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2006 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

18. Reincorporation

Authors : Randall A. Heron, Wilbur G. Lewellen

Published in: Encyclopedia of Finance

Publisher: Springer US

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Abstract

Under the state corporate chartering system in the U.S., managers may seek shareholder approval to reincorporate the firm in a new state, regardless of the firm’s physical location, whenever they perceive that the corporate legal environment in the new state is better for the firm. Legal scholars continue to debate the merits of this system, with some arguing that it promotes contractual efficiency and others arguing that it often results in managerial entrenchment. We discuss the contrasting viewpoints on reincorporations and then summarize extant empirical evidence on why firms reincorporate, when they reincorporate, and where they reincorporate to. We conclude by discussing how the motives managers offer for reincorporations, and the actions they take upon reincorporating, influence how stock prices react to reincorporation decisions.

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Metadata
Title
Reincorporation
Authors
Randall A. Heron
Wilbur G. Lewellen
Copyright Year
2006
Publisher
Springer US
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-26336-6_44