Skip to main content
Top

2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

3. Results of a Survey in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland on How to Prevent Violations of Competition Laws

Authors : Georg Götz, Daniel Herold, Johannes Paha

Published in: Competition Law Compliance Programmes

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This report presents the results of a survey on competition law compliance in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland in which 86 large companies participated. The study shows that 80 % of the firms have implemented measures to identify and mitigate the risks of violating competition laws. The majority of firms and measures concentrate on legal risks (e.g. insufficient awareness of the content and scope of competition laws), whereas risks related to changes in the economic environment (e.g. entry into the market, competition by imports, and more intense competition) are rarely addressed. Risk mitigation heavily relies on competition law training, even though these measures hardly seem sufficient. This is obvious from the fact that 71 % of the firms whose employees had violated competition laws in the past had already trained these employees before the misconduct occurred. We conclude from our study that those measures should be improved that help to detect cartelisation risks at an early stage. Furthermore, sanctions imposed by the firms on the offenders of competition laws require a clearer design and more systematic communication.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Footnotes
1
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB, Act Against Restraints on Competition), Kartellgesetz (KartG in Austria or KG in Switzerland, Anti-Trust Law).
 
2
Note that five of them had quit the survey before answering the detailed questions on risk identification. Another 12 firms quit during the process of answering these questions.
 
3
As before, we calculate the percentage shares of the answers yes and no while excluding ns and qs. This ensures the comparability of percentages even when the firms quit the survey. To provide an example, consider two situations A and B:
         A:  yes = 40  no = 40  qs = 6
         B:  yes = 30  no = 30  qs = 26
Our calculation ensures that yes and no are assigned a percentage share of 50 % in both cases.
 
4
Paha (2014) provides a theoretical foundation of the decision behaviour in situations where agents possess imperfect information about competition law enforcement.
 
5
Similar developments can be seen among others in the following law proceedings: Zinc phosphate (COMP/E-1/37.027), monochloroacetic acid (COMP/E-1/C.37.773), fittings (COMP/F-1/38.121) organic peroxide (COMP/E-2/37.857).
 
Literature
go back to reference Ashton, J. K., & Pressey, A. D. (2012). Who manages cartels? The role of sales and marketing managers within international cartels: Evidence from the European Union 1990–2009. CCP Working Paper No. 12-11. Ashton, J. K., & Pressey, A. D. (2012). Who manages cartels? The role of sales and marketing managers within international cartels: Evidence from the European Union 1990–2009. CCP Working Paper No. 12-11.
go back to reference Aubert, C., Rey, P., & Kovacic, W. E. (2006). The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(6), 1241–1266.CrossRef Aubert, C., Rey, P., & Kovacic, W. E. (2006). The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(6), 1241–1266.CrossRef
go back to reference Beckenstein, A. R., & Gabel, H. L. (1982). Antitrust compliance: Results of a survey of legal opinion. Antitrust Law Journal, 51(3), 459–516. Beckenstein, A. R., & Gabel, H. L. (1982). Antitrust compliance: Results of a survey of legal opinion. Antitrust Law Journal, 51(3), 459–516.
go back to reference Beckenstein, A. R., & Gabel, H. L. (1986). The economics of antitrust compliance. Southern Economic Journal, 52(3), 673–692.CrossRef Beckenstein, A. R., & Gabel, H. L. (1986). The economics of antitrust compliance. Southern Economic Journal, 52(3), 673–692.CrossRef
go back to reference Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. The Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217. Cited after: Becker, G. S., & Landes, W. M. (Eds.). (1974). Essays in the economics of crime and punishment. New York: Columbia University Press. Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. The Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217. Cited after: Becker, G. S., & Landes, W. M. (Eds.). (1974). Essays in the economics of crime and punishment. New York: Columbia University Press.
go back to reference Buccirossi, P., & Spagnola, G. (2008). Corporate governance and collusive behavior. In W. D. Collins (Ed.), Issues in competition law and policy (Vol. 2, chapter 51, pp. 1219–1240). Chicago: ABA Book Publishing. Buccirossi, P., & Spagnola, G. (2008). Corporate governance and collusive behavior. In W. D. Collins (Ed.), Issues in competition law and policy (Vol. 2, chapter 51, pp. 1219–1240). Chicago: ABA Book Publishing.
go back to reference Bussmann, K. D., Nestler, C., & Salvenmoser, S. (2013). Wirtschaftskriminalität und Unternehmenskultur 2013. PricewaterhouseCoopers AG and Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle-Wittenberg. Available from: http://goo.gl/Mjnl3S. Accessed 1 September 2014. Bussmann, K. D., Nestler, C., & Salvenmoser, S. (2013). Wirtschaftskriminalität und Unternehmenskultur 2013. PricewaterhouseCoopers AG and Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle-Wittenberg. Available from: http://​goo.​gl/​Mjnl3S. Accessed 1 September 2014.
go back to reference Conelly, B. L., Trevis Certo, S., Duane Ireland, R., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 39–67.CrossRef Conelly, B. L., Trevis Certo, S., Duane Ireland, R., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 39–67.CrossRef
go back to reference Grueninger, S., Schoettl, L., & Quintus, S. (2014). Compliance im Mittelstand. Studie des Center for Business Compliance & Integrity. Hochschule Konstanz Technik, Wirtschaft und Gestaltung. Available from: http://goo.gl/5gNsv8. Accessed 1 September 2014. Grueninger, S., Schoettl, L., & Quintus, S. (2014). Compliance im Mittelstand. Studie des Center for Business Compliance & Integrity. Hochschule Konstanz Technik, Wirtschaft und Gestaltung. Available from: http://​goo.​gl/​5gNsv8. Accessed 1 September 2014.
go back to reference Harrington, J. E. (2006). How do cartels operate? In Foundations and trends in microeconomics. Hannover: Now Publishers. Harrington, J. E. (2006). How do cartels operate? In Foundations and trends in microeconomics. Hannover: Now Publishers.
go back to reference Herold, D. (2015). Competition law compliance programs as internal signaling devices. Unpublished Working Paper. Herold, D. (2015). Competition law compliance programs as internal signaling devices. Unpublished Working Paper.
go back to reference Herold, D., & Paha, J. (2016). Predicting cartel formation. Unpublished Working Paper. Herold, D., & Paha, J. (2016). Predicting cartel formation. Unpublished Working Paper.
go back to reference Kaplow, L. (1995). A model of optimal complexity of legal rules. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 11(1), 150–163. Kaplow, L. (1995). A model of optimal complexity of legal rules. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 11(1), 150–163.
go back to reference Marcel, J. J., & Cowen, A. P. (2014). Cleaning house or jumping ship? Understanding board upheaval following financial fraud. Strategic Management Journal, 35(6), 926–937.CrossRef Marcel, J. J., & Cowen, A. P. (2014). Cleaning house or jumping ship? Understanding board upheaval following financial fraud. Strategic Management Journal, 35(6), 926–937.CrossRef
go back to reference Miller, N. H. (2009). Strategic leniency and cartel enforcement. The American Economic Review, 99(3), 750–768.CrossRef Miller, N. H. (2009). Strategic leniency and cartel enforcement. The American Economic Review, 99(3), 750–768.CrossRef
go back to reference Murphy, J., & Kolasky, W. (2012). The role of anti-cartel compliance programs in preventing cartel behavior. Antitrust, 26(2), 61–64. Murphy, J., & Kolasky, W. (2012). The role of anti-cartel compliance programs in preventing cartel behavior. Antitrust, 26(2), 61–64.
go back to reference Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics (Vol. 3 (B), pp. 2485–2563). North-Holland, Amsterdam, chapter 38. Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics (Vol. 3 (B), pp. 2485–2563). North-Holland, Amsterdam, chapter 38.
go back to reference Murphy, K. J. (2001). Performance standards in incentive contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3), 245–278.CrossRef Murphy, K. J. (2001). Performance standards in incentive contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3), 245–278.CrossRef
go back to reference Office of Fair Trading. (2010). Drivers of compliance and non-compliance with competition law. OFT report 1227. Available from: http://goo.gl/rbfoqr. Accessed 1 September 2014. Office of Fair Trading. (2010). Drivers of compliance and non-compliance with competition law. OFT report 1227. Available from: http://​goo.​gl/​rbfoqr. Accessed 1 September 2014.
go back to reference Paha, J. (2014). Cooperation and compliance with risk and uncertainty about law enforcement. Unpublished Working Paper. Paha, J. (2014). Cooperation and compliance with risk and uncertainty about law enforcement. Unpublished Working Paper.
go back to reference Paha, J., & Götz, G. (2015). Screening und das Compliance-Risikomodell: Konzepte zur unternehmensinternen Aufdeckung von Verstößen gegen das Kartellverbot. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 12, 1198–1210. Paha, J., & Götz, G. (2015). Screening und das Compliance-Risikomodell: Konzepte zur unternehmensinternen Aufdeckung von Verstößen gegen das Kartellverbot. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 12, 1198–1210.
go back to reference Rotemberg, J. J., & Saloner, G. (1986). A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms. American Economic Review, 76(3), 390–407. Rotemberg, J. J., & Saloner, G. (1986). A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms. American Economic Review, 76(3), 390–407.
go back to reference Sokol, D. D. (2012). Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement. Antitrust Law Journal, 78(1), 201–240. Sokol, D. D. (2012). Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement. Antitrust Law Journal, 78(1), 201–240.
go back to reference Van Heerden, A., Weller, F., & Weidinger, G. (2013). Wirtschaftskriminalität. Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz im Vergleich. Wirtschaftskriminalität in Grossunternehmen und dem Mittelstand. KPMG AG. Available from http://goo.gl/MQhPEB. Accessed 1 September 2014. Van Heerden, A., Weller, F., & Weidinger, G. (2013). Wirtschaftskriminalität. Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz im Vergleich. Wirtschaftskriminalität in Grossunternehmen und dem Mittelstand. KPMG AG. Available from http://​goo.​gl/​MQhPEB. Accessed 1 September 2014.
go back to reference European Commission (22.11.2001), Case COMP/E-1/37.027 European Commission (22.11.2001), Case COMP/E-1/37.027
go back to reference Decision of 11.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 4237 Decision of 11.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 4237
go back to reference European Commission (30.10.2002), Case COMP/E-2/37.784 European Commission (30.10.2002), Case COMP/E-2/37.784
go back to reference Decision of 30.10.2002, Reference number COM(2002) 4283 Decision of 30.10.2002, Reference number COM(2002) 4283
go back to reference European Commission (27.11.2002), Case COMP/E-1/37.152 European Commission (27.11.2002), Case COMP/E-1/37.152
go back to reference European Commission (17.12.2002), Case COMP/E-2/37.667 European Commission (17.12.2002), Case COMP/E-2/37.667
go back to reference Decision of 5.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 3923 Decision of 5.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 3923
go back to reference European Commission (10.1.2003), Case COMP/E-1/37.512 European Commission (10.1.2003), Case COMP/E-1/37.512
go back to reference Decision of 22.11.2001, Reference number K(2001) 3695 Decision of 22.11.2001, Reference number K(2001) 3695
go back to reference European Commission (19.8.2003), Case COMP/C.38.279/F3 European Commission (19.8.2003), Case COMP/C.38.279/F3
go back to reference Decision of 2.4.2003, Reference number K(2003) 1065 Decision of 2.4.2003, Reference number K(2003) 1065
go back to reference European Commission (2.4.2003), Case COMP/E-2/37.857 European Commission (2.4.2003), Case COMP/E-2/37.857
go back to reference Decision of 10.12.2003, Reference number K(2003) 4570 Decision of 10.12.2003, Reference number K(2003) 4570
go back to reference European Commission (21.4.2004), Case COMP/E-1/36.212 European Commission (21.4.2004), Case COMP/E-1/36.212
go back to reference Decision of 20.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 4573 Decision of 20.12.2001, Reference number K(2001) 4573
go back to reference European Commission (3.9.2004), Case COMP/E-1/38.069 European Commission (3.9.2004), Case COMP/E-1/38.069
go back to reference Decision of 3.9.2004, Reference number K(2004) 2826 Decision of 3.9.2004, Reference number K(2004) 2826
go back to reference European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/C.37750/B2 European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/C.37750/B2
go back to reference European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/C.37750/B23l European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/C.37750/B23l
go back to reference Decision of 29.9.2004, Reference number K(2004) 3598 Decision of 29.9.2004, Reference number K(2004) 3598
go back to reference European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/E-1/C.37.773 European Commission (29.9.2004), Case COMP/E-1/C.37.773
go back to reference Decision of 19.1.2005, Reference number C(2004) 4876 Decision of 19.1.2005, Reference number C(2004) 4876
go back to reference European Commission (19.9.2005), Case COMP 38.337 PO European Commission (19.9.2005), Case COMP 38.337 PO
go back to reference Decision of 19.1.2005, Reference numbers C(2005) 3452, C(2005) 3765 Decision of 19.1.2005, Reference numbers C(2005) 3452, C(2005) 3765
go back to reference European Commission (21.12.2005), Case COMP/F/C.38.443 European Commission (21.12.2005), Case COMP/F/C.38.443
go back to reference Decision of 21.12.2005, Reference number (2005) 5592 Decision of 21.12.2005, Reference number (2005) 5592
go back to reference European Commission (20.9.2006), Case COMP/F-1/38.121 European Commission (20.9.2006), Case COMP/F-1/38.121
go back to reference Decision of 20.9.2006, Reference number C(2006) 4180 Decision of 20.9.2006, Reference number C(2006) 4180
go back to reference European Commission (20.11.2007), Case COMP/38.432 European Commission (20.11.2007), Case COMP/38.432
go back to reference Decision of 20.11.2007, Reference number K(2007) 5469 Decision of 20.11.2007, Reference number K(2007) 5469
go back to reference European Commission (28.11.2007), Case COMP/39.165 European Commission (28.11.2007), Case COMP/39.165
go back to reference Decision of 28.11.2007, Reference number C(2007) 5791 Decision of 28.11.2007, Reference number C(2007) 5791
go back to reference European Commission (5.12.2007), Case COMP/38.629 European Commission (5.12.2007), Case COMP/38.629
go back to reference Decision of 5.12.2007, Reference number K(2007) 5910 Decision of 5.12.2007, Reference number K(2007) 5910
go back to reference European Commission (19.10.2013), Case COMP/39.437 European Commission (19.10.2013), Case COMP/39.437
go back to reference Decision of 5.12.2012, Reference number C(2012) 8839 Decision of 5.12.2012, Reference number C(2012) 8839
Metadata
Title
Results of a Survey in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland on How to Prevent Violations of Competition Laws
Authors
Georg Götz
Daniel Herold
Johannes Paha
Copyright Year
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44633-2_3