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01-04-2015

Public choice perspectives on intellectual property

Authors: Eli Dourado, Alex Tabarrok

Published in: Public Choice | Issue 1-2/2015

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Abstract

We mine two public choice traditions for insights into intellectual property rights: the Virginia school, centered on James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, and the Bloomington or Institutional Analysis and Development school, centered on Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom. We apply the perspectives of each school to issues of intellectual property and develop new insights, questions, and focuses of attention. We also explore tensions and synergies between the two schools on issues of intellectual property.

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Title: Public choice perspectives on intellectual property
Authors: Eli Dourado
Alex Tabarrok
Publication date: 01-04-2015
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: Public Choice / Issue 1-2/2015
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0195-x

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Buchanan’s anti-conservatism