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On Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions Read chapter Read first chapter

2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Removal and Threshold Pricing: Truthful Two-Sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants

Authors : Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We consider mechanisms for markets that are two-sided and have agents with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The agents of the market are strategic and act to optimize their own utilities, while the mechanism designer aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade. We focus on one example of this setting motivated by a foreseeable privacy-aware future form of online advertising.
Recently, it has been suggested that markets of user information built around information brokers could be introduced to the online advertising ecosystem to overcome online privacy concerns. Such markets give users control over which data gets shared in online advertising exchanges. We describe a model for the above form of online advertising and design two mechanisms for this model. The first is a deterministic mechanism which is related to the vast literature on mechanism design through trade reduction and allows agents with a multi-dimensional strategic space. The second is a randomized mechanism that can handle a more general version of the model. We provide theoretical analyses of our mechanisms and study their performance using simulations based on real-world data.

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previous chapter Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees
next chapter A Two-Stage Mechanism for Ordinal Peer Assessment
Footnotes
1
We often refer to agents with a multi-dimensional strategic space as multi-dimensional agents.
 
2
The sole exception for this is the work of Segal-Halevi et al. [21], which was done independently in parallel to our work. However, [21] does not offer a solution for the deterministic multi-dimensional strategic spaces case.
 
3
Here and throughout the paper, a reference to domination of strategies should be understood as a reference to weak domination. We never refer to strong domination.
 
4
The parameters \(\gamma \) and \(\alpha \) both bound the maximum capacity of the agents, and they are related by \(\alpha = \gamma /\tau \). We chose to formulate Theorems 1 and 2 in terms of the parameter that the mechanism corresponding to each theorem assumes access to.
 
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Metadata
Title
Removal and Threshold Pricing: Truthful Two-Sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants
Authors
Moran Feldman
Rica Gonen
Copyright Year
2018
Book
Algorithmic Game Theory

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-99659-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-99660-8

Copyright Year: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15

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