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Published in:
2015 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Replicator Dynamics of Axelrod’s Norms Games
Authors : Michael Andrews, Edward Thommes, Monica G. Cojocaru
Published in: Interdisciplinary Topics in Applied Mathematics, Modeling and Computational Science
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
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Abstract
We create pure strategy versions of Robert Axelrod’s well-known norms and metanorms games. Our findings show that the only evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the norms game is one in which a player defects and is lenient. This result is derived using classic game theoretical tools, and we conclude that Axelrod’s original statement that the norms game always collapses holds. The metanorms game, however, has two evolutionarily stable strategies. The first is a repeat from the norms game, while the other is one in which a player follows the norm and punishes those who are lenient and those who defect.