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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

6. Political Consequences

Author : Jonas Richter

Published in: Formalisation Through Taxation

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Framed in the corresponding literature, this chapter reasons that the formalisation process of the economy triggers a political response from the taxpayer. It shows that firms seem to increasingly affiliate themselves with business associations to organise and insist on better public spending and accountability as well as sector or firm specific demands. The findings thus hint towards a process of strengthened political capabilities of the taxpayer to pursue collective action, which might alter Paraguay’s political equilibrium in the long run.

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Metadata
Title
Political Consequences
Author
Jonas Richter
Copyright Year
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29282-9_6

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