Skip to main content
Top

2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

12. Shariah Compliance and Risk-Incentive Trade-Offs

Authors : Suren Basov, Ishaq Bhatti

Published in: Islamic Finance in the Light of Modern Economic Theory

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

In this chapter we are going to consider the principal–agent relationship. We will start by reminding the reader of the results of the conventional principal–agent problem, then consider it under a mudārabah contract, before finally discussing how social norms can be used to mitigate the risk-incentive trade-offs.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Footnotes
1
These results require some simple calculations that are standard and so are omitted.
 
Literature
go back to reference Arbi, L., S. Basov, and M.I. Bhatti. 2014. On Sharia’a-compliance and return to investment. Journal of Stock and Forex Trading 3: 116. Arbi, L., S. Basov, and M.I. Bhatti. 2014. On Sharia’a-compliance and return to investment. Journal of Stock and Forex Trading 3: 116.
go back to reference Basov, S., and M.I. Bhatti. 2013. Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs. The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics (Contributions) 13: 1–14.CrossRef Basov, S., and M.I. Bhatti. 2013. Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs. The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics (Contributions) 13: 1–14.CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Shariah Compliance and Risk-Incentive Trade-Offs
Authors
Suren Basov
Ishaq Bhatti
Copyright Year
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-28662-8_12