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2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Researching the Political Economy of Regulation at the Local Level: Theoretical and Methodological Issues

Author : Alberto Asquer

Published in: The Political Economy of Local Regulation

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK

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Abstract

This chapter aims to outline some theoretical and methodological issues that originate when researching the political economy of regulation at the local level. First, the chapter discusses the rationales and motivations for undertaking research on the political economy of local regulation. We will discuss, then, more specific research issues that relate to the definition of regulatory performance, to the explanation for the performance of regulatory systems, and to the design of regulatory systems. After indicating the kind of methodological approaches that researchers can follow, we will conclude by reviewing the results that are expected from research in this area of inquiry.

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Metadata
Title
Researching the Political Economy of Regulation at the Local Level: Theoretical and Methodological Issues
Author
Alberto Asquer
Copyright Year
2017
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58828-9_3

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