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Published in:
2012 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Signature Schemes Secure against Hard-to-Invert Leakage
Authors : Sebastian Faust, Carmit Hazay, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Peter Sebastian Nordholt, Angela Zottarel
Published in: Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In the auxiliary input model an adversary is allowed to see a
computationally hard-to-invert function
of the secret key. The auxiliary input model weakens the bounded leakage assumption commonly made in leakage resilient cryptography as the hard-to-invert function may information-theoretically reveal the entire secret key. In this work, we propose the
first
constructions of digital signature schemes that are secure in the auxiliary input model. Our main contribution is a digital signature scheme that is secure against
chosen message attacks
when given an
exponentially hard-to-invert function
of the secret key. As a second contribution, we construct a signature scheme that achieves security for
random messages
assuming that the adversary is given a
polynomial-time
hard to invert function. Here, polynomial-hardness is required even when given the entire public-key – so called
weak
auxiliary input security. We show that such signature schemes readily give us auxiliary input secure identification schemes.