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Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 4/2019

14-11-2018 | Original Paper

Ranking objects from a preference relation over their subsets

Authors: Giulia Bernardi, Roberto Lucchetti, Stefano Moretti

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 4/2019

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Abstract

In many everyday situations, we need to rank individuals or single items having the possibility to observe the behavior of groups. In this paper we propose a way to get this ranking over the elements of a set X, starting from an arbitrary preference relation over the subsets of X and taking into account the information provided by this ranking over the subsets. To this purpose, we use a very common approach in the social choice framework: we single out some properties that a general solution should satisfy, and we prove that these properties characterize a unique solution. Given the generality of the approach, we believe that this paper is only a starting point for a more extended analysis. In particular, it is clear that different contexts can suggest other properties, thus identifying alternative ranking methods.

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Metadata
Title
Ranking objects from a preference relation over their subsets
Authors
Giulia Bernardi
Roberto Lucchetti
Stefano Moretti
Publication date
14-11-2018
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 4/2019
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1161-1

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