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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Practical Password Hardening Based on TLS

Authors : Constantinos Diomedous, Elias Athanasopoulos

Published in: Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Text-based passwords are still the dominant form of user authentication in remote services. Beyond the many usability issues associated with handling several text-based passwords, security is also an important dimension. Through the years, a significant amount of on-line services has been compromised and their stored passwords have been leaked. Once the database is compromised, it takes little time for a program to crack the cryptographically hashed (weak) passwords, no matter the algorithm used.
In response to this problem, researchers have proposed cryptographic services for hardening all stored passwords. These services perform several sessions of cryptographic hashing combined with message authentication codes. The goal of these services is to coerce adversaries to use them while cracking the passwords. This essentially transforms off-line password cracking to on-line.
Although these services incorporate elaborate cryptographic schemes for password hardening, it is unclear how easily typical web sites can utilize them without outsourcing the functionality to large providers. In this paper, we take a systems approach for making any web site that is serviced through TLS capable of strongly hardening their passwords. We observe that any TLS-enabled web server is already equipped with strong cryptographic functions. We modify mod_ssl, the module that offers TLS to any Apache web server, to act as a password-hardening service. Our evaluation shows that with an overhead similar to adapting hash functions (such as scrypt and bcrypt), our proposal can protect even the weakest passwords, once they are leaked.

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Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
But not unseen [6].
 
2
The term weak here is not associated necessarily with password entropy [15], but with guessing probability. Even high-entropy passwords can be cracked if they are based on known words [1].
 
3
Involving a secret key in the computation can be seen also as adding pepper [15] to the password.
 
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Metadata
Title
Practical Password Hardening Based on TLS
Authors
Constantinos Diomedous
Elias Athanasopoulos
Copyright Year
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_21

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