2011 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Smaller Decoding Exponents: Ball-Collision Decoding
Authors : Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, Christiane Peters
Published in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2011
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Very few public-key cryptosystems are known that can encrypt and decrypt in time
b
2 +
o
(1)
with conjectured security level 2
b
against conventional computers and quantum computers. The oldest of these systems is the classic McEliece code-based cryptosystem.
The best attacks known against this system are generic decoding attacks that treat McEliece’s hidden binary Goppa codes as random linear codes. A standard conjecture is that the best possible
w
-error-decoding attacks against random linear codes of dimension
k
and length
n
take time 2
(
α
(
R
,
W
) +
o
(1))
n
if
k
/
n
→
R
and
w
/
n
→
W
as
n
→ ∞.
Before this paper, the best upper bound known on the exponent
α
(
R
,
W
) was the exponent of an attack introduced by Stern in 1989. This paper introduces “ball-collision decoding” and shows that it has a smaller exponent for each (
R
,
W
): the speedup from Stern’s algorithm to ball-collision decoding is exponential in
n
.