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2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. Renegotiation Analysis

Authors : Carlos Oliveira Cruz, Joaquim Miranda Sarmento

Published in: The Renegotiations of Public Private Partnerships in Transportation

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

While the previous chapter provided a theory-based perspective over renegotiations, this chapter focusses on a set of research questions with the aim to provide a comprehensive and systematic overview of the empirical research on PPP renegotiations. The objective is to provide evidence from real world examples and research, on how renegotiations occurred. Based on the existing literature, our key research questions can be posed as follows:
  • How frequent are renegotiations in PPPs?
  • Who initiates the renegotiation process?
  • When do renegotiations happen?
  • What are the main motives for the occurrence of renegotiations?
  • What are the main results of renegotiations?
  • What are the main determinants of renegotiation processes?

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Metadata
Title
Renegotiation Analysis
Authors
Carlos Oliveira Cruz
Joaquim Miranda Sarmento
Copyright Year
2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61258-0_4