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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

7. Prohibition of Abusive Practices

Author : Walter Frenz

Published in: Handbook of EU Competition Law

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

Pursuant to Art. 102 TFEU, the abusive exploitation of a dominant position within the Internal Market, or a significant part thereof, on the part of one or more undertakings that is capable of impairing transnational trade is incompatible with the Internal Market. There are different forms of abusive exploitation, included the refusal to grant a license (Microsoft) or a supply (Amazon). Selectively low prices are another current problem.

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See above paras 1 et seq. and further in Frenz (2012b), paras 34 et seq.

See detailed discussion above at para 19.

See above paras 41 et seq.

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 22 et seq.)—Continental Can; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 38)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 29)—Michelin; Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (para 30)—ERT.

See also Wurmnest (2012), p. 231 et seq.

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 15 para 5.

In general, see above paras 60 et seq.

Especially clear, DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, December 2005, paras 4, 56 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf); see also Commission Communication—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (paras 5, 19 as well as para 30): pursuance of only those cases with a high probability of harm to the consumer, however subject to recognition of the significance of the competitive process.

O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013), p. 78, citing ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—Glaxo-SmithKline Services. Regarding the central importance of the consumer, see Ayal (2014), p. 81 et seq.

ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.

ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63 end)—Glaxo-SmithKline Services.

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 125)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (paras 106 et seq.)—British Airways; General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 664)—Microsoft; detailed discussion above paras 70 et seq.

ECJ, Cases C-468–478/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:504 (para 37)—GlaxoSmithKline.

Wurmnest (2012), p. 217.

Eilmansberger, In: Bornkamm et al. (2015), Art. 82 EG para 6; Wurmnest (2012), p. 90.

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 21)—Post Danmark.

Ayal (2014), p. 117.

See ECJ, Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 176)—Deutsche Telekom; Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 64)—TeliaSonera Sverige; Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 23)—Post Danmark; General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 268, 270)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

General Court, Case T-219/99, ECLI:EU:T:2003:343 (paras 242 et seq.)—British Airways.

In light of the Google case, O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013), p. 261 citing the decision of the Hamburg Regional Court of 4 April 2013, 408 HKO 36/13—Verband deutscher Wetterdienstleister.

O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013), p. 261, citing AG Jacobs, ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:264 (para 67)—Bronner.

Hellwig (2006), p. 248: “Recht auf Wettbewerbsfreiheit”.

Ayal (2014), p. 132 et seq.

See above paras 1807 et seq.

Jickeli (2011), p. 307.

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 24)—Post Danmark; Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 174, 176, 180)—Deutsche Telekom.

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 17 et seq.

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 4.

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 6.

In favour, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 20.

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 21)—Post Danmark; cf. Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 24)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22, last amended in OJ 2009 L 253, p. 18.

Podszun (2014), 249.

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 332 et seq.)—Microsoft; Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II; in particular on the issue as a whole, paras 2068 et seq., 2077 et seq., 2083 et seq.

Expressly rejecting this, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 22; emphasising the “teleological reduction of the prohibition of discrimination to its competition law base core” performed in Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. c) TFEU, Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 164.

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; later, e.g. Case 62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 69)—AKZO Chemie.

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 23)—Post Danmark; Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 64)—TeliaSonera Sverige as well as above, paras 1812 et seq. including with regard to its limits.

See ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 21)—Post Danmark.

General Court, Case T-191/98 inter alia, ECLI:EU:T:2003:245 (para 1460)—Atlantic Container Line.

See above para 1813.

See above paras 60 et seq., 1807 et seq.

Rejecting the latter, ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257—IMS Health.

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 30)—Michelin; O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013), p. 166.

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 27)—L’Oréal; Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (paras 42 et seq.)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen; General Court, Case T-111/96, ECLI:EU:T:1998:183 (para 138)—ITT Promedia.

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 70)—Michelin; Case 62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 69)—AKZO Chemie.

See below paras 1848 et seq.

Emphasising the reduction of economic freedom of action in such cases, Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 4.

E.g. Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 25; Lang (1979), 346, 348 et seq.; similar view Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 5. Contrary opinion Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 51.

Restrictive view, e.g. Joliet (1973), 97 et seq.

See Mestmäcker (1966), p. 334 et seq.

See also, Wurmnest (2012), p. 341 et seq.

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 25; see specifically in relation to Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. c) TFEU Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 164.

See ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257—IMS Health; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (paras 42 et seq.)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen.

Rose and Bailey (2013), para 10.009.

See ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 27)—Continental Can; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; from the literature, e.g. Ritter et al. (1991), p. 354 et seq.; contrary opinion Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 57.

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 26; Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 117 et seq.; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 3; different view especially compared to prior literature, e.g. Everling, In: Wohlfarth et al. (1960), Art. 86 paras 1 et seq.; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 paras 56 et seq.; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 48.

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands; General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 93)—Hilti. In favour of a causality requirement based on “systemic-teleological considerations” and market power as perhaps not a required element but “sufficiently important”, see Eilmansberger, In: Bornkamm et al. (2015), Art. 82 EG paras 128 et seq.

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 26)—Continental Can; Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 526/527)—Suiker Unie; Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 70)—AKZO Chemie; Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (paras 22, 30)—Post Danmark; General Court, Case T-111/96, ECLI:EU:T:1998:183 (para 139)—ITT Promedia.

See above paras 1812 et seq.

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 26)—Continental Can.

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; General Court, Case T-111/96, ECLI:EU:T:1998:183 (para 138)—ITT Promedia.

In general, see ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents; Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474 (para 24)—GB-Inno-BM; Case C-271 inter alia/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:440 (para 36)—Telecommunications services.

See above para 1815.

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

See recital 7, Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (“EC Merger Regulation”), OJ L 24, p. 1, as well as below, paras 1848 et seq.

See above para 1822.

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 25 et seq.)—Continental Can.

Cf. ECJ, Case 43/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:347 (para 13)—Ancides.

Mestmäcker (1995), p. 446.

See above paras 177 et seq.

See above paras 174 et seq. as well as paras 2348 et seq.

See immediately following para 1844.

Rose and Bailey (2013), paras 10.011, 10.049 et seq. See below paras 2327 et seq.

See above para 1836.

See ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen; Rose and Bailey (2013), para 10.011.

Additional discussion, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 36.

ECJ, Case 32/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42 (405)—Italy/Council and Commission.

See below para 2354. See also e.g. Jickeli (2011), p. 316.

Most recently General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II. For additional discussion, see paras 1871 et seq.

See above paras 1504 et seq.

See ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 25)—Continental Can; General Court, Case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41 (para 22)—Tetra Pak I.

Contrasting view, de Bronett, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 22 para 108.

E.g. Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 383; Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 22; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 9; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 5; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 11; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 37 with additional citations in fn. 89.

See ECJ, Case 32/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42 (407)—Italy/Council and Commission; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 116)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Cases 142 and 156/84, ECLI:EU:C:1987:490 (paras 37 et seq., 65)—BAT and Reynolds; Case C-310/93 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:101 (paras 67 et seq.)—BPB Industries and British Gypsum; not in this series ECJ, Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (paras 17 et seq.)—Alsatel.

General Court, Case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41 (para 24)—Tetra Pak I.

See ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (paras 30 et seq.)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen; General Court, Case T-229/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:155 (paras 79 et seq.)—Deutsche Bahn.

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 130/138 et seq.)—United Brands with regard to the re-sale of green bananas.

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 80 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

See ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 456)—Suiker Unie; General Court, Case T-68 inter alia/89, ECLI:EU:T:1992:38 (para 358)—SIV; from the literature, e.g. Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 22; also Joliet (1970), p. 237 et seq.; Schröter (1977), p. 456 et seq.

Thus the idea of de Bronett, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 22 para 108.

See, e.g., Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 para 37 end; by contrast subject to reservations Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 23; see also Commission Decision 89/93/EEC, OJ 1989 L 33, p. 44 (para 83, 84a)—Flat glass; 92/213/EEC, OJ 1992 L 96, p. 34 (para 42)—British Midland/Aer Lingus: Commission’s non-cumulation principle, Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 382.

See by contrast Commission Decision 92/213/EEC, OJ 1992 L 96, p. 34—British Midland/Aer Lingus; 93/252/EEC, OJ 1993 L 116, p. 21—Gillette; 98/531/EC, OJ 1998 L 246, p. 1—Van den Bergh. See also ECJ, Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (para 20)—Alsatel.

Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1.

General Court, Case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41 (para 25)—Tetra Pak I; also ECJ, Cases C-395 and 396/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132 (paras 52 et seq.)—Compagnie maritime belge transports; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 9 end.

General Court, Case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41 (para 25)—Tetra Pak I; also ECJ, Cases C-395 and 396/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132 (para 44)—Compagnie maritime belge transports; other view in the literature, Wiedemann (1989), I. AT para 373.

For a detailed discussion, see Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 42.

Council Regulation of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (“EC Merger Regulation”), OJ L 24, p. 1.

100

See below para 3521, 3541.

101

In favour of a clear segregation, Jickeli (2011), p. 307 et seq.

102

ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (paras 33 et seq.)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen; Case 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25 (para 23)—BRT/SABAM.

103

See regarding Art. 21 ECMR No. 139/2004, paras 3238 et seq.

104

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 10 end; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 43 end; critical with regard to the legal practice of parallel application, Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 199.

105

See below para 3239 end.

106

Still critical, e.g. Koch, in: Grabitz and Hilf (1986), Art. 86 para 11.

107

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 29. See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 130 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche: Basis for sanctions.

108

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 43.

109

Schröter and Bartl, In: Schröter et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 318; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 198.

110

ECJ, Case C-30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 32)—Bodson; Case C-387/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:439 (para 52)—Banchero.

111

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 8.

112

ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (paras 10 et seq.)—Corbeau. Further discussion, regarding the following topic as well, see above paras 221 et seq., 1119 et seq.

113

ECJ, Case C-90/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:101 (para 18)—Van Ameyde.

114

ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 34)—Bodson.

115

See ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 34)—Höfner and Elser; Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603 (para 29, 31)—Job Centre; Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (paras 95 et seq.)—Albany; Cases C-115–117/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:434 (paras 95 et seq.)—Brentjens; Case C-219/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:437 (paras 85 et seq.)—Drijvende Bokken; Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376 (para 49)—MOTOE.

116

ECJ, Case C-553/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083—DEI; see with further and critical discussion paras 4242 et seq.

117

General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 118)—Dimosia; see e.g. ECJ, Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376 (para 48 end)—MOTOE.

118

Regarding the prohibition of cartels, see above paras 1119 et seq.

119

ECJ, Case C-387/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:439 (para 46)—Banchero.

120

Detailed discussion below in conjunction with paras 4152 et seq.

121

See below paras 4207, 4235 end, 4242 et seq.

122

ECJ, Case C-553/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083—DEI.

123

Also General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 118)—Dimosia; see paras 4242 et seq.

124

See ECJ, Case C-18/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:195 (para 42)—Corsica Ferries I; Case C-163/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:54 (para 27)—Silvano Raso; Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306 (para 40)—Corsica Ferries II; Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376 (para 48 end)—MOTOE.

125

ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (para 18)—Sacchi; Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 23)—Genova; Case C-22/98, ECLI:EU:C:1999:419 (para 21)—Becu; Case C-258/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:301 (para 11)—Giovanni Carra.

126

Restrictive application, ECJ, Case C-202/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:120 (para 55)—Telecommunications devices; Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 12)—Corbeau.

127

E.g. Pappalardo (1984), 527 et seq.; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 50 with additional citations.

128

ECJ, Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (para 57)—Ambulanz Glöckner; emphasising discretion on the part of the Member States: Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 10. Detailed discussion at paras 4288 et seq.

129

See below paras 4199 et seq.

130

ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 32)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen.

131

ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 32)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen; General Court, Case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41 (paras 23 et seq.)—Tetra Pak I.

132

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II.

133

See Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 28 et seq.

134

See above paras 1119 et seq. as well as paras 4152 et seq.

135

See only Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 168 et seq., however with repeated references to the examples.

136

See e.g. Microsoft, General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 665)—Microsoft.

137

See above para 1862.

138

See above paras 193 et seq., 1525 et seq.

139

Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (paras 783 et seq.)—Microsoft II.

140

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II.

141

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 389 et seq.)—Microsoft.

142

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 86)—British Airways.

143

See above para 1776 as well as paras 2357 et seq.

144

See below para 2363.

145

See above para 656 as well as 696.

146

See e.g. ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (paras 15 et seq.)—Sacchi; Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (para 17)—CBEM; Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (paras 20 et seq.)—Höfner and Elser; Cases C-48 and 66/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:63 (paras 20 et seq.)—PTT Nederland; further paras 4199 et seq.

147

See above paras 1854 et seq.

148

See ECJ, Case 26/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:150 (para 7/9)—General Motors Continental; Case 226/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:421 (para 9)—British Leyland; Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (paras 14 et seq.)—Genova.

149

See e.g. ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 18 et seq.)—Continental Can; Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 36 et seq.)—United Brands; Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (para 3)—Hugin; General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 18)—Hilti. Detailed discussion above at paras 385 et seq.

150

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 142 et seq.; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 30.

151

ECJ, Case 22/79, ECLI:EU:C:1979:245 (paras 11 et seq.)—Greenwich Film. For additional discussion, see above paras 386 et seq.

152

For additional discussion, see paras 2194 et seq.

153

See above paras 177 et seq.

154

ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (para 17)—Hugin.

155

ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (para 17)—Hugin; Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 30)—L’Oréal; General Court, Case T-69/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:39 (para 76)—RTE; Case T-70/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:40 (para 64)—BBC.

156

See above paras 177 et seq., 1066 et seq.

157

Regarding the prohibition of cartels, see ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 37)—Expedia; additional discussion with additional citations above para 1007.

158

ECJ, Case 22/71, ECLI:EU:C:1971:113 (para 16/18)—Béguelin; Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 198/202)—United Brands; General Court, Case T-65/89, ECLI:EU:T:1993:31 (para 134)—BPB Industries and British Gypsum.

159

ECJ, Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 26)—LʼOréal; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 30)—Michelin; Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (para 12)—Alsatel; Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 69)—AKZO Chemie; also General Court, Case T-128/98, ECLI:EU:T:2000:290 (paras 147 et seq.)—Aéroports de Paris.

160

Commission Decision 85/609/EEC, OJ 1985 L 374, p. 1 (para 67)—AKZO; 89/22/EEC, OJ 1989 L 10, p. 50 (para 114)—BPB Industries; 91/299/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 21 (paras 40 et seq.)—Soda/Solvay; 91/300/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 40 (paras 41 et seq.)—Soda/ICI; 98/531/EC, OJ 1998 L 246, p. 1 (para 256)—Van den Bergh Foods; 2000/74/EC, OJ 2000 L 30, p. 1 (para 86)—Virgin/British Airways; 2002/405/EC, OJ 2002 L 143, p. 1 (para 172)—Michelin.

161

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 30)—Michelin.

162

O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013), p. 166.

163

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 107 et seq.)—United Brands; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 39)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 48)—Michelin; based on Commission practice, e.g. Commission Decision 92/213/EEC, OJ 1992 L 96, p. 34 (paras 21 et seq.)—British Midland/Aer Lingus.

164

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 107 et seq.)—United Brands; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 30)—Michelin; Case 62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 55 et seq.)—AKZO Chemie; also General Court, e.g. Case T-69/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:39 (para 63)—RTE; Case T-83/91, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246 (para 122)—Tetra Pak II. Based on Commission practice, e.g. Commission Decision 92/163/EEC, OJ 1992 L 72, p. 1 (paras 101, 104 et seq.)—Tetra Pak II; 92/213/EEC, OJ 1992 L 96, p. 34 (paras 18 et seq.)—British Midland/Aer Lingus as well as 85/609/EEC, OJ 1985 L 374, p. 1 (paras 67 et seq.)—AKZO. From the literature, see, e.g. Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 10; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 6 according to which remaining competition must be (capable of being) reduced.

165

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 62 and 64.

166

See e.g. ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (paras 12 et seq.)—Sacchi; Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (paras 29 et seq.)—Höfner and Elser; Case C-242/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376 (para 35)—GT-Link. These are the reference examples under Art. 106 (1) TFEU, see above, paras 1853 et seq.

167

See ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 22)—Commercial Solvents; Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (paras 16 et seq.)—CBEM; Case C-271 inter alia/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:440 (para 36)—Telecommunications services.

168

See Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of 18 April 1951, OJ II 1952, p. 445, effective 23 July 1952.

169

On 23 July 2002, Art. 97 ECSC; regarding continued applicability for pending matters, ECJ, Cases C-201 and 216/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:190—Arcelor.

170

ECJ, Case 13/60, ECLI:EU:C:1962:15 (94)—Ruhrkohlenverkaufskontore I.

171

Further discussion of the topic as a whole, Schröter (1977), p. 439 et seq., contrary view Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 61.

172

See ECJ, Case 13/60, ECLI:EU:C:1962:15 (84)—Ruhrkohlenverkaufskontore I.

173

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 4; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 66.

174

ECJ, Case 40/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:18 (para 16)—Sirena; Case 78/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:59 (para 17)—Deutsche Grammophon; Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 381, 456)—Suiker Unie; similarly Commission, Das Problem der Unternehmenskonzentration im Gemeinsamen Markt, Studies, Reihe Wettbewerb No. 3, 1966, p. 25; by contrast without the capability criterion Commission Decision 72/21/EEC, OJ 1972 L 7, p. 25 (35)—Continental Can Company; 73/109/EEC, OJ 1973 L 140, p. 17 (38 et seq.)—European sugar industry; however, subsequent application 85/609/EEC, OJ 1985 L 374, p. 1 (para 67)—AKZO; additional citations above, para 1888.

175

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 76.

176

ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (paras 3 et seq.)—Hugin: positive by contrast, Commission, 17th Report on Competition Policy 1987, sub-section 84; from the literature, O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006), p. 166.

177

See e.g. ECJ, Case 26/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:150 (para 7/9)—General Motors Continental; Case C-436/97 P, ECLI:EU:C:1999:205 (para 10)—Deutsche Bahn confirming General Court, Case T-229/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:155 (para 57)—Deutsche Bahn.

178

ECJ, Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (paras 14 et seq.)—Alsatel.

179

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 77.

180

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 66.

181

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 94; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 88; Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 82; regarding causal independence, Mestmäcker (1966), p. 329.

182

See e.g. ECJ, Case 26/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:150 (para 7/9)—General Motors Continental; Case 13/77, ECLI:EU:C:1977:185 (para 30/35)—Inno/ATAB; Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474 (paras 14 et seq.)—GB-Inno-BM; Case C-258/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:301 (para 13)—Giovanni Carra, Case C-180–184/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428 (para 126)—Pavlov.

183

See above para 1860.

184

Still expressing a contrary view, ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (paras 12 et seq.)—Sacchi; Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (paras 27 et seq.)—ERT as well as Case C-271 inter alia/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:440 (paras 35 et seq.)—Telecommunications services.

185

See e.g. ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (paras 3 et seq.)—Hugin; see also Case C-333/94 P, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 (para 31)—Tetra Pak.

186

ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 31)—Höfner and Elser; Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603 (paras 26 et seq.)—Job Center.

187

ECJ, Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (para 93)—Albany; Cases C-115–117/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:434 (para 93)—Brentjens; Case C-219/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:437 (para 83)—Drijvende Bokken; Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376 (para 49)—MOTOE.

188

See ECJ, Case 226/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:421 (paras 3 et seq.)—British Leyland with regard to imported vehicles.

189

Wurmnest (2012), p. 267, 259 et seq. on the topic as a whole in relation to various approaches.

190

Commission Decision COMP/E-1/38.113 (para 46)—Prokent/Tomra; without objection in General Court, Case T-155/06, ECLI:EU:T:2010:370—Tomra and ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221—Tomra.

191

Möschel (1983), para 505; further discussion below.

192

Roth (2007), p. 39.

193

Wurmnest (2012), p. 266, 268.

194

See above paras 945 et seq.

195

The view posited by represents of the “partenaire obligatoire” doctrine, Glais and Laurent (1983), p. 286 et seq.; Glais (1987), 205; Hoet (1989), 152 et seq.

196

See ECJ, Case 26/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:150 (para 7/9)—General Motors Continental; General Court, Case T-70/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:40 (para 51)—BBC; Commission Decision 89/205/EEC, OJ 1989 L 78, p. 43 (para 22)—Magill; 98/531/EC, OJ 1998 L 246, p. 1 (para 259)—Van den Bergh Foods; 98/538/EC, OJ 1998 L 252, p. 47 (para 31)—AAMS.

197

Approving, Commission Decision 77/327/EEC, OJ 1977 L 117, p. 1 (9)—A.B.G.; open by contrast ECJ, Case 77/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:141 (para 19/23)—BP Handelsmaatschappij.

198

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 34 end)—Continental Can.

199

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 37)—Michelin.

200

Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5.

201

Emphasising the rearward-looking orientation, Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 27. See below paras 1963 et seq.

202

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 128; Riesenkampff and Lehr, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 2 FKVO paras 51 et seq.; below paras 3607 et seq.

203

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents; Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474 (paras 18 et seq.)—GB-Inno-BM; Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 169); Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (paras 39 et seq.)—TeliaSonera Sverige; General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 187)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; on the converse situation of abusive behaviour in view of the dominant position on another, already dominated market, ECJ, Case C-333/94 P, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 (paras 25 et seq.)—Tetra Pak.

204

Further discussion, Bätge (2011), p. 86 et seq.; same approach Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 141 et seq.: distortion of competition “in any market”.

205

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 21)—Commercial Solvents; similarly, ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 47)—AKZO Chemie.

206

ECJ, Case C-333/94 P, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 (paras 25 et seq.)—Tetra Pak.

207

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 30; generally emphasising the close relationship (and the investigatory relationship) between the relevant market and the dominant position, Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 25.

208

See above paras 945 et seq.

209

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 29; O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006), p. 106.

210

See fundamentally ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 32)—Continental Can; also General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 64)—Hilti; settled case law.

211

See ECJ, Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 25)—L’Oréal; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 37)—Michelin; General Court, Case T-65/96, ECLI:EU:T:2000:93 (para 62)—Kish Glass; settled case law; on problems and differences in detail, Barth (2011), p. 49 et seq.

212

E.g. Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 40; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 31; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 49.

213

Also rejecting this position Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 133, contra Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 32; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 49.

214

Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (para 7).

215

Further discussion, Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (paras 36 et seq.).

216

See ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (paras 7 et seq.)—Hugin with regard to replacement parts for cash registers.

217

See ECJ, Case 78/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:59 (paras 16 et seq.)—Deutsche Grammophon.

218

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (paras 46 et seq.)—Michelin. This assessment has not changed over time, Commission Decision 2002/405/EC, OJ 2002 L 143, p. 1 (para 116)—Michelin.

219

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 12 et seq.)—United Brands confirming Commission Decision 76/353/EEC, OJ 1976 L 95, p. 1 (11 et seq.)—United Brands.

220

Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (para 43).

221

Wurmnest (2012), p. 322.

222

Further ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (paras 37 et seq.)—Michelin as a representative case for this issue; referring to this as well, Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 29 with additional citations.

223

Using this as a base, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 141 and thus also AG Lenz, ECJ, Case 62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:154 (paras 59 et seq.)—AKZO Chemie.

224

General Court, Case T-65/96, ECLI:EU:T:2000:93 (paras 62 et seq.)—Kish Glass.

225

ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (para 7)—Hugin.

226

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 30 end, inter alia citing Commission Decision 92/33/EEC, OJ 1992 L 12, p. 24—Yves Saint Laurent Parfums.

227

See above para 1895.

228

Drawing a distinction between original and third-party spare parts for Hugin cash registers and thus the maintenance/repair market on the one hand and the market for new cash registers on the other, see also Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 32; see also Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 145.

229

Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 22; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 72; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 148.

230

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 33)—Continental Can; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 41)—Michelin; Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (paras 20 et seq.). More expansive Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 34.

231

General Court, Case T-65/96, ECLI:EU:T:2000:93 (para 68)—Kish Glass, confirmed in ECJ, Case C-241/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2001:556—Kish Glass.

232

For additional discussion, see paras 1963 et seq.

233

Accordingly problematic, Commission Decision 88/501/EEC, OJ 1988 L 272, p. 27 (paras 36 et seq.)—Tetra Pak I; likewise critical, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 146 in conjunction with fn. 639.

234

See e.g. ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (para 7)—Hugin; see also above para 1915; Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 37. A comprehensive overview of the various product markets that have been the subjects of decisions to date may be found in Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 35 et seq.

235

Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (para 17).

236

General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 75)—Hilti; ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 23/33)—United Brands.

237

For example, for the preservation of broadband Internet access upon a 10 % increase in connection fees, Commission Decision COMP/38.233 (para 199)—Wanadoo Interactive.

238

Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (para 39, 41).

239

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 31 end: “Cross-price elasticity is an unsuited standard for market definition in all cases where the price of a product is only one factor among many that influences the purchasing decision …”.

240

Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 50; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 138, advocating for a significant limitation on meaningfulness.

241

General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 76)—Hilti.

242

Wurmnest (2012), p. 315.

243

General Court, Case T-219/99, ECLI:EU:T:2003:343 (paras 92 et seq.)—British Airways rejecting the SSNIP test (para 104).

244

General Court, Case T-427/08, ECLI:EU:T:2010:517 (paras 87 et seq.)—CEAHR.

245

Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (para 7).

246

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 38)—Michelin; Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (paras 19 et seq.)—Commercial Solvents.

247

General Court, Case T-340/03, ECLI:EU:T:2007:22 (para 90)—France Télécom: “strong indication”.

248

Detailed discussion including computational examples, O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006), p. 110 et seq.

249

See e.g. Schwalbe and Zimmer (2011), p. 77 et seq.; further discussion Wurmnest (2012), p. 279 et seq.

250

For example, in the case referred to above as well, France Télécom, Wurmnest (2012), p. 318 et seq. citing Commission Decision COMP/38.233 (para 199 in conjunction with fn. 223 and para 257)—Wanadoo Interactive.

251

Regarding susceptibility to error, see Wurmnest (2012), p. 286 et seq. with additional citations.

252

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 16 para 8.

253

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 52; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 156; Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 85 presumes this as a rule and demands particular grounds “for a geographically narrow market definition” (para 87).

254

See above for the relevant product market, paras 1907 et seq.

255

Using this as a base, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 156. See above para 1904.

256

See also Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (para 48).

257

Commission Decision of 9 February 2000, M.1628 (paras 178 et seq.)—Totalfina/Elf Aquitaine; Commission Decision of 21 October 2008, M.4919 (paras 26 et seq.)—Statoilhydro/Conocophilips for filling stations; Commission Decision of 25 January 2000, M.1684 (para 23)—Carrefour/Promodes for the grocery business; Barth (2011), p. 49 et seq. regarding alternative approaches as well.

258

See Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (para 29, 45, 50); see paras 1919 et seq.; contra in this context, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 154.

259

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 84 end.

260

See e.g. ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 35 end)—Continental Can; Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 45/56)—United Brands; more recently, General Court, Case T-65/96, ECLI:EU:T:2000:93 (paras 81 et seq.)—Kish Glass.

261

Further discussion, Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (paras 30 et seq., 50).

262

See Commission Decision 91/299/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 21 (paras 42 et seq.)—Soda/Solvay; 91/300/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 40 (paras 44 et seq.)—Soda/ICI; from the literature Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 84; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 151.

263

Further ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 13/15 et seq., 366/368, 441/442 et seq.)—Suiker Unie; Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 39/43 et seq.)—United Brands; Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (para 30).

264

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 84 with additional aspects.

265

See also ECJ, Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (paras 13 et seq.)—Alsatel.

266

See ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 441/442)—Suiker Unie, provided that Art. 101 TFEU does not apply in any event (ECJ, Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (para 20)—Alsatel), which in contrast to Art. 102 TFEU, specifically refers to market sharing in its list of examples. See Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 152 in conjunction with fn. 663 with additional examples.

267

See ECJ, Case 26/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:150 (paras 4 et seq.)—General Motors Continental; Case 226/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:421 (paras 3 et seq.)—British Leyland; Case C-242/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376 (para 35)—GT/Link; Commission Decision 89/205/EEC, OJ 1989 L 78, p. 43 (para 21)—Magill.

268

See ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 27)—Bodson.

269

The Commission has secondary market this to be the relevant geographic market, Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 86.

270

Accord, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 131.

271

Limited to such an extent as well, ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (paras 9 et seq.)—Commercial Solvents; Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (paras 30 end, 51); see also Commission Decision 92/262/EEC, OJ 1992 L 134, p. 1 (paras 2 et seq., 54)—Shipowners’ Committees; 93/82/EEC, OJ 1993 L 34, p. 20 (paras 8 et seq., 52 et seq.)—CEWAL.

272

See, e.g. ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (paras 9 et seq.)—Commercial Solvents; Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (paras 3 et seq.)—Hugin as well as later, e.g. Commission Decision 89/113/EEC, OJ 1989 L 43, p. 27 (para 90)—Decca Navigator System. Assuming a legal presumption, Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 85.

273

Regarding the relationship of these two markets, see above paras 1925 et seq.

274

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 45/56)—United Brands.

275

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 371 et seq.)—Suiker Unie.

276

The connection between one or more Member States with the sub-region of one Member State, Commission Decision 72/21/EEC, OJ 1972 L 7, p. 25 (38)—Continental Can Company; 89/205/EEC, OJ 1989 L 78, p. 43 (para 21)—Magill.

277

In this regard, Commission Decision 89/113/EEC, OJ 1989 L 43, p. 27 (para 88)—Decca Navigator System; 89/205/EEC, OJ 1989 L 78, p. 43 (para 21)—Magill: the largest part of Ireland and Northern Ireland as the relevant market. See also Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 87 with additional citations.

278

In relation to Belgium, ECJ, Case 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25 (para 5)—BRT/SABAM; for Greece, Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (para 31)—ERT; for Ireland in any event Commission Decision 97/624/EC, OJ 1997 L 258, p. 1 (paras 92 et seq.)—Irish Sugar; 98/531/EC, OJ 1998 L 246, p. 1 (para 255)—Van den Bergh.

279

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 441/442 et seq.)—Suiker Unie.

280

See ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 28)—Bodson; previously Thiesing (1976), p. 360 et seq. as well as AG Mayras, ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:78 (paras 371 et seq.)—Suiker Unie.

281

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 371 et seq., 445/447)—Suiker Unie.

282

See above paras 1925 et seq.

283

Sugar, ECJ, Case C-40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 373 et seq.)—Suiker Unie.

284

See e.g. ECJ, Case C-18/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:195 (para 41)—Corsica Ferries I; Case C-163/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:54 (para 26)—Silvano Raso itself for the harbour of La Spezia.

285

General Court, Case T-128/98, ECLI:EU:T:2000:290 (para 152)—Aéroports de Paris.

286

ECJ, Cases C-395 and 396/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132—Compagnie maritime belge transports for freight shipments between harbours in France and Northern Europe as well as Western Africa/ Zaire; Commission Decision 92/213/EEC, OJ 1992 L 96, p. 34 (para 17)—British Midland/Aer Lingus for the flight route between London Heathrow and Dublin.

287

ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:1403 (para 41)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen.

288

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 23/33)—United Brands.

289

See Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 88 et seq.; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 37; Thiesing (1976), p. 369.

290

For example in the case of the oil crisis, ECJ, Case 77/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:141 (para 35/39)—BP Handelsmaatschappij.

291

Represents the prevailing opinion in the mean time, e.g. Hoppmann (1974), p. 32; Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 54 et seq.; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 68 et seq.; additional citations Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 158 fn. 698.

292

See also ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 45/56)—United Brands.

293

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 88; see also Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 92.

294

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 67/68)—United Brands; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 39 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche; General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 80)—Hilti.

295

See also Eilmansberger, In: Bornkamm et al. (2015), Art. 82 EG para 103.

296

Similar, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 92 against Roth (2001), para 9-058 with additional citations.

297

For additional discussion, see above paras 1899 et seq.

298

The latter may also occupy such a position, see above paras 1894, 1916.

299

Detailed discussion, Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5 (paras 53 et seq.).

300

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 103.

301

See Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 377, 478/481)—Suiker Unie.

302

ECJ, Case 75/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:399 (paras 84 et seq.)—Metro II.

303

Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 94.

304

See Commission Decision 93/252/EEC, OJ 1993 L 116, p. 21 (para 27)—Gilette.

305

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 53 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

306

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 39 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 36)—Michelin; From recent Commission practice, e.g. Commission Decision 98/531/EC, OJ 1998 L 246, p. 1 (paras 18 et seq.)—Van den Bergh as well as 2002/405/EC, OJ 2002 L 143, p. 1 (paras 19 et seq.)—Michelin.

307

However, in this context it does not comprise the determinative factor itself, see General Court, Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (paras 77, 103 et seq.)—Compagnie maritime belge transports.

308

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 111/120)—United Brands; Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 59 et seq.)—AKZO Chemie.

309

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 381/382, 452 et seq.)—Suiker Unie; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 41)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 60)—AKZO Chemie; General Court, Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (paras 76 et seq.)—Compagnie maritime belge transports.

310

Contrary opinion Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 para 92; Korah (1980), 395 et seq.

311

Contrary opinion Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 98; earlier Knöpfle (1982), 1808.

312

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 97; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 94.

313

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 98 et seq.; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 95.

314

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 379/380, 452)—Suiker Unie; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 53 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

315

General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 92)—Hilti; Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (para 76)—Compagnie maritime belge transports. According to Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 98, 102, a monopoly “is by definition .... characterised by the circumstance that there is only a single supplier in the relevant market. Quasi-monopolies in which an undertaking enjoys a market share of greater than 90 % are equivalents”; levels of 70–80 % merely comprise market dominance.

316

Contra Commission Decision 89/22/EEC, OJ 1989 L 10, p. 50 (para 115)—BPB Industries; 91/300/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 40 (para 47)—Soda/ICI; 98/531/EC, OJ 1998 L 246, p. 1 (paras 260 et seq.)—Van den Bergh.

317

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 95 end, who rejects the foregoing Commission Decision as incorrect.

318

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 111/120)—United Brands; Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 51)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

319

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 52)—Michelin; from the literature, e.g. Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 53 et seq.

320

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 58)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

321

See Commission Decision 85/609/EEC, OJ 1985 L 374, p. 1 (paras 68 et seq.)—AKZO; 88/589/EEC, OJ 1988 L 317, p. 47 (paras 24 et seq.)—London European/SABENA.

322

Commission Communication—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 14); see also Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 103, with limiting reference to the ruling in Virgin/British Airways, in which the latter undertaking enjoyed a market share of just under 40 %.

323

Whish and Bailey (2011), p. 183.

324

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 57 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche; however, with higher figures, e.g. Case C-250/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:413 (para 48)—DLG: 36 % and 32 % respectively; approx. 40 % in Commission Decisions 2000/74/EC, OJ 2000 L 30, p. 1 (para 88)—Virgin/British Airways as well as 88/589/EEC, OJ 1988 L 317, p. 47 (paras 24 et seq.)—London European/SABENA.

325

See Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 99.

326

Whish and Bailey (2011), p. 183.

327

See prior view ECJ, Case 75/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:399 (paras 85 et seq.)—Metro II as well as Case 26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (para 17)—Metro I.

328

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 107)—United Brands.

329

Cf. on the issue of parallels, above paras 1504 et seq.

330

Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreements, OJ 2010 L 335, p. 36.

331

Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of specialisation agreements, OJ 2010 L 335, p. 43.

332

Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 88, in footnotes), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.

333

General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 93)—Hilti.

334

ECJ, Case 62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 56, 61)—AKZO Chemie.

335

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 121/124)—United Brands as well as explicitly Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 107 end.

336

Using this as a basis, Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 39.

337

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 36)—Continental Can.

338

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 15)—Commercial Solvents.

339

See ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (para 9)—Hugin.

340

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 109; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 106.

341

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 121/124)—United Brands; from Commission practice, Commission Decision 72/21/EEC, OJ 1972 L 7, p. 25 (37)—Continental Can Company; 89/93/EEC, OJ 1989 L 33, p. 44 (para 79)—Flat glass.

342

See e.g. Commission Decision 89/22/EEC, OJ 1989 L 10, p. 50 (paras 30 et seq., 117)—BPB Industries within additional aspects.

343

Commission Decision 88/138/EEC, OJ 1988 L 65, p. 19 (para 69)—Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti.

344

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 48)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

345

See e.g. ECJ, Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (paras 16 et seq.)—CBEM; Case C-18/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:195 (para 40)—Corsica Ferries I.

346

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 48 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

347

See above paras 1946 et seq.

348

See above paras 1963 et seq., likewise with regard to the following.

349

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 111; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 108.

350

Bulst and Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 43 et seq.

351

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 88/93)—United Brands; see also, e.g. Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 61)—AKZO Chemie.

352

See also ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 48)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

353

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 58)—Michelin.

354

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 88/93 et seq.)—United Brands.

355

General Court, Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (para 78)—Compagnie maritime belge transports as well as, e.g. ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 56)—AKZO Chemie.

356

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 46 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La-Roche; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 110 in conjunction with fn. 465.

357

ECJ, Case 26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (para 17)—Metro I.

358

See, subject to repetition and approval of the results of the Commission, General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (paras 86, 93 et seq.)—Hilti.

359

See ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (paras 53 et seq.)—Michelin as well as, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 69 et seq.)—United Brands.

360

See Commission Decision 77/327/EEC, OJ 1977 L 117, p. 1 (8 et seq.)—A.B.G. ECJ, Case 77/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:141 (paras 18 et seq.)—BP Handelsmaatschappij overruled this decision on other grounds.

361

E.g. Commission Decision 88/501/EEC, OJ 1988 L 272, p. 27 (para 29, 36)—Tetra Pak I; 89/113/EEC, OJ 1989 L 43, p. 27 (paras 92 et seq.)—Decca Navigator System.

362

See ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 61)—AKZO Chemie.

363

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 59.

364

Not relying on size also as the determinative factor, ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 47 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

365

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 51 end)—Michelin: large capacity for new tyres which could be utilised to produce refurbished tyres.

366

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 61)—AKZO Chemie.

367

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 121/124)—United Brands; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 55)—Michelin.

368

See also ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 61)—AKZO Chemie.

369

Different result, ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 55 et seq.)—AKZO Chemie; however, correctly applying a restrictive approach, ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 46)—Hoffmann-La Roche; by contrast also in favour of indicative effect, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 114 end; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 107 and from Commission practice, e.g. Commission Decision 92/163/EEC, OJ 1992 L 72, p. 1 (para 101 (2))—Tetra Pak II.

370

Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 38; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 113; Wertheimer (1981), p. 173; Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 60.

371

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 99; Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 113.

372

See e.g. ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (paras 9 et seq.)—Commercial Solvents; Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 82/84 et seq.)—United Brands; Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 61)—AKZO Chemie; Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 93)—Hilti.

373

Accord, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 109 with additional citations from Commission practice.

374

Commission Decision 2000/74/EC, OJ 2000 L 30, p. 1 (paras 47, 92 et seq.)—Virgin Airways, whereby however abuse of demand-side power in relation to the provider of the respective services was not at issue, see Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 101 fn. 403.

375

Rose and Bailey (2013), para 10.041 with reference to the UKCAT.

376

Commission Decision COMP/38113, paras 88 et seq.—Prokent-Tomra.

377

See above para 1916.

378

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 75, 101; Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 127.

379

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 101 end; Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 128.

380

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 61.

381

See above para 1947.

382

See above para 1946.

383

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 68)—United Brands; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (paras 26 et seq.)—Michelin approves inclusion just as does the Commission, e.g. Commission Decision 2002/405/EC, OJ 2002 L 143, p. 1 (para 199)—Michelin.

384

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 115; against the inclusion of the market output test, Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 88 end.

385

Warning of this in relation to the foregoing, Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 109; completely rejecting this view, Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 4.

386

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 44)—Hoffmann-La-Roche; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 118; Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 118.

387

Drawing distinctions in detail, ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 69 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

388

See below para 2275 for low sales prices as well.

389

General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (paras 87, 93)—Hilti based on patents for bundled sale as well.

390

See above paras 1884 et seq.

391

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 121/124 et seq.)—United Brands; see also, e.g. Commission Decision 87/500/EEC, OJ 1987 L 286, p. 36 (para 18)—BBI/Boosey & Hawkes; 97/624/EC, OJ 1997 L 258, p. 1 (para 109)—Irish Sugar.

392

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 45/56, 121/124 et seq.)—United Brands; see also Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 59)—Michelin.

393

See ECJ, Case 13/60, ECLI:EU:C:1962:15—Ruhrkohlenverkaufskontore I re ECSC.

394

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 48 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche and/or Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 94/96)—United Brands.

395

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 117 citing Commission Decision 89/22/EEC, OJ 1989 L 10, p. 50 (paras 43, 117)—BPB Industries as well as 91/299/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 21 (paras 8 et seq.)—Soda/Solvay.

396

Against a market outcome test, Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 88 end.

397

See e.g. ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 88/93)—United Brands; see also General Court, Case T-69/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:39 (para 63)—RTE.

398

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 56, 61)—AKZO Chemie; General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 93)—Hilti.

399

See—also with regard to the foregoing—Commission Decision 91/299/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 21 (paras 12 et seq., in particular 45)—Soda/Solvay.

400

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 44)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

401

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 56, 61)—AKZO Chemie.

402

However, often asserted in earlier writings, Everling, In: Wohlfarth et al. (1960), Art. 86 paras 1 et seq.; Joliet (1969), 681 et seq.; Joliet (1970), p. 247 et seq.; see also Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 57 as well as Koch, In: Grabitz and Hilf (1986), Art. 86 para 46; however now contra Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 119 et seq.

403

See above paras 1 et seq.

404

See previously paras 1896 et seq.

405

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 166.

406

See e.g. ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 39)—TeliaSonera Sverige; General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 189)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

407

See e.g. ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 27)—LʼOréal; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 70)—Michelin; Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 69)—AKZO Chemie; Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 24)—Post Danmark, see ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 27)—Continental Can.

408

See above paras 8 et seq., 19 et seq. as well as paras 1805, 1824.

409

See fundamentally ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 23 et seq.)—Continental Can; similarly later, e.g. Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 125)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 29)—Michelin. Corresponding decisions of the Commission, e.g. Commission Decision 91/299/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 21 (para 50)—Soda/Solvay; 91/300/EEC, OJ 1991 L 152, p. 40 (para 53)—Soda/ICI. See generally above paras 13 et seq., 34 et seq.

410

Settled case law, since ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; see also Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 27)—L’Oréal; Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 69)—AKZO Chemie; Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 24)—Post Danmark; General Court, Case T-65/89, ECLI:EU:T:1993:31 (para 118)—BPB Industries and British Gypsum; from the literature, see e.g. Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 163.

411

See Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 184.

412

See above para 1816.

413

In this context, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 163 with additional citations; similarly Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 85; Mestmäcker (1995), p. 445 et seq.

414

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 57)—Michelin; Case C-202/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 (para 5)—France Télécom; Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 23)—Post Danmark.

415

General Court, Case T-259 inter alia/02, ECLI:EU:T:2006:396 (paras 205, 207 and 210)—Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich; Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 319)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

416

E.g. Emmerich, In: Dauses (2014), H. I. § 3 para 64 on price abuses; Mailänder, In: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 56; contrary view Focsaneanu (1977), p. 370 et seq.

417

Explicitly ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 27)—LʼOréal; Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 69)—AKZO Chemie; General Court, Case T-111/96, ECLI:EU:T:1998:183 (para 138)—ITT Promedia.

418

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 29)—Continental Can; General Court, Case T-65/89, ECLI:EU:T:1993:31 (para 70)—BPB Industries and British Gypsum; contrary view Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 120, in the case of the direct obstruction of competitors; contra Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 164.

419

Established case law ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 26)—Continental Can; see also e.g. Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (paras 32 et seq.)—Commercial Solvents.

420

See above paras 1866 et seq.

421

Follow-on to Koch, in: Grabitz and Hilf (1986), Art. 86 paras 51 et seq.; see e.g., Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 89 et seq.; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 168 et seq.; Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 163 et seq.; de Bronett, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 22 paras 38 et seq. (with regard to exploitative abuse and exclusionary abuse). Not relying on a fixed typology, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 173.

422

See ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 522 et seq.)—Suiker Unie.

423

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 182/183 et seq.)—United Brands; in detail, below paras 2208 et seq.

424

See ECJ, Case 26/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:150 (para 15/16)—General Motors Continental as well are recently, General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II; further discussion below, paras 2085 et seq.

425

For example, in Microsoft, see General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 665)—Microsoft I: Relying on Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. b) TFEU; Haslinger (2012), 675 applies the essential facilities doctrine.

426

See ECJ, Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52 (paras 46 et seq.)—GVL; for additional examples, see Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 174.

427

See above para 1994.

428

Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 52.

429

At most, Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. b)–d) TFEU are to be extended to exclusionary abuse, see e.g. Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 176 with additional citations in fn. 804.

430

E.g. Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 150; characterising exploitative abuse primarily as “price and terms abuse”, Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 144 et seq.

431

Petzold (2012), p. 151.

432

Additional discussion, Petzold (2012), p. 156 et seq.; contra Henk-Merten (2004), p. 52.

433

See immediately following para 2010.

434

Regarding such cases, below paras 2208 et seq.

435

Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 71.

436

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 191.

437

General significance, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 191; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 174; Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 154, 159.

438

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands.

439

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 17 paras 2 et seq.; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 168 contra Joliet (1970), p. 247 et seq.

440

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 191)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; ECJ, Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (paras 201 et seq.)—Deutsche Telekom; Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 42)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

441

See General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:173 (paras 332 et seq.)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; against general price regulation under Art. 102 TFEU Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 169.

442

Same opinion, Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 170.

443

In favour of cases of sovereign barriers and essential facilities, Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 171; ECJ, Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (paras 201 et seq.)—Deutsche Telekom; General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 187)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

444

Limited to such circumstances, Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 171.

445

Generally and only for a residual meaning as ultimo ratio in the case of very high barriers to market access, Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 172.

446

Petzold (2012), p. 154 citing Pozdnakova (2010), 133.

447

Petzold (2012), p. 154; Ackermann (2012), p. 357 et seq.

448

Setting the price is thus not enough because coercion is then lacking. In this context, the coercion criterion has the function of removing a mere stage of price fixing from the scope of Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. a) TFEU.

449

See e.g. ECJ, Case 26/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:150 (para 11/12)—General Motors Continental; Case C-242/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376 (para 39)—GT-Link.

450

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands.

451

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands.

452

See further critical aspects, including fundamental ones: Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 168 et seq., 174 et seq.

453

See Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 396 et seq.; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 176; further aspects in Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 164; Hoppmann (1988), p. 515 et seq.

454

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 196.

455

ECJ, Case C-159/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:188 (para 47)—Scippacercola.

456

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 144 et seq.

457

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands, where however, the same sentence required a comparison to prices for competing products as to fairness. For additional discussion, see below paras 2039 et seq.

458

See e.g. ECJ, Case C-340/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:281 (para 46)—TNT Traco.

459

Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 398 et seq.

460

Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 179 et seq.

461

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 28)—Post Danmark.

462

See e.g. ECJ, Case 110 inter alia/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:326 (paras 25 et seq.)—Lucazeau.

463

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands.

464

ECJ, Case C-395/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:319 (para 42)—Tournier; see however Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 155: Authority of a geographic market comparison concept; from the literature, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 195; Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 164.

465

ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 19)—Genova.

466

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands.

467

See ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 43)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen. Critical of officially-coerced price reductions and their long-term negative effects Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 176 et seq.

468

Accordingly critical Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 401; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 193.

469

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 144 et seq. however highlights the differences between EU and national treatment.

470

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (paras 332 et seq.)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

471

See ECJ, Case 15/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:114 (para 9)—Centrafarm; Case 53/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:472 (para 17)—Renault.

472

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 193 end; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 63.

473

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands.

474

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 192 end, with additional citations.

475

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 194.

476

Detailed discussion at paras 2246 et seq.

477

Cf. regarding to some extent uncertain determination of costs of production/provision, e.g. ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands. see above paras 2023 et seq.

478

For a more detailed discussion, e.g. Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 180 et seq.

479

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 248/257)—United Brands.

480

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 261/266)—United Brands; see by contrast ECJ, Case 226/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:421 (paras 25 et seq.)—British Leyland, where there was a sixfold difference compared to comparable services.

481

This may be used subject to consideration of differing labour costs. However, in reaction to this factor, production of labour-intensive products will be concentrated in countries with appropriate costs.

482

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 258/260)—United Brands: in some cases prices 100 % higher.

483

See e.g. ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 31)—Bodson.

484

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 155 end, citing the Micro Leader Business case.

485

ECJ, Case 395/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:319 (paras 40 et seq.)—Tournier; Case 110 inter alia/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:326 (paras 25 et seq.)—Lucazeau.

486

Regarding the burden of proof for undertakings, see Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 155.

487

More detailed discussion, see Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 200.

488

ECJ, Case 395/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:319 (paras 40 et seq.)—Tournier.

489

See above para 2010.

490

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 205.

491

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 182/183)—United Brands.

492

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 398/399 et seq.)—Suiker Unie; Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 152/160)—United Brands: no re-sales of unripe bananas and sale of ripe bananas only to retailers.

493

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 152/160)—United Brands.

494

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 184/194)—United Brands.

495

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 152/160)—United Brands; more recently, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (paras 18 et seq.)—Genova.

496

See ECJ, Case 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25 (paras 12/14 et seq.)—BRT/SABAM.

497

ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (paras 42 et seq.)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen.

498

See above para 2049.

499

ECJ, Case 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25 (paras 6/8 et seq.)—BRT/SABAM.

500

General Court, Case T-111/96, ECLI:EU:T:1998:183 (para 140)—ITT Promedia.

501

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 182/183)—United Brands.

502

See ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 398/399, 518 et seq.)—Suiker Unie; from the literature, e.g. Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 183; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 74.

503

ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (339)—Consten und Grundig.

504

Cf. however, Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 68.

505

In this context, see e.g. Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 210.

506

See Meessen, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Einführung para 131.

507

See, e.g. Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 214; Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 201.

508

ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 19)—Genova; Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 202; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 214 end.

509

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 214; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 194, 209.

510

511

General Court, Case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41 (para 23)—Tetra Pak I; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 204.

512

In favour, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 215.

513

See also, further discussion under paras 2203 et seq.

514

For additional discussion, see immediately following paras 2079 et seq.

515

Contrary view, see below at paras 2074 et seq.

516

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 225; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 216.

517

General Court, Case T-111/96, ECLI:EU:T:1998:183 (paras 60 et seq.)—ITT Promedia.

518

Referring in any event to this indirect effect or objective, Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 189; Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 349; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 para 212.

519

ECJ, Case 53/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:472 (para 16)—Renault; Case 238/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:477 (para 9)—Volvo/Veng; from the literature Eilmansberger (1992), 627.

520

Also in favour of permissibility, Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 47; rejecting this in the case of temporary consumer harm Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 212 end in conjunction with footnote 991; see also Joliet (1970), p. 244 et seq.

521

See above paras 2058 et seq.

522

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 213.

523

In the current context, Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 191; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 75.

524

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 213 in conjunction with fn. 999.

525

See above para 1507.

526

ECJ, Case C-6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents.

527

See Commission, Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy 1987, sub-section 85; cf. paras 2083 et seq. regarding the Microsoft case.

528

ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (paras 50 et seq.)—Magill.

529

Frenz (2012a), 1483 et seq. in relation to the following paragraphs as well.

530

ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 54)—Magill.

531

ECJ, Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (para 26)—CBEM.

532

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents.

533

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents.

534

See above paras 1520 et seq.

535

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18—Commercial Solvents; Case C-311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394—CBEM.

536

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 665)—Microsoft.

537

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II.

538

ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 56)—Magill.

539

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents; Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (para 25)—CBEM.

540

ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (para 38 end, however also paras 40 et seq.)—Bronner.

541

See above paras 1515 et seq.

542

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 593)—Microsoft.

543

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II.

544

Leupold and Pautke (2005), 111 view them as melting away citing ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (paras 34 et seq.)—Bronner. However, this contains repercussions based on a monopolistic delivery system on the daily newspaper market. By contrast, still relying on this, Stopper (2005), 102 et seq. with regard to the ruling in Microsoft.

545

See US v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F 3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Stopper (2005), 101 in conjunction with fn. 83.

546

Ensthaler and Kempel (2010), 1113. Further discussion of the topic as a whole, Beckmerhagen (2002); Hohmann (2001), and Shin (2003).

547

Körber (2012), 765 et seq.

548

Recently, Haslinger (2012), 675 as well as comprehensive discussion in Naue (2012), passim; contra Heutz (2010), p. 177 et seq.

549

Stopper (2005), 100 et seq. citing Körber (2004a), 885 et seq.; Wirtz and Holzhäuser (2004), 685 et seq.

550

Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 28 para 131, 57 in conjunction with fn. 100 against the IMS Health decision, Commission Decision 2002/165/EC, OJ 2002 L 59, p. 18—NDC Health/IMS HEALTH.

551

For additional discussion, see below paras 2086 et seq.

552

ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 54)—Magill. For additional discussion, see above para 2068.

553

ECJ, Case 53/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:472 (paras 15 et seq.)—Renault; Case 238/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:477 (paras 8 et seq.)—Volvo/Veng.

554

ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 56)—Magill.

555

Distinction since ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (345)—Consten und Grundig; see also Cases C-92 and 326/92, ECLI:EU:C:1993:847 (para 22)—Phil Collins; further discussion Jaglarz (2012), p. 31 et seq. with additional citations.

556

ECJ, Case C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 50)—Magill.

557

ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (paras 40 et seq.)—Bronner.

558

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II.

559

ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257 (paras 28 et seq.)—IMS Health.

560

ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257 (para 44)—IMS Health; critical and opposed Jakobs (2012), p. 142, 158 et seq.

561

Also critical Wirtz and Holzhäuser (2004), 689.

562

Leupold and Pautke (2005), 112 citing AG Tizzano, ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:537 (para 62)—IMS Health.

563

Leupold and Pautke (2005), 111; see also Höppner (2004), 751 et seq., who views the opening of a dominated market as a case of the application of the essential facilities doctrine.

564

See above paras 2058 et seq.

565

See e.g. ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 39)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

566

See Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792—Microsoft; summary provided in Zimmerlich (2004), 1260.

567

Berg (2005), 55; without a more detailed evaluation, General Court (President), Case T-201/04 R, ECLI:EU:T:2004:372 (para 27)—Microsoft I.

568

Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (paras 693 et seq.)—Microsoft.

569

Previously recognised by the Commission, Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (para 547)—Microsoft.

570

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 319)—Microsoft.

571

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 334)—Microsoft; ignored by Ensthaler and Kempel (2010), 1113.

572

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 332 et seq.)—Microsoft; see also Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II citing ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257 (para 38)—IMS Health.

573

Other view, Naue (2012), p. 212 in conjunction with fn. 684.

574

Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (paras 560 et seq., 712, 783)—Microsoft; analysed by the General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 705 et seq.)—Microsoft.

575

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 647 et seq.)—Microsoft; further discussion Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (paras 693 et seq.)—Microsoft.

576

Naue (2012), p. 216.

577

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 664)—Microsoft.

578

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 593)—Microsoft.

579

See General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 374 et seq.)—Microsoft.

580

See Weidenbach et al. (2012), 66 et seq.

581

Classic view, ECJ, Case 238/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:477—Volvo/Veng; as well as Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257—IMS Health.

582

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 369)—Microsoft.

583

Weidenbach et al. (2012), 73.

584

ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (paras 40 et seq.)—Bronner.

585

Weidenbach et al. (2012), 73.

586

Körber (2012), 765 et seq.

587

Summarising, Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (paras 783 et seq.)—Microsoft.

588

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 688)—Microsoft.

589

ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 50)—Magill.

590

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 689 et seq.)—Microsoft.

591

Summarising, General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 711)—Microsoft.

592

As part of summary proceedings, the arguments from General Court (President), Case T-201/04 R, ECLI:EU:T:2004:372 (para 44)—Microsoft were not rejected as prima facie without justification, so that the need to suspend a decision by the Commission could be credibly asserted; however, it failed due to a lack of urgency and irreparable damages.

593

See above paras 1819 et seq.

594

Wielsch (2005), 396; with regard to the ruling in IMS Health von Welser (2004), 315.

595

Thus warning of a curtailment in protection of intellectual property, Schwarze (2002), 81.

596

Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (para 562)—Microsoft.

597

Detailed discussion, Leupold and Pautke (2005), 114 et seq.

598

This also applies in the case of a compulsory license, Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792, (Art. 5 (a))—Microsoft.

599

ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 19)—Genova; General Court, Case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41 (para 23)—Tetra Pak I.

600

Körber (2004a), 889.

601

Haslinger (2012), 675.

602

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 142)—Microsoft II.

603

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (paras 143 et seq.)—Microsoft II.

604

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 217; see basis decisions, ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 398/399)—Suiker Unie; Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 182/183)—United Brands; however, no longer explicitly referred to later by Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 194 et seq.

605

Cf. above at para 2058.

606

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 334)—Microsoft.

607

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 593)—Microsoft.

608

For example in the case of P&I-Clubs-Pooling Agreement (Commission Decision IV./D-1/30.373, OJ 1999 L 125, p. 12) in which “the difficulties in applying Art. 102 TFEU as an instrument to cover insufficiently satisfied demand segments” was shown, see, e.g. Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 196.

609

E.g. Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 225; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 220.

610

See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 85 et seq.)—United Brands for Chiquita bananas.

611

Explicitly referring to this, ECJ, Case 126/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:136 (para 24)—Salonia referring to the prohibition on discrimination set out in Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. c) EC.

612

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 184/194)—United Brands.

613

See ECJ, Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52 (paras 54 et seq.)—GVL.

614

Commission Decision COMP/C.37.685—GVG/FS.

615

See below para 2210.

616

Making a distinction based on product-related grounds, Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 196; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 221.

617

Considering various categories of abuse by objective, Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 178.

618

ECJ, Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52 (paras 56 et seq.)—GVL.

619

ECJ, Cases C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (para 60)—Deutsche Post also in relationship to Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 182/183)—United Brands.

620

Detailed discussion regarding the following, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 222 et seq.

621

For (green) bananas, ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 130 et seq.)—United Brands.

622

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 398/399)—Suiker Unie.

623

ECJ, Case 41/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:120 (para 26)—Italy/Commission.

624

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 152/160)—United Brands.

625

ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (para 51)—Almelo.

626

Commission Decision 97/624/EC, OJ 1997 L 258, p. 1 (paras 120 et seq.)—Irish Sugar with additional variations.

627

ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (para 44)—Almelo and Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 89)—Hoffmann-La Roche; see also Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 149)—AKZO Chemie.

628

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 526/527)—Suiker Unie. Regarding the following discussion, see Frenz (2013d), 222 et seq.

629

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 89)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

630

Detailed discussion in ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 105 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

631

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (paras 90 et seq.)—Hoffmann-La Roche with additional details.

632

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (paras 72 et seq.)—Michelin.

633

General Court, Case T-203/01, ECLI:EU:T:2003:250 (para 111)—Michelin.

634

Commission Decision COMP/E-2/36.041/PO, OJ 2002 L 143, p. 1 (paras 218 et seq.)—Michelin II; Wurmnest (2012), p. 584.

635

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (paras 75 et seq.)—Michelin.

636

Paul (2008), p. 222 et seq.

637

Wurmnest (2012), p. 540 et seq., 570.

638

639

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 90)—Hoffmann-La Roche; later, see also, e.g. Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 84)—British Airways.

640

Wurmnest (2012), p. 585; voicing doubt, Paul (2008), p. 222 et seq.

641

Wurmnest (2012), p. 549 et seq., 571.

642

See most recently, ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 29)—Post Danmark.

643

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

644

General Court, Case T-65/89, ECLI:EU:T:1993:31 (para 120)—BPB Industries and British Gypsum.

645

Wurmnest (2012), p. 577 in conjunction with fn. 275 citing Commission Decision IV/29.020, OJ 1976 L 223, p. 27 (para 12)—Vitamins.

646

Explicitly ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 68)—British Airways.

647

General Court, Case T-203/01, ECLI:EU:T:2003:250 (para 241)—Michelin.

648

AG Kokott, ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:133 (paras 75 et seq.)—British Airways; Wurmnest (2012), p. 579 in conjunction with fn. 287.

649

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (paras 75 et seq.)—British Airways.

650

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (paras 73 et seq.)—British Airways.

651

Wurmnest (2012), p. 581 et seq.

652

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 86)—British Airways.

653

Wurmnest (2012), p. 587.

654

655

Accordingly, specifics added by the case law decided thereunder, suggestion by Bien and Rummel (2012), 740.

656

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 42)—Post Danmark; see also Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 30, 4th indent).

657

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 30, 2nd indent).

658

ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 (paras 80 et seq.)—Tomra.

659

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (paras 23 et seq.).

660

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 45). In favour of only “limited weight”, see also Fuchs (2011), p. 263.

661

Bien and Rummel (2012), 740 citing AG Mazák, ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:55 (para 15)—Tomra.

662

Bien and Rummel (2012), 740 citing Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.990—Intel.

663

Bien and Rummel (2012), 740.

664

ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 (para 42)—Tomra; approving Bien and Rummel (2012), 740.

665

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (paras 41 et seq.)

666

Wurmnest (2012), p. 596; similar Barthelmeß (2010), 120.

667

See Wurmnest (2012), p. 597 as well as General Court, Case T-155/06, ECLI:EU:T:2010:370 (paras 238 et seq.)—Tomra.

668

Rose and Bailey (2013), para 10.092.

669

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 486)—Suiker Unie.

670

Commission Decision 71/224/EEC, OJ 1971 L 134, p. 15 (22 et seq.)—GEMA.

671

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 226, citing inter alia Commission Decision 89/113/EEC, OJ 1989 L 43, p. 27 (paras 40 et seq., 100 et seq.)—Decca Navigator System; cf. regarding statutory efforts by the Member States, Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 201 et seq.

672

See below paras 2304 et seq.

673

For additional discussion, see above paras 2116 et seq.

674

Stating this position, Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 102 AEUV para 56 in conjunction with fn. 164.

675

See above paras 2058 et seq.

676

See above paras 2001 et seq.

677

Commission Decision 87/359/EEC, OJ 1987 L 194, p. 28—Tariff preferences in air and maritime transport in Spain; see also ECJ, Case C-18/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:195 (para 17)—Corsica Ferries I: Reduced fees only for domestic ships.

678

Tending in this direction Epiney, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 18 AEUV para 44; Mohn (1990), p. 30 et seq.

679

See ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 11)—Genova; in general, Zuleeg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2003), Art. 12 EG para 18.

680

In favour of the application of the general clause in conjunction with Art. 18 TFEU and Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. c) TFEU, Commission Decision 81/1030/EEC, OJ 1981 L 370, p. 49 (para 48)—GVL; without opinion, however ECJ, Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52 (para 58)—GVL.

681

See above paras 2043 et seq., 2051 et seq., 2054 et seq., 2066.

682

See above para 2041.

683

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 227/233)—United Brands.

684

See above paras 2041 et seq.; as well as in this context, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 246; Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 170; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 379 end.

685

Illustrated in ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 227/233)—United Brands.

686

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 250 in relation Siragusa (1979), 184 et seq.; Steindorff (1981), 438; Wertheimer (1981), p. 189.

687

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 227/233)—United Brands.

688

General Court, Case T-229/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:155 (paras 86 et seq.)—Deutsche Bahn with additional aspects.

689

ECJ, Case C-323/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:368 (para 26)—La Crespelle for import products at a specific import price.

690

See above paras 2140 et seq.

691

Viewing this as a decisive indicator, ECJ, Case 40/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:18 (para 17)—Sirena; Case 78/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:59 (para 19)—Deutsche Grammophon in the more recent decisions cited, commencing with United Brands, the substantive justification of price differences had already been established as basic criterion, as is illustrated in the Deutsche Bahn decision in particular.

692

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 96)—Hoffmann-La Roche; detailed discussion above, paras 2116 et seq.

693

Detailed discussion, General Court, Case T-83/91, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246 (paras 185 et seq.)—Tetra Pak II.

694

ECJ, Case 77/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:141 (para 29/34)—BP Handelsmaatschappij.

695

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 227/233)—United Brands.

696

See Emmerich, In: Dauses (2014), H. I. § 3 para 109; Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 421; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 241; with regard to the general clause, see Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 65; other view only in the context of a requirement of equal treatment, Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 217 citing the ruling in AKZO.

697

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 241.

698

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 219; limiting its statement to such an extent, ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 119 et seq.)—AKZO Chemie. The actual transaction was the same however. Accordingly, what is involved is the question of dissimilar treatment of different addressees which must be substantively justified. This illustrates the closeness of the relationship between the dissimilar treatment of equivalent transactions and similar treatment of dissimilar transactions. However, a requirement of equality of treatment is beyond dispute.

699

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 211.

700

See above paras 2140 et seq.

701

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 211.

702

Prevailing opinion, e.g. in addition to Bunte Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 421; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 243; similar on this topic, Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 85; only from the perspective of the dominant undertaking, Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 379 likewise; Koch, In: Grabitz and Hilf (1986), Art. 86 para 67.

703

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 244.

704

Commission Decision 71/224/EEC, OJ 1971 L 134, p. 15 (26)—GEMA.

705

See above paras 2018 et seq.

706

Exemplary, General Court, Case T-229/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:155 (paras 87 et seq.)—Deutsche Bahn with a more detailed cost calculation.

707

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 211 end.

708

E.g. in favour of a break-down of different transportation costs, Commission Decision 76/353/EEC, OJ 1976 L 95, p. 1 (14)—United Brands; in favour of inclusion in general, ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 227/233)—United Brands.

709

See above paras 2020 et seq.

710

ECJ, Case T-504/93, ECLI:EU:T:1997:84 (paras 124, 128 et seq.)—Tiercé Ladbroke; from the literature, Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 212; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 89; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 246.

711

See above para 2036 as well as 2030.

712

See Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 426 et seq.

713

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 212 end.

714

See Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 457 et seq.

715

Regarding such a case, Commission Decision 88/518/EEC, OJ 1988 L 284, p. 41 (paras 33 et seq.)—Napier Brown/British Sugar; classified as above, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 251.

716

Commission Decision 81/1030/EEC, OJ 1981 L 370, p. 49 (55 et seq.)—GVL; contra Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 208.

717

Correctly so, Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 102 AEUV para 56; see also Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 421.

718

See, e.g. Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 422 et seq.; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 376; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 242.

719

E.g. Deselaers, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 422 et seq.; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 376.

720

See Commission Decision COMP/38.745, WuW 2005, 455 (para 93)—BdKEP/Deutsche Post and Germany; contra Petzold (2012), p. 162 et seq.

721

In the instant context, see ECJ, Cases C-468–478/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:504 (para 49)—GlaxoSmithKline; General Court, Case T-301/04, ECLI:EU:T:2009:317 (para 156)—Clearstream.

722

In the instant context, see General Court, Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 (paras 150 et seq.)—Irish Sugar.

723

In this context, Petzold (2012), p. 163 et seq.

724

Contra, ECJ, Case C-242/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376 (para 41)—GT-Link.

725

Contra, General Court, Case T-301/04, ECLI:EU:T:2009:317 (paras 156 et seq.)—Clearstream.

726

Ostendorf and Grün (2008), 956 et seq.; de Bronett, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 22 para 70 end; Henk-Merten (2004), p. 92; Petzold (2012), p. 165 et seq.

727

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 165.

728

In general, ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 234)—United Brands.

729

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 208; critical Petzold (2012), p. 160.

730

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 525)—Suiker Unie.

731

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 208; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 86.

732

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 170; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 248.

733

Commission Decision 81/1030/EEC, OJ 1981 L 370, p. 49 (paras 49 et seq.)—GVL; cf. Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 170 in fn. 538; earlier critical, Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 92; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 69; approving by contrast Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 248.

734

Petzold (2012), p. 159 et seq.

735

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 145)—British Airways; see also General Court, Case T-301/04, ECLI:EU:T:2009:317 (paras 192 et seq.)—Clearstream.

736

See by contrast ECJ, Case C-18/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:195 (para 43)—Corsica Ferries I; General Court, Case T-83/91, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246 (paras 160 et seq.)—Tetra Pak II.

737

See Petzold (2012), p. 161 citing Commission Decision COMP/38.745 (para 95) with further citations—BdKEP/Deutsche Post and Germany.

738

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 261 with relevant examples, see also para 263; list as well in Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 222 et seq.

739

Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 275.

740

See General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 860 et seq.)—Microsoft; from the literature Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 157 et seq.

741

E.g. de Bronett, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 22 paras 79 et seq., Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 219; Emmerich, In: Dauses (2014), H. I. § 3 para 114; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 94; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 70; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 249; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 255.

742

This according to the widely-accepted definition as a distinction from the “supplementary transaction”, e.g. Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 275; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 256; referring to a first and second transaction Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 95.

743

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 158.

744

ECJ, Case C-311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (para 26)—CBEM; different approach Commission Decision 88/589/EEC, OJ 1988 L 317, p. 47 (para 31)—London European/SABENA.

745

Regarding a refusal to supply in general, see below paras 2203 et seq. as well as above 2060, 2066, 2068 et seq. in the context of Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. a) TFEU. In any event, production or sales, as applicable, is limited as well if indispensable goods or services cannot be purchased.

746

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 257.

747

Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 96; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 70.

748

Likely also Nagel (1992), p. 89 et seq.

749

See also Siragusa (1977), p. 398 et seq. Contrary to prevailing opinion, e.g. Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 195; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 257.

750

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 257.

751

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 256.

752

See also Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 158: De facto condition.

753

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 111)—Hoffmann-La Roche: Loss of a rebate if supplementary goods/services not purchased; cased discussed by Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 158.

754

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 111)—Hoffmann-La Roche; from the literature Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 158 et seq.

755

See above paras 1907 et seq.

756

Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 95. Cf. also Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 157 end, who emphasises the objectives of the dominant undertaking.

757

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 196; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 281; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 258; more liberal, Siragusa (1977), p. 410 et seq.; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 159: Factual relationship and commercial practice as definitional criteria; however these are elements justifying bundling without defining the concept from the outset.

758

ECJ, Case C-333/94 P, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 (para 36)—Tetra Pak building on the considerations set out in General Court, Case T-83/91, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246 (para 138)—Tetra Pak II.

759

General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (paras 66 et seq.)—Hilti; affirmed by the ECJ, Case C-53/92 P, ECLI:EU:C:1994:77 (paras 11 et seq.)—Hilti.

760

See, e.g. Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 258.

761

In favour of permissibility in principle Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 163.

762

Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (paras 800 et seq.)—Microsoft on the basis of a so-called separate demand test; General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 859)—Microsoft.

763

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 162.

764

See above paras 2051 et seq.

765

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 197; similar, Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 95: reasonable grounds; still further Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 70: any substantive reason.

766

De Bronett, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 22 para 82: “inseparably integrated system” of primary and supplemental transaction; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 259.

767

General Court, Case T-83/91, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246 (para 82)—Tetra Pak II; approved in ECJ, Case C-333/94 P, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 (paras 36 et seq.)—Tetra Pak.

768

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 261 citing Commission, 19th Report on Competition Policy 1989, sub-section 62.

769

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 163.

770

Such that there is no integrated product, see above para 2183.

771

Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792 (para 402)—Microsoft.

772

Stopper (2005), 106 et seq.; same conclusion Körber (2004b), 575.

773

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 197.

774

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 940)—Microsoft.

775

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 229 end; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 95; contrary view Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 70.

776

See above paras 1998 et seq., 2111.

777

See only Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 247 et seq.; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 275; see however the traditional commentary by contrast, e.g. Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 190 et seq.

778

See above para 2163.

779

See above paras 2069 et seq.

780

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 25 et seq.)—Continental Can.

781

See Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 271 et seq. However, different break-down by Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 221 et seq.

782

See above paras 2136 et seq.; addressing this topic in more detail, ECJ, Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52 (paras 54 et seq.)—GVL supported by the general clause so that an examination under Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. c) EC was viewed as superfluous following this decision and by contrast applicability was not denied.

783

General opinion, e.g. Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 375; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 272 as well as reliance on the Commission AG Mayras, ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:78 (sub-section 398 et seq.)—Suiker Unie.

784

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 125)—Hoffmann-La Roche. Also to this effect, Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 169.

785

See above para 1822.

786

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 247; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 271; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 375, however, arguing in favour of a liberal standard.

787

See by contrast Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 69.

788

Assuming an infringement of the general clause to such an extent, ECJ, Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52 (paras 56 et seq.)—GVL.

789

See General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 665)—Microsoft.

790

See above paras 2071 et seq., 2077 et seq.

791

See, e.g. Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 248 et seq.; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 273 et seq.

792

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (paras 182 et seq.)—United Brands.

793

ECJ, Cases C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (paras 59 et seq.)—Deutsche Post.

794

ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 54)—Magill. Detailed discussion above at paras 2069, 2072, 2077 et seq.

795

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 665)—Microsoft; detailed discussion above paras 2083 et seq.

796

See above para 2071.

797

See Leupold and Pautke (2005), 109, 111.

798

In favour of the broadcast of advertisements, ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (para 17)—Sacchi, even if apparent only in approach; Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (para 26)—CBEM regarding linking access to broadcast times to contracts with an undertaking affiliated with the dominant undertaking; see above paras 2068, 2174.

799

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 273; Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 179 et seq., 182.

800

See e.g. ECJ, Case 36/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140 (para 16/19)—Walrave; Case C-415/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463 (paras 82 et seq.)—Bosman; detailed discussion Frenz (2012b), paras 347 et seq.

801

See, e.g. Commission Decision 94/19/EC, OJ 1994 L 15, p. 8 (paras 61 et seq.)—Sea Containers/Stena Sealink; 94/119/EC, OJ 1994 L 55, p. 52 (paras 10 et seq.)—Rødby harbour.

802

See, e.g. Commission Decision COMP/C.37.685—GVG/FS.

803

Körber (2004a), 885 et seq.; Stopper (2005), 100 et seq.; Wirtz and Holzhäuser (2004), 683 (685 et seq.).

804

Detailed discussion above at para 2074.

805

Regarding this discussion and the factual background with additional citations Frenz (2002), 307 et seq.

806

See Frenz (2014), 282 et seq.

807

Naue (2012), p. 218.

808

Naue (2012), p. 218.

809

Baxter (1966), 273 et seq.

810

Naue (2012), p. 165.

811

Mennicke (1996), 646 et seq., 659; Ridyard (1996), 445; current Naue (2012), p. 166.

812

Naue (2012), p. 219 criticising the ruling in Microsoft, General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 643 et seq.)—Microsoft; further discussion above paras 2083 et seq.

813

ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (paras 64 et seq.)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.

814

Naue (2012), p. 221.

815

Naue (2012), p. 221.

816

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 125)—Hoffmann-La Roche; General Court, Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 (para 232)—Irish Sugar.

817

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 664)—Microsoft.

818

ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257 (para 38)—IMS Health.

819

See ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 125)—Hoffmann-La Roche: Examination of an impairment of competition and the restriction of trade between Member States.

820

Most recently General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II.

821

Naue (2012), p. 223 et seq.

822

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II citing ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257 (para 38)—IMS Health.

823

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 561)—Microsoft.

824

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 593)—Microsoft.

825

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 334)—Microsoft; from the literature Weidenbach et al. (2012), 74; Körber (2007), 1213 as well as Leistner (2005), 150 et seq.

826

Weidenbach et al. (2012), 70 et seq.

827

Körber (2012), 765 et seq.

828

Körber (2012), 766 citing ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (para 41)—Bronner, however without this case being explicitly based on the essential facilities doctrine; rather it falls in line with cases decided under Art. 102 sent. 2 alt. b) TFEU in keeping with the most recent ruling in Microsoft (General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II). Reference is made there to the ruling in IMS Health (Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257) which Körber assigns to the essential facilities doctrine ((2012), 765 fn. 62).

829

Körber (2012), 766 with additional citations.

830

Detailed discussion, Körber (2012), 766 et seq.

831

See above paras 2078 et seq.

832

For a detailed discussion, see Frenz (2013c), paras 1226 et seq.

833

Cf. General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 333)—Microsoft.

834

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 29).

835

Cf. OLG Koblenz, ruling of 2 March 2006, U 799/05 Kart (para 46)—bottle wholesaling on the parallels §§ 19, 20 GWB.

836

Weidenbach et al. (2012), 70 citing General Court, Case T-203/01, ECLI:EU:T:2003:250 (para 54)—Michelin.

837

Cf. fundamental decision, ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (339)—Consten und Grundig: Inclusion of competition with third parties due to potential harm to consumers.

838

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 286.

839

See above para 2070.

840

Cf. BGH, WRP 2008, 823 (829 et seq.)—Soda Club II.

841

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 29) citing General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (paras 118 et seq.)—Hilti; Case T-83/91, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246 (paras 83 et seq., 138)—Tetra Pak II.

842

Cf. OVG Lüneburg, NJW 2003, 531.

843

Commission Decision 88/589/EEC, OJ 1988 L 317, p. 47 (para 26)—London European/SABENA; 92/213/EEC, OJ 1992 L 96, p. 34 (paras 24 et seq.)—British Midland/Aer Lingus.

844

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 142)—Microsoft II.

845

Accordingly, within limits Weidenbach et al. (2012), 74 et seq.

846

See also rejecting this view, BGH, WRP 2008, 823 (829 et seq.)—Soda Club II.

847

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 29).

848

See above in relation to access to power transmission lines, Frenz (2012c), 191 et seq. The considerations developed there will be presented below in general terms.

849

Commission Decision of 18 December 2013, COMP/39678 inter alia OJ 2014 C 86, p. 4—Deutsche Bahn I/II.

850

ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (paras 55 et seq.)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

851

Most recently, ECJ, Case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062 (paras 75, 96)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 56)—TeliaSonera Sverige. See below paras 2247 et seq.

852

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 181)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España assessing the ruling in ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569—Bronner.

853

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (paras 319 et seq.)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; see ECJ, Case T-259 inter alia/02, ECLI:EU:T:2006:396 (paras 205, 207 and 210)—Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich.

854

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (paras 323 et seq.)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

855

See above paras 2014, 2032.

856

Detailed discussion in General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (paras 332 et seq.)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España with additional aspects.

857

See above paras 2133 et seq.

858

Opposed to the classification presented here, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 301.

859

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 482 et seq.)—Suiker Unie.

860

ECJ, Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (para 10)—Alsatel.

861

Regarding rebate systems, Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 247 et seq.

862

Cf. above at paras 1812 et seq.

863

See fundamentally ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche; later, e.g. Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 27)—L’Oréal; Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 70)—Michelin.

864

Regarding the following discussion, see Frenz (2013a), 60 et seq.

865

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 70 following the ruling in Hoffmann-La Roche at para 69)—AKZO Chemie.

866

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 199, 190.

867

See ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 42)—TeliaSonera Sverige; Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 201)—Deutsche Telekom.

868

See Petzold (2012), p. 131 et seq.

869

However, in favour, Petzold (2012), p. 120 et seq., providing a summary at p. 150; Hoffmann (2003), 1282; other view Lommler (2011), 249.

870

Similarly, Petzold (2012), p. 156 et seq.; by contrast in favour of including the obstructive effect on the downstream market, Henk-Merten (2004), p. 52.

871

See Commission Communication—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 80).

872

Petzold (2012), p. 180 et seq. with additional aspects.

873

ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569—Bronner; see paras 2072, 2092.

874

ECJ, Case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062 (para 75, 96)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

875

See General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 187)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

876

Ostendorf and Grün (2008), 956 et seq.; de Bronett, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 22 para 70; by contrast, in favour of a group privilege Henk-Merten (2004), p. 92.

877

Petzold (2012), p. 166 who accordingly detours to predatory pricing.

878

ECJ, Case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062 (paras 75, 96, 150)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (paras 55 et seq.)—TeliaSonera Sverige; Maritzen and Ondrejka (2011), 729.

879

Case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

880

Petzold (2012), p. 124.

881

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 187)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; citing inter alia ECJ, Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 169)—Deutsche Telekom.

882

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 189)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

883

See ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (paras 39 et seq.)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

884

See, e.g. Petzold (2012), p. 100.

885

See Künzler (2008), p. 458 et seq.

886

This threatens to overshadow as as-efficient competitor test, Fuchs (2011), p. 254 et seq. who does not accept a “safe harbour” and only accepts an indicative function (p. 259 et seq.).

887

See the exceptional circumstances in General Court, Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (paras 134, 149)—Compagnie Maritime Belge.

888

Petzold (2012), p. 102.

889

ECJ, Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 201)—Deutsche Telekom; Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 42)—TeliaSonera Sverige as well as, General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 191)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

890

Künzler (2008), p. 459; Petzold (2012), p. 102 with additional citations.

891

See above paras 1812 et seq.

892

ECJ, Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 202)—Deutsche Telekom as well as ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 44)—TeliaSonera Sverige and currently, General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 192)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

893

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 192)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España as well as paras 268, 270 regarding sufficient potential anti-competitive effect and the special responsibility for ensuring that effective and distortion-free competition is not affected in the Internal Market; see, e.g. ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 64)—TeliaSonera Sverige as well as Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 176)—Deutsche Telekom.

894

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (para 181)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España assessing the ruling in ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569—Bronner.

895

ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (paras 55 et seq.)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

896

897

Petzold (2012), p. 103.

898

Further discussion, Petzold (2012), p. 104 et seq. with additional citations, inter alia, contra Schuhmacher (2011), p. 332, who from the outset does not want to include mere losses in monopoly profits even though they are unreasonable from a purely economic standpoint and, at most, conform to the special responsibility of the dominant undertaking.

899

General Court, Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (paras 319 et seq.)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España.

900

See ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (paras 69, 84 et seq., 107)—British Airways; Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 75)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

901

See above paras 2085 et seq. regarding General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II.

902

Regarding its rejection, above paras 70 et seq.

903

However, tending in this direction Maritzen and Ondrejka (2011), 730 et seq.; generally dismissive, below paras 2354 et seq.

904

Petzold (2012), p. 112 et seq., 115.

905

ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 75)—TeliaSonera Sverige; Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 86)—British Airways.

906

907

Petzold (2012), p. 115.

908

Regarding the following discussion, see Frenz (2013b), 150 et seq.

909

Cf. above at paras 2113 et seq.

910

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 71)—AKZO Chemie; see also Case C-550/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:512—Akzo Nobel.

911

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 71)—AKZO Chemie.

912

Detailed discussion in ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 94 et seq.)—AKZO Chemie.

913

Commission Decision COMP/38.233 (paras 45 et seq.)—Wanadoo Interactive; Wurmnest (2012), p. 449 et seq. also citing DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, December 2005, paras 106 et seq. (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf).

914

Schuhmacher (2007), 364. For a detailed discussion, see Wurmnest (2012), p. 392 et seq.

915

See ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 33)—Post Danmark.

916

Only then as well, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (paras 26 et seq.)

917

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (paras 64 et seq.) subject to consideration not only of average avoidable costs, but rather also prices above them; further discussion on the profit sacrifice concept, Wurmnest (2012), p. 360 et seq.

918

Most recently, ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 30)—Post Danmark; Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 26). See Commission Decision COMP/38.233 (para 75)—Wanadoo Interactive.

919

ECJ, Case C-550/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:512—Akzo Nobel; General Court, Case T-83/91, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246 (para 147)—Tetra Pak II in relation to ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 184/189)—United Brands.

920

ECJ, Case C-333/94 P, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 (para 41)—Tetra Pak.

921

Also based on this consideration, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 24).

922

More detailed discussion, with additional citations Wurmnest (2012), p. 396 et seq., 471; but see also Zimmer and Paul (2008), 620.

923

Likewise, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 64) views this as “mostly a clear point of reference”.

924

See ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (paras 37 et seq.)—Post Danmark: losses unsustainable by competitors over the long term.

925

Presupposed in ECJ, Case C-202/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 (para 36, 111)—France Télécom; explicitly, General Court, Case T-340/03, ECLI:EU:T:2007:22 (para 130)—France Télécom; analysed in Wurmnest (2012), p. 472.

926

Eilmansberger, In: Bornkamm et al. (2015), Art. 82 EG para 527.

927

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 29).

928

See ECJ, Case C-395 and 396/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132 (paras 119 et seq.)—Compagnie maritime belge transports.

929

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 72)—AKZO Chemie; Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 27, 29 end)—Post Danmark.

930

Wurmnest (2012), p. 447 citing Commission Decision IV/30.698, OJ 1985 L 374, p. 1 (para 77)—AKZO.

931

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 22)—Post Danmark in reference to ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 43)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

932

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 66).

933

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 65).

934

See above para 2260.

935

See below para 2356.

936

See Commission Decision 83/462/EEC, OJ 1983 L 252, p. 13 (para 30)—ECS/AKZO—interim measures; in general, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 304 citing the recovery of costs principle set out in the since expired Art. 3 alt. c) ECSC.

937

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents; similarly, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 45)—AKZO Chemie.

938

See Commission Decision COMP/35.141, OJ 2001 L 125, 27—Deutsche Post AG I; further discussion, Najork (2004), p. 20 et seq.

939

Wurmnest (2012), p. 454; see also ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (paras 31 et seq.)—Post Danmark.

940

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 73).

941

General Court, Case T-83/91, ECLI:EU:T:1994:246 (para 151)—Tetra Pak II: Sales at a loss over four years with prices between 10 and 34 % below purchase prices.

942

Commission Decision 83/462/EEC, OJ 1983 L 252, p. 13 (paras 30 et seq.)—ECS/AKZO—interim measures; 85/609/EEC, OJ 1985 L 374, p. 1 (paras 80 et seq.)—AKZO; summarised by Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 311.

943

Sufficient based on ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 72, 79 et seq.)—AZKO Chemie and based on the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 66).

944

Accordingly negative, Wurmnest (2012), p. 455.

945

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 69).

946

See, e.g. Commission Decision COMP/38.233 (paras 125 et seq., 291)—Wanadoo Interactive.

947

This is the case in “combination scenarios” (Wurmnest (2012), p. 465 et seq.) Hilti (Commission Decision 88/138/EEC, OJ 1988 L 65, p. 19 (para 81)—Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti) and Irish Sugar (see General Court, Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 (para 108)—Irish Sugar).

948

This is the case where there is only a single competitor who is merely competitive via a cheaper price, ECJ, Cases C-395 and 396/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132 (paras 115 et seq.)—Compagnie maritime belge transports; to such an extent, see also Wurmnest (2012), p. 464.

949

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 68)—British Airways.

950

See General Court, Case T-203/01, ECLI:EU:T:2003:250 (para 241)—Michelin.

951

AG Kokott, ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:133 (paras 75 et seq.)—British Airways.

952

Wurmnest (2012), p. 579 in conjunction with fn. 287.

953

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 75)—British Airways.

954

ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 (para 80, 91)—Hoffmann-La Roche. See above paras 2116 et seq.

955

Wurmnest (2012), p. 577 citing, General Court, Case T-65/89, ECLI:EU:T:1993:31 (para 120)—BPB Industries and British Gypsum.

956

See most recently, ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 (para 71, 79)—Tomra.

957

ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 (para 72)—Tomra.

958

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (paras 23 et seq., 45; discussed further by Wurmnest (2012), p. 592 et seq.

959

Accordingly, where no predatory intent may be proved as was the case in ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 29)—Post Danmark.

960

See General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 100)—Hilti.

961

General Court, Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 (para 185)—Irish Sugar.

962

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 69).

963

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 44)—Post Danmark.

964

Wurmnest (2012), p. 469.

965

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 28) citing the fundamental decision, ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 74)—AKZO Chemie and Case C-202/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 (para 108)—France Télécom in relation to the examination of the business strategy.

966

Similarly, DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, December 2005, para 122 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf). However, a contrary view Wurmnest (2012), p. 458 et seq.

967

ECJ, Case C-333/94 P, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 (para 44)—Tetra Pak.

968

Accepted without further discussion of the issue, General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (para 100)—Hilti.

969

Contra, Wurmnest (2012), p. 458 et seq.

970

See, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 71) namely in the case of high opportunities for market access.

971

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 71 in conjunction with para 19).

972

973

Similarly the case in Irish Sugar, see General Court, Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 (para 188)—Irish Sugar, as well as Hilti, see Commission Decision 88/138/EEC, OJ 1988 L 65, p. 19 (paras 80 et seq.)—Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti.

974

From the perspective of access to power transmission lines, see Frenz (2012c), 193 et seq.

975

See ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (paras 37 et seq.)—Post Danmark.

976

ECJ, Case C-550/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:512—Akzo Nobel.

977

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 28)—Post Danmark citing ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 74)—AKZO Chemie and Case C-202/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 (para 108)—France Télécom.

978

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 30)—Post Danmark.

979

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 22)—Post Danmark.

980

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 21 end)—Post Danmark.

981

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 21)—Post Danmark; cf., e.g. Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 24)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

982

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 23)—Post Danmark; cf. Case C-202/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 (para 5)—France Télécom.

983

Cf. ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 69)—AKZO Chemie; Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (paras 174, 176 and 180)—Deutsche Telekom.

984

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 24)—Post Danmark.

985

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 74).

986

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 28); ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 41)—Post Danmark; Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 86)—British Airways; Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 76)—TeliaSonera Sverige.

987

See ECJ, Case C-202/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 (para 36, 111)—France Télécom; General Court, Case T-340/03, ECLI:EU:T:2007:22 (para 130)—France Télécom.

988

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 42)—Post Danmark.

989

See ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 137)—AKZO Chemie.

990

Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 246.

991

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 137)—AKZO Chemie.

992

General Court, Case T-65/89, ECLI:EU:T:1993:31 (para 118)—BPB Industries and British Gypsum.

993

ECJ, Case C-202/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:214 (para 56)—France Télécom.

994

Wurmnest (2012), p. 474 citing ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (para 115)—AKZO Chemie; General Court, Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 (para 184)—Irish Sugar; Case T-340/03, ECLI:EU:T:2007:22 (paras 182, 187)—France Télécom.

995

ECJ, Case C-62/86, ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 (paras 110 et seq.)—AKZO Chemie; General Court, Case T-340/03, ECLI:EU:T:2007:22 (para 197)—France Télécom; Wurmnest (2012), p. 456, 474.

996

Commission Decision 94/31.043, OJ 1992 L 72, p. 1 (para 148)—Tetra Pak II.

997

DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, December 2005, para 110 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/ discpaper2005.pdf): However, no predatory effect is permitted as a result.

998

Wurmnest (2012), p. 397, 475.

999

Eilmansberger, In: Bornkamm et al. (2015), Art. 82 EG paras 517 et seq.; Wurmnest (2012), p. 475.

1000

Frenz (2012c), 196.

1001

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 43)—Post Danmark.

1002

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (paras 42 et seq.)—Post Danmark.

1003

Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 74).

1004

See above paras 235 et seq.

1005

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 306.

1006

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 307.

1007

Cf. General Court ruling, Case T-191/98 inter alia, ECLI:EU:T:2003:245—Atlantic Container Line, which was reversed in Commission Decision 1999/243/EC, OJ 1999 L 95, p. 1 based on a lack of sufficient evidence.

1008

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 302, citing in particular Commission Decision 87/500/EEC, OJ 1987 L 286, p. 36 (para 9)—BBI/Boosey & Hawkes as well as General Court, Case T-111/96, ECLI:EU:T:1998:183 (paras 60 et seq.)—ITT Promedia; cf. also Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 225 et seq.

1009

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 25 et seq.)—Continental Can.

1010

Art. 102 TFEU does not apply in such cases, see below para 2314.

1011

ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (paras 32 et seq.)—Ahmed Saeed air travel for the aviation sector, see also General Court, Case T-51/89, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41 (paras 25 et seq.)—Tetra Pak I in relation to Block Exemption Regulations; from the literature, see e.g. Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 374; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 318.

1012

ECJ, Cases 142 and 156/84, ECLI:EU:C:1987:490 (para 65)—BAT and Reynolds.

1013

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 377 et seq.

1014

Same conclusion, Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 377.

1015

Commission Decision 93/252/EEC, OJ 1993 L 116, p. 21 (para 25)—Gillette.

1016

In this context, see ECJ, Case C-6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 26)—Continental Can.

1017

ECJ, Case C-6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 27)—Continental Can.

1018

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 322.

1019

However, see also below para 2324 end.

1020

General Court, Case T-175/99, ECLI:EU:T:2002:78 (para 61)—UPS Europe.

1021

See the alternative position from Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 200.

1022

See, e.g. Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 110; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 323; Wertheimer (1981), p. 198; contra Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 82 end.

1023

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 324. See below paras 2327 et seq.

1024

Accordingly making such a presumption, Fikentscher (1965), p. 275 et seq.

1025

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 324.

1026

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 26 end)—Continental Can.

1027

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 29)—Continental Can.

1028

See above paras 1958 et seq.

1029

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 321: no longer far off.

1030

See above paras 1834 et seq.

1031

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 197 end, also states that Art. 102 AEUV applies in the case of an “extremely high cumulation of market shares”.

1032

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 325; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 197 “in the case of an extremely high cumulation of market shares”.

1033

See General Court, Case T-175/99, ECLI:EU:T:2002:78 (para 61)—UPS Europe.

1034

See above paras 2312, 2319.

1035

Limiting application, see above paras 2318 et seq.

1036

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 79, from which the terms individual and collective market dominance also originate.

1037

See ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (paras 378 et seq.)—Suiker Unie.

1038

Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 122 end.

1039

See ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 21, 25)—Bodson; Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (paras 41 et seq.)—Almelo; Case C-323/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:368 (para 17)—La Crespelle; Cases C-395 and 396/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132 (para 35)—Compagnie maritime belge transports.

1040

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 83 contra ECJ, Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (para 20)—Alsatel.

1041

General Court, Case T-191/98 inter alia, ECLI:EU:T:2003:245 (paras 654 et seq.)—Atlantic Container Line.

1042

Prevailing opinion Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 63 et seq.; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 49; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 46; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV paras 120 et seq.; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 85; Goldman et al. (1994), para 536; contrary view Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 77 et seq., see also General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (paras 275 et seq.)—Gencor.

1043

Detailed discussion, Kantzenbach and Kruse (1987), p. 14 et seq.

1044

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 85, 87.

1045

See e.g. Commission Decision 88/138/EEC, OJ 1988 L 65, p. 19 (para 54)—Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti; 88/501/EEC, OJ 1988 L 272, p. 27 (para 43)—Tetra Pak I.

1046

See by contrast, still opposed, Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 9; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 82.

1047

See only ECJ, Case C-508/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:289 (paras 47 et seq.)—ENI; additional discussion above, paras 654 et seq., 671 et seq.

1048

See ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 21)—Höfner and Elser; Case C-244/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:392 (para 14)—Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance as well as Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 123 end with an economic/functional definition of an undertaking so that “the affiliated undertakings may no longer autonomously determine their behaviour in the market but rather are primarily subject to the control of a parent company”.

1049

See e.g. ECJ, Case C-96/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:308 (para 33)—Spediporto; Cases C-140–142/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:330 (para 26)—DIP/Bassano del Grappa.

1050

ECJ, Cases C-395 and 396/96 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132 (paras 35 et seq.)—Compagnie maritime belge transports. See also Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 124: Internal and external competition is lacking.

1051

General Court, Case T-68 inter alia/89, ECLI:EU:T:1992:38 (para 358)—SIV; also Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 275)—Gencor; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 49; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 120; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 86; Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 63 however refers to the circumstance that the affinity between the undertakings depends “in particular on an assessment of the structures of the market in question”; similarly Bergmann, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 125: Connections result from “factors such as market structure in the market in question in particular” citing Commission Decision 89/93/EEC OJ 1989 L 33, p. 44 (para 78)—Flat glass.

1052

Cf. in the context of merger control, ECJ, Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, ECLI:EU:C:1998:148 (para 221)—Kali and Salz; for Art. 82 EC, General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 276) Gencor; following these decisions in this context, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 86 end.

1053

See only, e.g. Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 78.

1054

See above paras 1896 et seq.

1055

Commission Decision, COMP/39388 and 39389, OJ C 36, p. 8—E.ON. Cases COMP/39.388—German Electricity Wholesale Market and COMP/39.389—German Electricity Balancing Market) (notified under document number C(2008) 7367 final).

1056

ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 104)—Michelin; Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 32)—Höfner and Elser.

1057

Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 102 AEUV para 2.

1058

ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (para 17)—Hugin; Case 247/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:469 (para 11)—Alsatel.

1059

See, in addition to the ruling in Hugin e.g. ECJ, Case 31/80, ECLI:EU:C:1980:289 (para 29)—LʼOréal; see accordingly the detailed discussion regarding the following topic on the parallel considerations in the prohibition of cartels, above paras 181, 1072 et seq.

1060

ECJ, Case C-250/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:413 (para 54)—DLG; General Court, Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (para 201)—Compagnie maritime belge transports, explicitly related to both an agreement between undertakings as well as the abuse of a dominant position.

1061

ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (para 17)—Hugin.

1062

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 381; see ECJ, Case 322/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 (para 104)—Michelin; Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 32)—Höfner and Elser; Case T-69/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:39 (para 76)—RTE; Case T-70/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:40 (para 64)—BBC; Commission Decision 71/224/EEC, OJ 1971 L 134, p. 15 (26)—GEMA.

1063

ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 24)—Bodson; Case 22/79, ECLI:EU:C:1979:245 (para 12)—Greenwich Film; Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52 (para 38)—GVL.

1064

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 198/202)—United Brands.

1065

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (paras 32 et seq.)—Commercial Solvents.

1066

See above paras 1827, 2318 et seq.

1067

Further ECJ, Case 22/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 (paras 17 et seq.)—Hugin.

1068

Also critical, Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 334.

1069

General Court, Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (para 203)—Compagnie maritime belge transports.

1070

More detailed discussion, see Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 331 et seq.

1071

General Court, Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (para 203)—Compagnie maritime belge transports.

1072

General Court, Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 (para 170)—Irish Sugar.

1073

General Court, Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (para 201)—Compagnie maritime belge transports subject to reference to earlier case law, see, e.g. ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 69)—Magill, where, in turn, reference is made to the earlier case law, starting with the ruling in Michelin; see above, paras 2339 et seq.

1074

See also, e.g. Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 2.

1075

Using this as a starting point, Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 366 et seq., in addition citing the merger with the impairment of the flow of trade.

1076

ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 37)—Expedia; additional discussion above paras 862 et seq.

1077

See e.g. ECJ, Cases C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (para 69)—Magill still further refining Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 32)—Höfner and Elser, where it is noted there even though appreciability is not mentioned there; without further reference Cases C-215 and 216/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:12 (para 60)—Bagnasco; General Court, Case T-69/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:39 (para 77)—RTE; Case T-70/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:40 (para 65)—BBC; Case T-24 inter alia/93, ECLI:EU:T:1996:139 (para 201)—Compagnie maritime belge transports; Case T-228/97, ECLI:EU:T:1999:246 (para 170)—Irish Sugar.

1078

General Court, Case T-69/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:39 (para 77)—RTE; Case T-70/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:40 (para 65)—BBC.

1079

Accordingly, asserting that this criterion is superfluous, Koch, In: Grabitz and Hilf (1986), Art. 86 para 85.

1080

Relying on this AG Reischel, ECJ, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:162 (591)—Hoffmann-La Roche.

1081

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 369.

1082

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 372 with a description of the issue, paras 370 et seq.; see also Commission Notice—Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 81 (para 50): not possible “to establish general quantitative rules....”

1083

See above para 1870.

1084

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 229.

1085

ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 37)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen.

1086

Not decided in General Court, Case T-191/98 inter alia, ECLI:EU:T:2003:245 (para 1380)—Atlantic Container Line; see Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 102 AEUV para 3 end.

1087

Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG para 228.

1088

See, most recently General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 119)—Microsoft II; further discussion above, paras 2085 et seq.

1089

See above, e.g. paras 2028 et seq., 2051 et seq., 2058 et seq., 2066, 2070 as well as a detailed discussion at 2291 et seq.

1090

See General Court Case T-336/07, ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 (paras 619 et seq.)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; Loewenthal (2005), 455; Albors-Llorens (2007), 1727; van der Vijver (2012), 55.

1091

Rose and Bailey (2013), para 10.061.

1092

De la Mano et al., in: Faull and Nikpay (2014), para 4.291.

1093

General Court, Case T-30/89, ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 (paras 118 et seq.)—Hilti.

1094

De la Mano et al., in: Faull and Nikpay (2014), para 4.296.

1095

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 42)—Post Danmark.

1096

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 42)—Post Danmark.

1097

Rose and Bailey (2013), para 10.62.

1098

See above para 1776.

1099

See above paras 1819 et seq.

1100

Accordingly, for additional discussion, see above paras 1779 et seq.

1101

Detailed discussion at paras 2367 et seq.

1102

AG Jacobs, Opinions in the Case C-53/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:33 (para 72)—Syfait et al.; Lübbig, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 82 EG paras 230 et seq.

1103

See above para 304.

1104

See below paras 2858 et seq.

1105

ECJ, Case 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25 (para 12/14)—BRT/SABAM; Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 45)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen.

1106

See above paras 1788 et seq. as well as ECJ, Case C-261/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:351 (para 31)—Palmisani; Case C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465 (paras 29 et seq.)—Courage and Crehan.

1107

ECJ, Case C-126/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269 (para 36)—Eco Swiss.

1108

For a more in-depth discussion, see Braakman (1997).

1109

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 57. See also ECJ, Case 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25 (para 12/14)—BRT/SABAM; Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 45)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen.

1110

For its exclusive application, von Gamm (1979), Appendix to § 22 GWB, Art. 86 para 19; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 134.

1111

Cf. in general on the abuse of a power or monopoly position, Ellenberger, In: Palandt (2015), § 138 para 92.

1112

See e.g. Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 102 AEUV para 40; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 416; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 56.

1113

Bulst, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 389. See immediately following paras 2364 et seq.

1114

Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV paras 389 et seq.; with limitations Weyer, In: Jaeger et al. (2013), Art. 102 AEUV—Civil law consequences para 48.

1115

Contrary opinion von Gamm (1979), Appendix to § 22 GWB, Art. 86 para 19; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 134.

1116

See above para 1775 regarding the prohibition of cartels.

1117

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 60.

1118

Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV paras 61 et seq. likewise with regard to the following topic; others based on grounds of public interest, Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 419, in order to avoid a reversal of mass transactions.

1119

See above paras 1779 et seq.

1120

Other view, however the prevailing opinion, see, e.g. Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 421; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), Art. 86 para 135; Mailänder, in: Müller-Henneberg et al. (1980), Art. 86 para 100. As here, Jung, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 102 AEUV para 393.

1121

See e.g. Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 102 AEUV para 10; Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 422.

1122

Regarding the prohibition of cartels, see above para 1788.

1123

Fuchs and Möschel, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Art. 102 AEUV para 422; Schröter and Bartl, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 102 AEUV para 63; partially otherwise Baur (1988), 263 et seq.

1124

Detailed discussion Braakman (1997).

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Title: Prohibition of Abusive Practices
Author: Walter Frenz
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book: Handbook of EU Competition Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48591-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-48593-4

Copyright Year: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48593-4_7

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