and Wachtendorf
2003; Somers
2009). “For organizations, being prepared means that a firm or agency is equipped to deal with unforeseen adversity and it is ready to capitalize on unexpected opportunities” (Lengnick-Hall and Beck
2009, p. 3). This means that preparation capabilities help to develop resources that are necessary in times of crisis (e.g., suitable recovery plans, effective relationships, and mutual understanding). Important insights into this part of resilience can be gained from risk management, emergency planning, and business continuity management (BCM). Especially BCM—as a recent evolution of risk-based practice (Elliott et al.
1999,
2002; Herbane et al.
2004)—provides important insights into how organizations can prepare for critical events; for example, how organizations can develop suitable recovery plans for previously identified critical business operations (Randeree et al.
2012). Training and simulation practices can ensure that the benefits and objectives of such plans are achieved (Gibb and Buchanan
2006). For example, those practices support organizational members to learn complex procedures and develop personal and collective action repertoires (Lengnick-Hall et al.
2011). However, it is not solely the developed plans and formal procedures that prepare organizations for the great variety of unexpected events. Such events often do not correspond with planning assumptions and require intuitive acting and ad hoc decisions (Seville et al.
2008; Boin and McConnell
2007; Bhamra et al.
2011). “The most important benefit of preparing the plan is the growing of effective relationships and mutual understanding among those involved in the plan preparation process” (Crichton et al.
2009, p. 32). Thus, preparation does not mean planning for the unexpected—this is impossible. Rather, it means that organizations prepare without knowing if, when, or where an unexpected event will occur in the future. Such a preparation capability may be developed “by expanding general knowledge and technical facility, and generalized command over resources” (Wildavsky
1991, p. 221).
In sum, anticipation capabilities build a resilience potential which can be defined as “resilience that is not presently evident or realized” (Somers
2009, p. 13). Anticipation capabilities build the foundation for an effective response to critical situations and thus realized resilience; however, they provide control only to a limited extent and “important actions, adjustments, and decisions must be undertaken in real time” (Schulman
2004, p. 43). Thus, organizations also need to develop coping capabilities. The next section concentrates on the processes behind this real-time coping with unexpected events.
3.2.2 Coping capabilities
In addition to the anticipation of and preparation for critical events, resilience also means coping “with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest” (Wildavsky
1991, p. 77). In the literature, there are many synonyms for coping with unexpected events: e.g., dealing with unknown hazards (Wildavsky
1991), responding productively to significant change (Horne and Orr
1998), or designing and implementing positive adaptive behavior matched to the immediate situation (Mallak
1998). Clearly, all these terms refer to an effective handling of unexpected events so as to resist destruction. The overall ability to cope with the unexpected is closely related to crisis (incident) management and can be separated into two sub-categories: the ability to accept a problem and the ability to develop and implement solutions (see, e.g., Smart and Vertinsky
1977; Reilly
1993; Jaques
2007). These capabilities imply immediate or short-term action in response to unexpected events (Madni and Jackson
2009).
Accepting The notion that coping with unexpected events starts with accepting the problem has already been suggested in the literature on individual resilience. For example, Coutu (
2002) states that resilient people display, among other things, a staunch acceptance of reality. At the organizational level, this phenomenon is discussed as “the cognitive challenge” (Hamel and Vaelikangas
2003, p. 54). It is argued that critical events, even if they are predictable, often come as a surprise because organizations take refuge in denial. This means that, “for many organizations, the future is less unknowable than it is unthinkable” (Hamel and Vaelikangas
2003, p. 55). The negative consequence is that organizations require too much time to realize and act on those events. For this reason, organizations need to develop the ability to accept a problem. Only then can they face critical situations and react quickly. In this context, Weick (
1993) already pointed out that organizations, to accept reality, need an attitude of wisdom. Resilient organizations are not too confident or too cautious; they use their experiences, but also know their limits and invite doubt. Catalan and Robert (
2011) propose that the acceptance dimension of organizational resilience is comprised of three elements: understanding the environment in which the system operates, defining a reference state for the system, and being aware of and accepting system failures. These elements show some overlap with the previously discussed anticipation capabilities. Thus, it can be assumed that anticipation and coping capabilities are closely connected and that the promotion of anticipation capabilities may also have positive effects on the ability to accept a problem. So far, we know little about how the ability to accept failures is actually enacted and how organizations can develop this organizational ability.
Developing and implementing solutions When a crisis occurs, organizations must put their crisis plans into action and develop ad hoc solutions (Pearson and Clair
1998). Developing solutions in the face of crisis is always a combination of sensemaking and acting (Weick et al.
2005). “The basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs” (Weick
1993, p. 635). Sensemaking means that individuals or groups try to make things rationally accountable to themselves and others. Only if people understand the crisis situation are they able to act on it. For effective sensemaking, there must be continual feedback between understanding and action, which means that sense must continually be made and remade. Resilience researchers have already emphasized that collective sensemaking is an important element of (cognitive) resilience (e.g., Lengnick-Hall and Beck
2009; Lengnick-Hall et al.
2011; Linnenluecke et al.
2012) and much can be learned from the various studies that provide insights into the functioning of sensemaking in organizations (e.g., Maitlis
2005; Patriotta
2003; Maitlis and Christianson
2014).
One of the most important principles to facilitate the collective sensemaking process is ‘bricolage’ (Weick
1993): the capability to improvise and to solve problems creatively (Kendra and Wachtendorf
2003). What first sounds counterintuitive—to improvise in already chaotic situations—can help to prevent catastrophe. In his study on the Mann Gulch fire disaster, Weick (
1993) argues that improvisation makes organizations less vulnerable since it allows for a recombination of those actions that are already in the organization’s repertoire into novel combinations. Accordingly, if an organizational order fails in a crisis situation, a substitute might be developed immediately. In their paper on HROs, Weick et al. (
1999) explain that bricolage may be enacted through informal “epistemic networks” (Rochlin
1989). “Knowledgeable people self-organize into ad hoc networks to provide expert problem solving” (Weick et al.
1999, p. 100). These ad hoc networks are not formalized and they dissolve when the disturbance has been managed. Bourrier (
1996) describes these structures as “informal latent networks activated only in the face of uncertainties and rapidly developing contingencies as a supplement to the normal patterns of formal hierarchy and compliance with strict roles” (p. 105). Consequently, such networks may help to quickly combine the knowledge that is necessary to cope effectively with events that cannot be predicted. In disaster research, similar organizational forms are discussed as emergent (response) groups (Drabek and McEntire
2003; Tierney
2003; Majchrzak et al.
2007).
However, the ability to develop solutions not only means idea generation, but also coordination. During times of severe adversity, when decisions must be made promptly and failures could have dramatic consequences, both formal and informal coordination mechanisms are important (Faraj and Xiao
2006). On the one hand, firms need formal structures and clear responsibilities for quick decision making and immediate response. On the other hand, firms also need openness and freedom for flexible and creative action. Faraj and Xiao (
2006) explore how coordination occurs in a medical trauma center—a so-called fast-response organization—and describe two types of coordination practices. They argue that expertise coordination practices (reliance on protocols, community of practice structuring, plug-and-play teaming, and knowledge sharing) are necessary to manage the distributed knowledge and ensure the timely application of the needed expertise. They further suggest that dialogic coordination practices (epistemic contestation, joint sensemaking, cross-boundary intervention, and protocol breaking) are time-critical responses to unexpected events that ensure failure-free operations. In this context, Gittell (
2002) shows that the performance effects of coordination mechanisms (e.g., team meetings) are mediated by relational coordination, a relationship-intensive form of coordination.
Overall, the ability to develop solutions allows for coordinated collective responses to adverse events (e.g., quick understanding and creative combination of knowledge). However, this also requires that the developed solutions are actually implemented. “(i)mplementation—is the pragmatic phase of (…) problem solving” (Dayton
2004, p. 179) and means the ability of an organization to actually realize a previously developed solution. Especially crisis situations require precise and quick implementation (Smart and Vertinsky
1977); however, research shows that newly developed solutions—regardless of how carefully they are designed—do not automatically lead to changes in the organizational patterns of action (Feldman
2003; Howard-Grenville
2005; Pentland and Feldman
2008). To ensure actual changes, the developed solutions must be widely accepted and adopted; thus, the support of the whole organization is needed. The previously mentioned coordination mechanisms seem to play an important role in implementing solutions. They can help to achieve a system-wide alignment and thus a “whole-system response” (Horne and Orr
1998, p. 30).
3.2.3 Adaptation capabilities
Beside the first two phases, resilience also includes the ability to adapt to critical situations and to use change for own purposes. This ability refers to adjustments following crises and is directed toward organizational advancement (Limnios et al.
2014). This type of long-term learning (Madni and Jackson
2009) increases the knowledge base of a firm, which in turn acts as a main antecedent for the anticipation dimension (see Fig.
1 and the detailed discussion in Sect.
3.4). Therefore, adaptation is one of the key capabilities that can help organizations avoid or reduce negative consequences from unexpected events (Carley
1991; Carley and Harrald
1997). Adaptation includes two types of capabilities: (1) reflection and learning and (2) organizational change capabilities.
Reflection and learning To use failure experience for own purposes, both cognition and behavior are essential. On the one hand, organizations must be able to reflect on the crisis situation and to incorporate the gained insight into the existing knowledge base. On the other hand, they must be able to act on this knowledge and produce change (Edmondson
2002). “Reflection is the process of stepping back from an experience to ponder, carefully and persistently, its meaning to the self through the development of inferences; learning is the creation of meaning from past or current events that serves as a guide for future behavior” (Daudelin
1997, p. 39). Different studies provide insight into the specific role of reflection within the learning process. For example, Daudelin (
1997) suggests four stages in the reflection process: articulation of the problem, analysis of the problem, formulation of a theory to explain the problem, and action. She also mentions different reflection practices that may facilitate learning from experience (e.g., problem-solving meetings, project review sessions, or informal discussions with friends/colleagues). Learning can be described as “ongoing process of reflection and action characterized by asking questions, seeking feedback, experimenting, reflecting on results, and discussing errors or unexpected outcomes of actions” (Edmondson
1999, p. 353). Although previous research comprises several case studies of organizations that have learned from unexpected events (e.g., Roberts et al.
2005; Rochlin et al.
1987) and organizations that have failed to learn from unexpected events (e.g., Sagan
1993; Vaughan
2005), there is only little empirical work on concrete practices by which organizations learn from incidents (Lindberg et al.
2010). Vastveit et al. (
2015) provide insight into actual practices used to improve safety performance in a Scandinavian refinery after unexpected incidents. They found that incident learning did not just happen through formal incident management processes, but also through daily work practices. They show that employees executed learning-related tasks in different ways from formal presentations of reports and risk-reducing measures to informal meetings and discussions raising the reflexivity of employees. Gressgård and Hansen (
2015) point to the important role of interaction and collaboration for learning from failures. In particular, they could show that knowledge exchange between units is an important predictor of perceived ability to learn from failures. With their in-depth analysis of post-flight reviews in a fighter squadron of the Israel Defense Force, Ron et al. (
2006) provide deep insight into the specific practice of after-action reviews.
Furthermore, organizations can learn from the vicariously experienced incidents from related or similar organizations (Kim and Miner
2007; Madsen
2009). This is particularly important since “[a]ny failure that occurs in one system will have a propensity to recur in another ‘like’ system for similar reasons” (Toft and Reynolds
1994, p. 4)—a phenomenon called isomorphism. Researchers show that accident rates for US airlines and railroads decline with an increase in the number of accidents experienced by other firms in the same industry (Haunschild and Sullivan
2002; Baum and Dahlin
2007) and that hotel chains learn from their industry’s operative and competitive experiences (Ingram and Baum
1997). Although there is limited evidence, it can also be assumed that failures in other industries are important learning sources (Aldrich
1999; Kim and Miner
2007; Crichton et al.
2009). Focusing on the banking industry, Kim and Miner (
2007) show that even near-failure experiences can generate vicarious learning. However, until now, there has been little empirical research on how vicarious learning works in the case of unexpected events. Some studies provide insight into how governments and private organizations assimilate unexpected events experienced by other firms and extract “lessons learned” from them (e.g., Kirchsteiger
1999; Roberts and Bea
2001; Weber et al.
2001). For example, they describe typical lessons learned processes such as information collection, verification, storage, and dissemination and point to used artifacts such as incident reports, organization stories, and alerts. However, the generation of lessons learned does not necessarily mean effective learning from (vicarious) failure experience. Research shows that organizations tend to focus on the surface, concentrating on active failures, rather than conducting deep analyses and uncovering problematic latent conditions (Haunschild and Sullivan
2002). As a result, organizations often generate new knowledge (lessons learned), but fail to translate this knowledge into new behaviors. Creating diversity in perspectives can force organizations to avoid simple interpretations through constructive conflict and deeper discussions about actions to take (Haunschild and Sullivan
2002; Gressgård and Hansen
2015).
Organizational change Overall change can only be achieved by higher-level learning (e.g., Fiol and Lyles
1985)—also called second-order learning (e.g., Sørensen
2002) or deutero learning (e.g., Visser
2007)—which results in the development of new norms, values, and practices. This higher-level learning implies a cultural readjustment (Turner
1976); the organization’s view of the world must change to stimulate a shift in beliefs and precautionary norms (Stead and Smallman
1999). Kendra and Wachtendorf (
2003) argue that resilient organizations show “a willingness to overturn or bypass experience, knowing that the current troublesome situation, although similar to those encountered previously, may in fact have quite novel features that require enquiry and ingenuity to address” (pp. 42–43). Therefore, organizations need to be able to simultaneously believe in and question their past experience (Weick
1969). This is necessary to be able to adapt to unexpected events, as Ryle (
1979) points out: “(T)o be thinking what he is here and now up against, he must both be trying to adjust himself to just this present once-only situation and in doing this to be applying lessons already learned” (p. 129).
To produce organizational change it is particularly important to actually act on previously generated knowledge. Organizations must be able to exploit a newly developed solution and transfer it to their individual parts. To achieve that, change management capabilities are needed. For example, it could be shown that an organization’s change management process is fundamental to organizational resilience (Ates and Bititci
2011). Other scholars point to the importance of a robust strategic planning process with an entrepreneurial focus (Demmer et al.
2011). In this context, organizations must also be aware that putting new knowledge into practice can create new problems or necessitate further changes. “Studies have shown that two out of three change initiatives fail” (Sirkin et al.
2005, p. 109). Hence, how change is managed is critical to resilience (Ates and Bititci
2011). As every other organizational change, change in response to unexpected events may result in different types of resistance. Thus, adaptation involves not only making important changes but also overcoming resistance to change (Dayton
2004). Resistance to change may be rooted in the individual (e.g., Piderit
2000), team (e.g., Janis
1982), or organizational levels (e.g., Lorsch
1986). To overcome the specific manifestations of resistance, various change management practices can be applied. Soft managerial practices such as effective communication and relationships within the organization seem to be particularly important to enhancing an organization’s resilience (Seville et al.
2008). Furthermore, the ability to change can find expression in the successful use of so-called “change agents”, which accompany the change and implementation process and, if necessary, have intervention methods and options (Jones
2006).